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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This study analyses the role of security in the European integration process. The 
focus of the study is the geographical widening of the integration process, i.e. the 
enlargements of the European Union (and its predecessor the European Community). 
The study looks at how the role of security has changed during the integration 
process by analysing the role that security issues have played in the context of the 
enlargements. It seeks to examine how arguments related to security politics have 
been used in promoting (or opposing) the geographical expansion of the European 
integration process and the accession of new member states. Additionally, the fifth 
round of enlargement in 2004 and 20071 is put under closer scrutiny in order to 
analyse the compatibility of the new member states’ views on security with those of 
the European Union (EU).  
 
Before going into the analysis of security’s role in the integration process there is a 
need to ponder what security actually is, i.e. what is meant by “security” and how it is 
to be conceptualised. In the study of International Relations (IR) the general 
development has been towards a wider security concept, extending the scope of 
security studies from military security to other forms of security as well. In this study 
the selected way of conceptualising “security” is such that it leads to an analysis of 
security argumentation – therefore turning attention on how different security 
arguments have played a central role in the European integration process. In doing 
this it highlights the linkages between security and integration. The enlargements of 
                                               
1 In 2004 ten new countries joined the EU: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania’s accesion took place in 
2007. In the course of the history of European integration it was the fifth geographical enlargement. 
The previous enlargements were: United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark (1973); Greece (1981); 
Spain and Portugal (1986); Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995). 
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the European Union/European Community as special forms of integration have an 
aspect of territoriality that unavoidably connects it to traditional security 
considerations. Furthermore, as will be explained in this study, the whole European 
integration process started with clearly security-oriented aims - the Schuman 
Declaration of 1950 presented European integration as the answer to questions of war 
and peace. During the Cold War period the focus of integration moved on to issues 
other than traditional security (key words of integration were the single market 
program, market liberalisation, efficiency cohesion, environment, technological 
research and development, social policies relating to employment, and the like) 
(Ojanen et al. 2000, 38; Dinan 1994, 130: Pinder 2001, 25). But since the late 1990s 
the traditional military-oriented conception of security has clearly been (re)gaining its 
significance in the integration process2. Additionally, the stabilisation of Eastern 
Europe and the reducing of the potential for conflict in the East served as proclaimed 
motivations for the EU to enlarge in 2004.  
 
The  basic  arguments  upon  which  the  support  for  the  accession  of  the  Central  and  
Eastern European countries largely rested included the notion that the enlargement 
would create stability, prosperity and security “to all of Europe’s peoples”3. The 
quality of these values, however, remains a complicated question: what kind of 
stability, and what type of security the enlargement will or is expected to bring? Is it 
question of  same type of  security as in the 1950s when the first  significant  political  
                                               
2 For indicators of this see e.g. Joint Declaration for European Defence 1998 (so called St.Malo 
Declaration), Helsinki Headline Goals, Petersberg tasks (Article 17 of the EU Treaty), European 
Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence 
(Cologne European Council Declarations 1999, Annex III), and the Security Strategy of the 
European Union (Solana 2003). These documents, together with other related documents, will be 
discussed in chapter 3 of this study. 
3 “The extension of the zone of peace, stability and prosperity in Europe will enhance the security of 
all its peoples.” (European Commission 2004a). 
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initiatives towards European integration, such as the Schuman Declaration were 
given? How much does the perception of security threats that inspired the Schuman 
Declaration and signing of the Paris Treaty (establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community in 1951) have in common with the EU’s current security concept 
manifested in the EU’s Security Strategy (Solana 2003)? Are the new member states’ 
security concepts similar to the EU’s security concept? Questions like these form the 
backbone of this study.  
 
The Schuman Declaration, Solana’s security strategy and the EU enlargement of 
2004 also give the time-frame of the analysis. The purpose is to explain the 
development of EU’s security conceptions and politics from Schuman to Solana. The 
five enlargements of the European Community / European Union (EC/EU) give the 
structure for this analysis. It is argued in this study that while in each enlargement 
round security has played a central role, the type of “security” in question has been 
different in each enlargement. The dominant security concept of the EC/EU has 
changed during the years of the integration process. Furthermore, and on more 
scholarly  level,  this  study  argues  that  analysis  of  the  enlargements  is  a  particularly  
fruitful way to show how security arguments have always been present in the 
European integration process, and that they have only varied in form.  
 
In  order  to  be  able  to  grasp  these  issues  this  study  builds  on  a  constructivist 
understanding  of  security  and  integration.  It  looks  at  the  transformation  process  of  
security concept and security politics in the context of European integration from a 
constructivist perspective. To put it simply, the constructivist security approach 
argues that for different actors “security” might refer to different issues, hence 
leading to differences in the ways the various aspects of security policy are 
emphasised. In a sense, security is what the actors make of it. Furthermore, security 
has different meanings in different times. Hence, security is to a large extent a social 
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construction. This notion and its logical consequences are central points of departure 
for this study: it leans on the diverse perceptions and conceptualisations of security. 
 
From scholarly and theoretical perspective this study can thus be seen as an attempt 
to counter the (alleged) lack of proper constructivist approaches in integration 
studies. This is done by incorporating certain aspects, ideas and tools of constructivist 
security studies into the study of integration. These tools include the securitisation 
theory and the sectors of security and as presented by the so-called Copenhagen 
School of security studies. Unlike in various other sub-disciplines of IR, in 
integration studies a proper constructivist turn has not taken place (see Christiansen et 
al. 2001, Checkel 2006).4 In  security  studies,  for  instance,  the  widening  of  security  
conception and the introduction of soft security has led to the adoption and 
development of constructivist research approaches and methods (see Krause & 
Williams 1997). 
 
Structure of the study 
 
In the following I present the structure of the study and explain how the more 
elaborated research questions and frameworks for analysis are built. 
 
The first empirical part of the study (i.e. Chapter 3) looks at the evolution of the EU’s 
concepts  of  security.  At  the  same  time  it  presents  the  development  of  the  EU’s  
security policy from 1950s to the beginning of the 21st century. The role of security is 
analysed in the early stages of the integration process and in each of the four 
enlargement rounds that preceded the fifth enlargement in 2004. Under scrutiny is 
                                               
4 According to Checkel constructivist approaches to European Union have problems in “meta-
theory (an unclear epistemology), methods (taking the linguistic turn seriously), concepts (power’s 
underspecified role) and theory (domestic politics)” (Checkel 2006, 2). 
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also the evolution of the membership criteria and the security concepts reflected 
therein. Various treaties, declarations, summits, and political initiatives that relate to 
the development of EC and EU’s common foreign, security and defence policy serve 
as other milestones in the historical perspective on security in the context of 
European integration. These elements give the ground for constructing the current 
EU’s security concept.  
 
The second empirical part (i.e. Chapter 4) deals with the EU enlargement of 2004 and 
concentrates on the security conceptions of the new member states. The focus is on 
the variety of ways in which the main actors of the enlargement process perceived 
security. This is approached by studying the national security strategies of the new 
member states, the accession process (e.g. the chapters of the accession negotiations) 
and the enlargement dialogue more generally. (Issues related to material and research 
methods are handled in detail in Chapter 2, as will be explained below.) 
 
On the basis of these two parts the study goes on to ask to which extent the security 
views of the new member states are compatible with the EU’s security conception. 
How have the differences and similarities appeared in the accession process? Were 
they presented in the form of security questions? The concluding chapter (i.e. chapter 
5) collects together the main findings, and draws some policy level conclusions. 
Additionally, the conclusions that concern the applicability and success of the chosen 
theoretical tools and research approach are presented in Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 2 forms the theoretical part of the study and precedes the empirical parts. In 
order to form and fine-tune the research questions – and eventually to find answers to 
them – there is a need to establish two frameworks for the study. Both frameworks 
are instrumental also in delineating and limiting the research object and research 
material.  
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Firstly, there is a need for a framework that analyzes how the role of security in the 
European integration process has evolved over time. The main building blocks of the 
first framework are introduced in the first sub-chapters of Chapter 2. The first of them 
deals with the relationship between security and integration on general level. The 
third part presents an overview of the development of constructivist security studies 
followed by a conceptual analysis of “security” and the operational definition of the 
concept as a research tool in this study. It also explains how the selected features of 
constructivist security approaches can be used in countering the deficiencies of 
integration studies. Thus it is explained in this part how to advance integration studies 
with the help of constructivist security studies. 
 
The second framework that is utilized relates more to the analysis undertaken in the 
second empirical part of the study (i.e. Chapter 4). The tools required for the analysis 
of the new member states’ security conceptions include the sectors of security, which 
also helps to organize and classify the research material and the interpretation of it. 
Furthermore, the tools used in the analysis of the compatibility of the new member 
states’ security views with those of the EU also stem from the constructivist 
approach. Thus this study looks at the enlargement dialogue between the applicants 
and the EU, paying particular attention to the analysis of issues that the actors give 
absolute priority and breaking free of otherwise binding procedures and rules.5 These 
issues designated as security issues are the key when trying to make out the way the 
main actors of the enlargement process perceive security.  
 
The second framework also explains the logic that connects the findings of the study 
with the conclusions regarding the policy level and the future of European security 
politics. The question concerning the security policy implications of the EU 
enlargement is approached by focusing attention on the way the applicant countries 
                                               
5 According to Buzan et al. (1998, 24-25) these are cases of securitisation (see chapter 2). 
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on the one hand and the current EU members on the other interpret security. The 
hypothetical assumption is that there is a significant difference in their interpretations 
and that this difference will be crucial and highly useful when drawing conclusions 
on the security policy implications of the enlargement. 
 
As well as building the frameworks for analysis Chapter 2 also addresses issues 
concerning methodology and research material. In this chapter the selection and 
delimiting of research material are explained. This theoretical chapter also discusses 
the ontological and epistemological solutions in the background of the theoretical 
approach and frameworks of the study. Furthermore, the significance of the effect of 
these solutions on the quality of the results of the study is tentatively assessed. (After 
the empirical analysis is done, the concluding chapter returns to these issues).  
  
 
15 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: SECURITY – BEYOND POLITICS? 
 
For the purposes of this study two frameworks are created. The first is the framework 
for analysing how the role of security in the European integration process has evolved 
in time. This framework provides the means for conceptualising and grasping the 
transformation of security. It also acts as  a guide for selecting, reading and analysing 
the research material. Additionally, the first framework is instrumental when defining 
the background and conditions on which the current EU’s collective security 
conception and common security policy (i.e. as opposed to national conceptions and 
policies) are based. The second framework is needed in order to examine the fifth 
enlargement round in greater detail, since it will help in analyzing the new member 
states’ security conceptions and their compatibility with the EU’s concept of security. 
The second framework also explains the logic from which the more practical policy-
level conclusions of the study are to be drawn. These conclusions will be concerned 
with the future of  the EU’s common security and defence policies,  and base on the 
match/mismatch of security conceptions. 
 
2.1 Framework for analysing the role of security in the course of integration 
 
Chapter 2.1 works on the building blocks of the first framework. Its first part 
discusses the relation of security and integration on a general level and explains why 
it is worthwhile to approach questions related to integration from a security 
perspective. In doing so it highlights the various connections between the European 
integration process and different security questions. Furthermore, it also explains why 
the enlargement rounds of the EC/EU are particularly useful in studying the 
relationship between security and integration. This means that this chapter scrutinizes 
the value of the enlargement rounds in analysing the role of security in the integration 
process. The second part of this chapter takes a closer look at the development of 
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constructivist security approaches, as well as their philosophical background 
(ontology and epistemology). This is followed by a conceptual analysis that provides 
the definition of “security” that will be used in the empirical parts of the study. It also 
explains how certain features of constructivist security studies can be used in 
developing and introducing a novel constructivist approach to studying integration.  
 
Integration studies as a discipline has been steadily gaining ground in IR. This study 
approaches the integration process equipped with research tools borrowed from 
security studies, rather than with the conventional methods of other integration 
studies. Therefore instead of going through the scholarly history and the variety of 
traditions and “isms” within integration studies, this theoretical chapter concentrates 
on the development of new security studies (Concerning different traditions of 
integration studies see e.g. Ojanen 1998, Rosamond 2000, Tiilikainen & Palosaari 
2007).6 
 
Additionally, this chapter also discusses the advantages and limitations of the 
selected research approach in dealing with the proposed research problem. I will 
return to these issues in the study’s concluding chapter. 
 
                                               
6 Integration theories can naturally be used for studying regional integration processes in other 
geographical regions than Europe, too (see e.g. Laursen 2003). In this study the term integration 
studies refers to the study of European integration. 
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2.1.1 The relationship between integration and security 
 
Why integration studies and security analysis? 
 
In explaining European integration a handful of approaches ranging from 
functionalist and neo-functionalist integration theory to federalist, pluralist and realist 
theories have traditionally been used. In order to grasp the role of security in the 
integration process, there is, however, a need to look at the tools presented in security 
studies. Since the constructivist approaches have established a relatively stable 
position in security studies, learning and borrowing from that tradition can help to 
build a properly constructivist research setting on integration too. 
 
Three different reasons can be presented that support the conceptual shift from 
integration  studies  to  security  studies.  Two  of  them  can  be  labelled  scholarly  or  
theoretical reasons, whereas the third relates to more practical issues. Firstly, it can be 
argued that among the traditional integration theories “[c]onceptual and analytical 
separation between security studies and integration studies […] has led to a neglect of 
the complementaries and interdependence between integration and security” (Wallace 
1997). Secondly, as was mentioned above, certain aspects of security studies can be 
utilised in countering the constructivist deficiency in integration studies. In this 
respect, the so-called Copenhagen School of security studies appears most promising. 
Chapter 2.1.2 presents the evolution of constructivist security studies and presents the 
conceptual model of the Copenhagen School, concentrating particularly on those 
aspects that can be used to build the framework for analysing the role of security in 
the integration process. 
 
Thirdly, it can be argued that due to the various linkages between integration and 
security, a security-oriented approach answers the question of the nature and future 
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direction of the integration process better than many other approaches. While security 
as one sector of integration automatically attracts attention and research, much wider 
issues concerning the essence of the European Union are connected to it. Therefore 
findings relating to security policy can contribute to the general study of integration. 
The remainder of this sub-chapter takes this argument further. 
 
When presenting arguments in favour of the security analysis of integration, one can 
start by referring to the end of the Cold War. To put it bluntly, it was that large-scale 
change in the international security architecture culminating in the fall of the Berlin 
Wall that made the whole idea of the Eastern enlargement of the EU possible in the 
first place. This made the fifth enlargement unavoidably connected to security issues. 
Furthermore, while the accession of new EU members per se is not seen to pose any 
security threat in traditional sense for the EU, it is however seen that enlargement of 
the EU into Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean will bring it 
closer to regions of instability and turmoil. 
 
A related argument can be derived from the cruel European reality of the 1990s. War 
was not absent in Europe during the decade when the European Union was 
established. Since the Eastern enlargement process started there have been two major 
military conflicts in Europe. Especially haunting is the European awareness of the 
fact that just before the Balkan burst into turmoil there were fixed ideas inside the 
Union that Yugoslavia would be an ideal state for EU membership. The confidence 
on stable development towards membership was so strong that it was assumed that  
Yugoslavia’s accession would take place before that of Finland, Sweden and Austria 
(Kaldor 2001, 52.). The experiences of the Balkans certainly boosted the political cry 
for increasing EU’s capacity to effectively manage crises in Europe. Support to these 
calls was given by the fact that despite the manifested European commitments to 
Common Security and Foreign Policy, it was the military intervention by NATO that 
served as the most concrete reaction to the war.  
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Additionally, the literature on European security suggests that the common defence 
plans carry a “revolutionary” significance, for in the long run they will transform the 
nature of the EU and its transatlantic and other relations (Andréani et al. 2001). It has 
also been noted that the field of security and defence shows a great potential for 
advancing whole integration process, and that the successful development of the 
European Security and Defence Policy can give an effective boost to integration 
because politics of security and crisis management demand special rapidity and 
efficiency of decision-making (Howorth 2001). This perspective, combining the 
nature of the EU and security policy development, also highlights the special 
concerns of neutral or militarily non-aligned EU member states regarding the famous 
Maastricht article J4. In Finland, for instance, the meaning of the phrases “eventual 
framing” and “might in time lead to common defence” in particular have been 
repeatedly analysed and debated. (Currently placed in the Article 2 of Title V of the 
Treaty of the European Union.) 
 
Consequently, in case the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or European 
Security  and  Defence  Policy  (ESDP)  serve  as  the  current  driving  force  of  the  
integration process, security analysis certainly would shed light on the way the whole 
European integration process is evolving. Thus, one can argue that the security 
perspective on integration will produce findings that concern the very essence and 
future of the EU and Europe. More or less following this line of thinking, in some 
literature the security issue, especially in the form of the CFSP or ESDP, has been 
linked  to  the  question  of  the  nature of  the  Union  (see  e.g.  Ojanen  et  al.  2000,  36;  
Palosaari 2001, 209; Wæver 1995a, 1995b, 24-26, Andréani et al. 2001, 5). This 
refers to shedding light on the fundamental features of the European Union through 
the security perspective. Because traditionally security has been such a restricted area 
in national politics integration on security issues is a telling indicator of the state and 
nature of the integration process. A related argument is that the main driving-force of 
European integration comes from within Europe’s history. Integration takes place 
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because a return to atrocities of the Second World War must be avoided (Wæver 
1995a, 1995b.). 
 
The challenges that transnational and global forces are posing to the state lead to 
another argument in favour of the security perspective. In the case of EU 
enlargements in 2004 and 2007 for most of the applicant countries de facto 
independence and sovereignty were relatively new issues, the process of nation-
building having thus a different weight than in the Western member states. Therefore 
it would seem reasonable to expect differences in security conceptions, especially in 
how the actors value their sovereignty in national foreign and security policies. 
Consequently the decline of the significance of state influence, along with the shift 
towards multinational defence planning and “post-national” legitimisation basis of 
armed forces would be difficult issues for the applicant countries to deal with. 
 
Furthermore, the arguments in favour of further enlargement of the EU often have 
much in common with the arguments that are used to promote further development of 
EU’s common foreign and security policy. Referring to the accession process of the 
Central and East European countries the President of the European Commission 
(1995-1999) noted in 1995: 
 
“First of all, we must preserve and develop what we have built over the past 
fifty years. It is something of a miracle that war between our peoples should 
have become unthinkable. To squander this legacy would be a crime against 
ourselves. Secondly, the Union cannot be a haven of peace in a troubled sea. 
Hence the importance of future enlargements. Hence, too, the importance of 
developing a genuine foreign and security policy.” (Santer 1995). 
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2.1.2 Security studies and constructivism 
 
The theoretical approach of this study gets inspiration from the ideas introduced by 
the so-called Copenhagen School of security studies. One of the main starting points 
of the Copenhagen School is that security is a social construction: securitisation 
means that  an issue is  moved out  of  the sphere of  normal politics  by arguing that  it  
poses an existential threat, therefore justifying the use of extraordinary measures 
(Buzan et al. 1999). Furthermore, in the Copenhagen School’s framework security is 
a broad concept, and different sectors of security (military, environmental, economic, 
societal, political) are used as analytical tools that identify specific types of 
interaction (ibid.). Whereas the securitisation concept has been widely welcomed and 
accepted as a significant contribution to security studies, the “multi-sectoral” 
approach on security has invoked various criticisms in the scholarly debate. I will 
present  the  main  points  of  this  criticism  –  together  with  some  ways  to  respond  to  
them – in the last part of this chapter. Before going into that, this chapter first gives 
an overview of the scholarly security debate. The purpose of doing this is to clarify 
the theoretical background from which the framework for analysing the role of 
security in integration stems from. Thus the following overview is one of the building 
blocks of the first framework of this study. 
 
Towards new security approaches: the security debate 
 
In International Relations (IR), a general scholarly shift started as the scholars had to 
react and adapt to the major scale changes, both quantitative and qualitative in their 
nature, of the post-Cold War international environment. A substantial redirection in 
the paradigm appeared in the form of new definitions of central concepts, and 
different  interpretations  of  the  relations  of  actors,  dynamics  and  the  logic  of  
processes. In particular the meanings of concepts such as security, sovereignty, 
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borders and territoriality, state and nation, identity, and local and global were pushed 
adrift and subjected to constant redefinition attempts. In the context of European 
politics it was noted that the clear binary in/out-mode of borders and identities was 
transforming into more fuzzy and dynamic features. (Richmond 2000; Christiansen, 
Petito & Tonra 2000.) 
 
The constitutive changes in the politics of the post-Cold War world brought about 
notions of a decline of state-centrism whereby transnational, subnational and global 
forces challenged the position of the state as the main unit in the international system. 
This on-going process conveys a twin dynamic of both fragmentation and integration 
of existing states. Regional integration (of what the European integration process is 
just one example) has been one of the factors putting pressure on the state and state 
sovereignty. From the perspective of traditional theories that pressure can be seen as 
either adding to the pressure on state sovereignty or counterbalancing the global 
forces by regaining state power via the pooling of state sovereignties. Theories that 
share the first view (such as federalism) argue that integration is a process that 
weakens or replaces the state and leads to the formation of a new political community 
(Ojanen 1998). The latter idea is promoted by theories that argue that the state 
strengthens itself through integration. In these theories (such as realist-oriented 
variants of integration theories) integration is viewed as an instance of normal 
international relations since state governments control the integration process (ibid.).  
 
The end of the Cold War also pushed the concept of security into an evolving process 
as traditional security referents, actors and logic lost importance and new ones 
appeared. Environmental, economic, political and societal issues came to 
complement military issues and transnational and multinational actors gained their 
place beside states. In general terms, the basis for the whole security debate is to 
question the primacy of the military element and of the state in the conceptualisation 
of security. 
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The renewal of security (i.e. widening and deepening) and security discourses (i.e. 
securitisation and politicisation) have been among the top issues in the debate about 
“new forms of security”. In addition to the analytical implications of the new, wider 
security concept the political implications of redefining security have also been 
present in the debate. 
 
The nature of security has thus been a topic of active scholarly and political 
discussion. After the Cold War some of the analysts saw the beginning of a new era 
of peace and co-operation in which liberal democracy, transnational capitalism and 
international organisations would reign. Others claimed that ahead was an anarchic 
future of ethnic and “civilisational” conflicts, weapons proliferation, and new threats 
to environmental and economic security. 
 
On  the  disciplinary  side  of  the  debate  the  main  focus  was  on  the  tensions  between  
those who insisted on holding on to a narrow military focus and those trusting the 
expansion in the categories and areas of analysis. The narrow security concept only 
refers to state level military security wherein the spirit of realism, power and balance 
of power are central. This traditional approach departs from seeing war and force as 
the core of security studies. It sees that a broad security agenda risks “securitising” 
everything, therefore voiding the security concept of any meaning. According to 
Ayoob,  
“the indiscriminate broadening of the definition of security threatens to make 
the concept so elastic as to render it useless as an analytical tool” (Ayoob 
1997, 120).   
 
This risk of “destroying the intellectual coherence” of the field has been pronounced 
and elaborated by other authors also (e.g. Walt 1991, 212-213 and Buzan et al. 1998, 
3). 
 
  
 
24 
The widening of the security concept appeared in the 1970s and 1980s in the form of 
a scientific debate as well as general criticism of the traditional concept. In the 
security debate environmental activists, peace researchers and critical researchers 
have been described as wideners of the security concept. The other side consists of 
“mainstream” researchers of strategy and international politics who consider states as 
the main actors in questions of international security (Forsberg 1996). In 1991 Walt 
(perhaps best labelled a mainstream researcher) described the different phases of the 
evolution of security studies in the following way: Prior to World War II security 
studies consisted mainly of “strategic studies” by professional military personnel or 
military and diplomatic historians. The “Golden Age“ of security studies saw the 
nuclear question entering the stage where deterrence, coercion and escalation, causes 
of stability, alternative targeting policies, arms control, and the role of conventional 
weapons were among the principal topics. Interdisciplinary tendencies were strong 
and game theory, behavioural revolution, and peace research gained ground. Many 
influential think-tanks however, kept the military perspective at a central position in 
the field. A period of decline started in the mid-1960s as topics such as international 
political economy and interdependence suited better the changes that the Vietnam 
War and détente had caused in international politics. According to Walt a renaissance 
of security studies started in the mid-1970s. This new wave of studies used the 
history and comparative case study method and, with the help of a reformulated 
realist perspective in IR theory, concentrated on conventional warfare, state 
behaviour and the causes of war. The traditionalism of Walt’s perspective becomes 
apparent when he commented on the potential problems lying ahead for security 
studies:  
 
“Security studies should remain wary of the counterproductive tangents that 
have seduced other areas of international studies, most notably the “post-
modern” approach to international affairs” (Walt 1991, 35). 
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Both in practical politics and academia the debate has lately consisted of remarks 
claiming security status for issues and referent objects in different sectors. This has 
led to a situation where the two main views of security studies clashed. 
“Traditionalists” emphasise the intellectual and political dangers of simply tacking 
the word “security” onto an ever-widening range of issues. They believed that War 
and force should remain as the core of security studies. “Wideners” stress new non-
military sources of threat. This wider security concept emphasises economic, social, 
human and environmental security factors. According to this approach, the 
globalisation of the economy and environmental issues has increased the significance 
of security actors other than the state. Thus military security is often interpreted as 
being only one sector among the other sectors of security.7 Although the wide 
security concept by default reduces the significance of the state, it can be argued that 
the wider agenda eventually extends the call for state mobilisation to a broader range 
of issues (Buzan et al. 1998, 4). However, it is no longer a question of mere defence 
of territorial integrity8, but rather a question of securing the identity and the 
preconditions of existence of the subject9 (Huru 1998, 49). In addition to state, these 
subjects of security can include societies, communities and individuals or even the 
whole of humankind.  
 
A deeper examination of the security debate reveals the both approaches actually 
contain a multitude of various nuances. The “pioneering” wideners stressed the 
necessity and urgency of environmental threats (e.g. Westing 1988), linked the 
patterns in economic and military sector (Mansfield 1994, Gowa 1994), or tackled the 
transnational crime and identity issues (Wæver, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre 1993). 
The rise of economic and environmental agendas in international relations has been 
                                               
7 With reference to the narrow security concept the term “hard” security is often used. Respectively, 
the new aspects that the wide security concept has introduced can be titled “soft” security. 
8 “Security studies may be defined as the study of threat, use, and control of military force.” Nye 
and Lynn-Jones (1988). 
9 “Security is a package which tells you what you are as it tells you what to die for; which tells you 
what to defend; and which tells you what is right as it tells you what is wrong.” Dillon (1996, 33). 
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followed by the emergence of so-called critical security studies. Even though the 
critical approaches share the same starting points as the wideners, they are 
characterised by a more fundamental critique of other security approaches. Instead of 
approaching reality as a fixed object that the analyst can mirror, they see reality as a 
self-reflexive realm of subjective practices and structures (Krause & Williams 1997). 
 
The situation of the security studies from the late 1990s has been presented, for 
example, by classifying scholars as either being associated with realism (traditional 
security studies), the Copenhagen School (combining realism and constructivism), or 
critical security studies. In addition a fourth school of hard-core post-structuralists 
has been proposed. 
 
As suggested by the various terms used in labelling the different participants of the 
academic security debate,  in order to really understand the security debate and the 
different schools in it, the two-dimensional narrow-wide-axis must be complimented 
with other aspects. A deeper view can be gained with the help of ontological and 
epistemological elaboration. On this basis Ian Manners (2002) presents a typology of 
approaches to the study of security. In both ontological and epistemological terms a 
division to positivist and post-positivist approaches form the basic line of 
demarcation. The traditional positivist approach, objective both in its ontological and 
epistemological starting points, assumes that “there is a world out there” (objective 
ontology) “which can be measured and analysed” (objective epistemology). In the 
opposite corner of table 1 below, i.e. being post-positivist in ontological and 
epistemological terms, stands the post-modern approach on security, which according 
to Manners departs from the basic assumptions that “the world is socially 
constructed” (subjective ontology) and “cannot be easily measured and analysed 
because of the contested nature of knowledge production” (subjective epistemology). 
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Table 1: Approaches to the study of security (Adapted from Manners 2002) 
 
     Ontology 
 
Epistemology 
Objective: 
“There is a world out 
there” 
Subjective: 
“The world is socially 
constructed” 
Objective: 
“..which can be 
measured and 
analysed” 
 
POSITIVISM 
 
 
CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 
Subjective: 
“Contested nature of 
knowledge 
production” 
 
CRITICAL THEORY 
 
 
POSTMODERNISM 
 
 
Using the terminology of this typology the approach selected for this study is based 
on subjective ontology and objective epistemology (i.e. “The world is socially 
constructed, and it can be measured and analysed”).  
 
The Copenhagen School and its critics 
 
The frameworks of this study follow the theoretical thinking of the Copenhagen 
School, and the research utilises the central conceptualisations of the school’s 
securitisation theory. The Copenhagen School presents a framework based on the 
wider security agenda that incorporates the traditionalist position. Therefore their 
approach can be labelled as a sort of a mid-way solution, in which,  while still being 
critical, the researchers at the Copenhagen School have however kept the state-
centred security conception central to their thinking (Laitinen 1999, 141). According 
to Eriksson the Copenhagen School combines realism and constructivism (Eriksson 
1999a, 314). Perhaps the self-definition of Wæver is most telling, he presents himself 
as a “post-modern realist” (Buzan et al. 1998, 2). In Manner’s typology the 
Copenhagen school is classified as a constructivist approach wherein “The world is 
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socially constructed, which can be measured and analysed”. In security analysis’ 
terms this is to say that “There are no objective ‘threats’. Conditions such as war, 
terrorism, disease or pollution turn into ‘threats’ only if a political entrepreneur 
classifies them as such” (Eriksson 1999b, 347).  
 
Manners also believes that the Copenhagen School has grown out of compromises 
between neorealist positivism and post-structuralist post-positivism. Whereas Buzan 
et al. see this middle position as a way to pursue the wider agenda in a coherent 
fashion and to formulate security that incorporates the traditionalist position (Buzan 
et al. 1998, 1-4). This view has been a source of fierce criticism, for example, 
McSweeney’s claims that such a compromise makes the representatives of the 
Copenhagen School neo-positivists (McSweeney 1996, 83). Eriksson’s related point 
is that the Copenhagen School draws on constructivist language theory, but 
epistemologically chooses “not to go all the way to a discursive, post-structuralistic 
mode of analysis” (Eriksson 1999a, 315). McSweeney’s criticism is largely grounded 
on the claim that Copenhagen School’s understanding of identity is deficient and 
does not form a plausible basis for the analysis of construction of security threats. 
Thus he argues that there are grounds to label the School as a proponent of the state-
centred security conception.10  
 
All in all, the central conceptualisation of the Copenhagen School, that is to say 
securitisation, is clearly an essential move towards widening security and has been 
acknowledged as such in the security debate (see Knudsen 2001, 358). However, 
some critics argue that the Copenhagen School’s members themselves have failed to 
acknowledge their responsibility for widening the security agenda. According to this 
                                               
10 For other critical views on the Copenhagen School see for example Hansen (2000), Williams 
(2003) and McDonald (2008). 
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line of thinking the adoption of sectors of security (environmental, political, societal, 
economic, military) means classifying more issues as security problems, and is thus a 
political, not a analytical move. On this basis it has been argued that the adopted 
sectors are not compatible with the securitisation perspective. So far the Copenhagen 
School has replied to this mainly by noting that the sectors are an analytical 
framework only, and not logically inconsistent with securitisation (Wæver 1999). 
 
The  “Symposium  on  the  political  role  of  security  analysts”  in  Cooperation and 
Conflict 34(3) presented a debate on the Copenhagen School’s theory. In replying to 
the criticism on the alleged inconsistency in  the securitisation and multisectoral 
approach Wæver stated that there is no logical contradiction in using securitisation 
theory with a multisectoral approach since the sectors are an analytical typology 
rather than a claim about the empirical existence of such sectors (Wæver 1999, 334-
340). On the other hand, the critics argued that the problem is primarily the 
undiscussed political implications of the presentation of five sectors (Eriksson 1999a, 
315-317, Eriksson 1999b, 349-351). Eventually, this problem leads to the “normative 
dilemma of constructivism” – in a socially constructed world there are risks in 
concept launching since the analyst cannot avoid participating in the construction of 
“reality” – of which the Copenhagen School is naturally aware (Wæver 1999). 
Furthermore, it is useful to note that even the positioning of the traditional security 
concept is/has been likewise political. From this perspective one can argue that even 
the initial labelling of a security problem is a political, not analytical, act. This is 
something that most of the critics of the security sectors fail to see. In fact, by 
criticising the sectors on this basis they are, quite unintentionally, promoting the 
traditional narrow security conception.  
 
Despite the criticism and claims of half-hearted reforming, other critically oriented 
approaches have much in common with the Copenhagen School since they all deal 
mainly with the social construction of security; however there are certain significant 
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distinctions. The Copenhagen School spells these out explicitly by stating that 
whereas critical security studies “mostly have the intent of showing that change is 
possible because things are socially constituted”, their own approach sees instead that 
“the socially constituted is often sedimented as structure and becomes relatively 
stable as practice that one must do analysis also on the basis that it continues”. The 
Copenhagen school also abstains from the emancipatory aim to evaluate “what are 
actual security  problems  (i.e.  for  the  people)  larger  than  those  propagated  by  the  
elites”. However they admit that such attempts can be complementary to their 
approach. (Buzan et al. 1998, 35). Additionally, the critical school emphasises 
individuals and the Copenhagen school concentrates more on collectivities and 
collectivism. One can also argue that they differ in that the Critical School might 
have an openly political approach in that sense that it aims to brush away the existing 
security constellation and point out the most important security issues. The 
Copenhagen School instead restrains to its explicit aims at the understanding of 
existing actors (Buzan et al. 1998). 
 
Although this classification implies a somewhat fragmented field, a combining factor 
can be identified in the criticism of neorealism. This criticism works as the starting 
point for the wider security perspective. Krause and Williams (1997, vii)11 list  the  
following points of criticism as being distinctive to critical approaches on security. 
They point out that the belief of cumulative knowledge and a linear process of 
scientific knowledge forms a biased and unarticulated foundation for the traditional 
(neorealist) security studies. Consequently they see that certain starting points have 
remained unproblematised for too long, such as the centrality of the state (sovereign 
nation-state particularly) as the subject of security, the exclusion of issues other than 
                                               
11 According to its preface the book Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases “emerged out of 
a desire to contribute to the development of a self-consciously critical perspective within security 
studies”. 
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those of traditional military diplomacy, and the assumption of international anarchy. 
Every introduction of a new type of security, whether societal security, human 
security, environmental security or the security of identity, questions the sovereignty-
security link that is so central to traditional security thinking. 
 
These critical notions have brought new issues to the research agenda. Among them 
have been the security aspects of identity and the identity aspects of security. The 
identity perspective on security declares that the source of conflict is an idea. 
Conflicts are about the creation of political objects, they are about competing claims 
to identity and sovereignty. Following this argumentation the question is what type of 
groups – ethnic, political, religious, national, etc – have the right to and success in 
declaring that they have special interests, including their existence, that deserve to be 
secured. Consequently new issues have come into the focus of research, that is the 
role of culture, civilisation, norms, and values are components in the constitution 
process of that which is to be secured (Krause & Williams 1997, 49-51). 
  
From this broad perspective security is indeed a historically variable condition (or a 
set of “self-reflexive historical practices” as Krause and Williams put it) whereby 
new threats emerge and new enemies are created. Therefore essential questions are 
how threats and interests are constituted? How the actors involved are constituted? 
And how might these processes change? (Krause & Williams 1997, 49-51). 
According to Möller security policy is a mental reflection of the knowledge attained 
from observation or information. Consequently, security policy mirrors change and 
continuity in perceptions and misperceptions (Möller 2007). 
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2.1.3 How to utilize constructivist security theory in studying integration? 
 
Basically, what is useful for the purposes of this study in the Copenhagen School’s 
framework is that with their concept of securitisation they hit the core of security 
politics and policymaking. In focus are the issues that are for some reasons thought to 
be and in some cases accepted be so vital that they are securitised, i.e. moved beyond 
politics. According to the Copenhagen School security is about existential threats and 
emergency measures. The special nature of these security threats justifies the use of 
extraordinary measures to deal with them. Securitising means declaring that some 
specific issue is causing an existential threat and therefore legitimising the use of 
emergency measures. Desecuritisation means not to have issues phrased as “threats 
against which we have countermeasures” but to move them out of this threat-defence 
sequence and into the ordinary public sphere (Buzan et al. 1998, 21-29). Thus 
security  analysis  should  study  the  dynamic  process  of  securitisation,  instead  of  any  
stable and given security threats and corresponding security politics that try to 
counter those threats. One should study the different arguments in  the  process  of  
security policymaking. On what type of argumentation are the claims based? What is 
the interaction between the audience the securitising actor like? Why are certain 
claims accepted and some not? Are there other relevant actors or countermoves? 
What makes certain actors more effective than others? What is the significance of 
resources and authority for making successful security moves? 
 
The argumentation of the securitising actors does not always get full support. This 
might lead to a situation in which the securitisation is not successful, resulting in an 
ineffective security move. A successful securitisation starts with an argument of an 
existential threat, leads to corresponding emergency action, and finally to an effect on 
inter-unit relations by breaking free of normal political rules. Therefore securitisation 
is in the end an essentially inter-subjective process but with “real life” effects. Thus 
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security is determined by actors, hence it is socially constructed.12 When an issue is 
securitised it becomes a political fact that has consequences because the securitisation 
will cause the actor to operate in a different mode than he or she would have 
otherwise. Successful securitisation is decided by the audience of the speech act. 
Therefore security rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the 
subjects. (Buzan et al. 1999.)  
 
It is due to this feature of their framework that the Copenhagen School gets merit in 
the security debate. The general usefulness of the securitisation concept is highlighted 
by the fact that even traditional security analysts can use the concept in their 
frameworks (Knudsen 2001, 358). 
 
What is useful for the purposes of this study is that this type of conceptualisation 
makes possible the analysis of security’s varying roles in the course of the integration 
process, since “security” is seen not as given or fixed, but changing. It is not a 
question of merely hard or soft security, but different and sometimes competing 
security arguments, i.e. talking security in order to gain priority for certain issues. 
Hence the constructivist approach helps to explain why security speech is tempting in 
the context of enlargement rounds (i.e. in widening the integration process) and why 
it is so often argued that enlargement is vitally important due to various security 
reasons. By referring to “security”, an issue is given the best possible boost as the 
inherent logic of security moves the issue almost beyond normal politics and presents 
it as having supreme priority. The third chapter of this study will show how securing 
for instance “democracy”, “economic stability” or some other object has served as 
                                               
12 Hence it is always eventually a question of perceived threats. An example given by Buzan et al. 
notes the case when hostile tanks are crossing the border: “Hostile” is an attribute not of the vehicle 
but of the socially constructed relationship – a foreign tank could be part of a peacekeeping force 
(Buzan et al.1999, 30). 
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justification for enlarging the EC/EU geographically. “Security” has been frequently 
used in making integration politics. 
 
On material13 and constructivist methods 
 
The conceptualisation of security presented above implies that there is a specific 
rhetorical structure to security, i.e. it is about survival, supreme priority, and 
extraordinary means. In the empirical context of this study this guides the attention 
on cases where such rhetoric is used by the EU member states, applicants, or the EU 
institutions (i.e. European Commission mainly). 
 
Wæver calls the Copenhagen School a “speech act theory of security” (Wæver 1999, 
334), but in fact the guidelines of the original speech act theory by Austin and others 
(Austin 1962, Bourdieu 1991, Butler 1996) the Copenhagen School refers to have not 
(yet) been properly embedded into the analysis framework of the School. However, 
even if the analytical framework of the Copenhagen School does not explore and 
exploit the philosophy of speech act theory exhaustively, it still succeeds in guiding 
the attention of security analysis to the utterance itself as the act, instead of trying to 
prove that something “really” is a security problem. Thus, the framework succeeds in 
                                               
13 Part of the research material dealing with Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (white books, security strategies, 
reports and speeches related to security issues, major speeches by relevant ministers and officials, 
public material concerning the security related co-operation with EU, WEU, NATO, etc) has been 
gathered in co-operation with the embassies of those countries in Helsinki and Stockholm. The 
material gathered has then been classified on the basis of the sectors of security that come from the 
selected theoretical framework. Already in the material gathering process the different sectors of 
security were kept in mind, and when material was acquired via personal contacts (virtual or face to 
face) the other than traditional aspects of security were explained for the informants (such as the 
embassy personnel of the applicant countries, government experts etc). 
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introducing security as a specific category that is constituted in political practice. 
Accordingly, the topic of security analysis is the process of constructing a shared 
understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. 
An analyst’s role is to see if the speech acts take the form of “politics of existential 
threats” with the argument that an issue takes priority over everything else and 
therefore allows the breaking of the rules. For the analysts this means interpreting the 
actions of political actors and their success in mobilising support around this or that 
security reference. Knudsen captures this well by noting that the framework of the 
Copenhagen School is useful for ”the study of the politics of security policymaking” 
(Knudsen 2001, 358). Therefore the Copenhagen School’s approach points to the 
inherently political nature of the designation of security issues. 
 
For the analysts this has several implications that concern both the focusing and the 
material of the analysis. Rather than going deeply into the textual interpretations in 
the fashion of post-structuralist discourse analysis or post-modern interpretative 
analysis, the focus is on identifying the securitising actor and audience and their 
relationship, the features of alleged threats, and the logic that shapes the action. 
Furthermore, of interest are both the way the security mode is constructed and the 
result of the move, including the determinants of a successful move.  
 
As this study adopts the main points of the theoretical frameworks from the 
Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory, the methodological solutions also follow 
the Copenhagen School. According to Buzan et al. (1998, 25) the way to study 
securitisation is to study discourse, argumentation, and political constellations. In 
order to get a grip of the relevant speech acts the material should be approached with 
the methods supplied by discourse analysis. That said there is no need to go deep into 
textual analysis and interpretation since discourse is here understood as a limited 
range of possible statements promoting a limited range of meanings. Discourses 
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constrain what it is possible to say (Larsen 2000). Discourses organize knowledge 
systematically and thus delimit what can be said and what can’t. Certain arguments 
that are so powerful in one period or at one place can sound nonsensical or absurd to 
others (Wæver 2002, 29). 
 
This type of discourse analysis works in public texts. It does not try to get to the 
thoughts  or  motives  of  the  actors,  i.e.  their  hidden  intentions  or  secret  plans.14 As 
Wæver (2002, 26) puts it, “If one sticks rigorously to the level of discourse, the logic 
of argument remains much more clear – one works on public, open sources and uses 
them for what they are, not as indicators of something else. What interests us is 
neither what individual decision makers really believe, but which codes are used 
when actors relate to each other.” Therefore for this study the reading of the material 
will concentrate on the level of formally pronounced objectives. 
 
Consequently, the material required for such studies reflects these guidelines. The 
research material is defined and structured according to the following four points. 
First of all, the enlargement rounds (in years 1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, 2004/2007) are 
selected as the main points in time within integration history that will be subjected to 
closer examination. As has been argued earlier in this chapter (see 2.1.1 on the links 
between security and integration), they reflect well the security conceptions at play 
and the general role of security in the integration process.15 In  addition  to  the  
enlargement rounds and the founding treaties the different milestones in the 
                                               
14 Fierke has pointed out that “There is no need to ’get inside heads’ and understand the intentions 
or moves of individual actors. This may make sense in a murder investigation, but how often are we 
really looking for ’individual motives’ at the international level that do not have some kind of inter-
subjective expression?” (Fierke 2001, 117) 
15 The conclusions of this study will then naturally clarify if the assumption on the fruitfulness of 
the enlargements in studying the relation of security and integration is correct or not. 
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development of common European foreign, security and defence policy since the 
1950s serve as sources of material. These milestones include among others 
“European Defence Community” and “European Political Co-operation”, as well as 
those parts that relate to foreign, security and defence policy of the following treaties, 
agreements and documents: the Single European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992), the Amsterdam Treaty, and the European Council meetings in Cologne 
(1999), Helsinki (1999), Nice (2000). Quite obviously the development stages of the 
CFSP and ESDP indicate something about the role of security in the integration 
process. All these events have brought new features to the EU’s security politics and 
to the way the EU perceives security. 
 
Secondly, a central point on which the empirical analysis concentrates is the 
international political context of each enlargement round. The purpose of this is to aid 
the understanding of the conditions of the wider security political situation 
surrounding each enlargement. When drawing conclusions on the role of security in 
each time period, it is imperative to recognise the conditions that have at that time 
influenced the security conceptions, that is to say to recognise those factors that mark 
the limits of the security discourse. These are the conditions that limit what it is 
possible to successfully link to security arguments and what can be achieved by 
security argumentation. 
 
Each description of political context is complemented by a depiction of the state of 
affairs in the integration process, which concentrates on assessing the stage of 
development of the common European foreign, security and defence policy. The 
analysis in the empirical chapters then continues by looking at the security arguments 
that have played a role in making the enlargements possible. Of special interest are 
cases where opposing security arguments appear. Security argumentation is sought 
inter alia from the accession negotiations and related documentation, and the 
decisions and positions of  the European Commission,  as  well  as  those of  individual  
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(member or applicant) states, particularly in cases where opposing standpoints can be 
identified.  
 
Additionally, the empirical part examines the development of membership criteria. 
This is necessary because the membership criteria constrain the use and feasibility of 
security argumentation. Consequently the following empirical chapters look for 
confirmation of the assumption that “the more established and demanding the 
membership criteria becomes the less room for security arguments that can override 
them”. To put it simply, if the applicant countries do not meet the accession criteria it 
becomes more difficult to argue that they should be accepted as members due to this 
or that security reason. However, as the following chapters will show, meeting the 
membership criteria has in some cases not been a prerequisite for accession. 
Therefore particular attention is put on assessing in what kind of cases and under 
which type of conditions it has been possible to override the then-membership criteria 
by referring to security. 
 
2.2 Framework for analysing the compatibility of security concepts  
 
Whereas the first framework is for analysing how the role of security in the European 
integration process has evolved as well as for reconstructing the development of the 
EU’s security concept, the second framework is required in order to look closer at the 
fifth enlargement round and the potential differences in the ways the main actors of 
the accession process perceived the significance and meaning of security. 
 
It can be argued that in general terms the fifth enlargement has been in many ways 
different from the previous enlargements. For instance both the number of applicants 
and the population size in question is much larger. A major departure from the 
viewpoint of security politics is that most of the accessing countries belonged to the 
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Eastern block in the Cold War period of antagonism (i.e. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania) – what 
kind of stability and security are they now looking for? In what terms do they read 
security politics? A question worth asking in this new situation is, do the security 
views  at  play  match?  This  perspective  should  also  offer  a  plausible  way  to  start  
unfolding the question of the security policy implications of the fifth EU 
enlargement. The security politics of the 15 incumbent member states tended to be in 
a constant state of flux – what sort of changes will the accession of 12 new members - 
with their divergent histories, identities and geographical factors - cause?  
 
This sub-chapter builds the framework for analysing these questions. Central building 
blocks of the framework are the constructivist security concept (as explained and 
defined in the previous sub-chapter) and sectors of security. The sectors provide the 
means to analyse the widening of national security strategies in order to see how they 
reflect the transformation of security conceptions.  Sectors are also used in locating 
matches and mismatches in security concepts. Consequently, they help in analysing 
the compatibility of the security concepts of the new members with that of the EU. 
 
Using sectors of security in analysing security concepts 
 
The Copenhagen School has presented five different sectors of security that result 
from the expansion of the security agenda. The sectors are military, environmental, 
economic, societal, and political.16 The descriptive features of these sectors are useful 
in the context of EU-enlargement. The starting point for the sector approach of the 
Copenhagen School is the finding that in general discussion economy, society, and 
                                               
16 Other presentations of this widened or extended security may give a different role for the military 
security, and place it in some other sectoral categorisation (for “extended” security and hierarchical 
model of security sectors see e.g. Huru 1998). 
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politics are too often separated without really thinking how to do it and what the 
consequences of such division to subsequent conclusions are. The division of the 
political, military, societal, economic, and environmental sectors of security that the 
Copenhagen school uses is an analytical method that should help to “disaggregate a 
whole  for  purposes  of  analysis  by  selecting  some  of  its  distinctive  patterns  of  
interaction” (Buzan et al. 1998, 7). The purpose of selecting them is simply to reduce 
complexity in order to facilitate a better analysis. Sectors identify specific types of 
interaction: Military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the political 
sector is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition; the 
economic sector is about relationships of trade, production, and finance; the societal 
sector is about relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is 
about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere. The 
analytical method of sectors starts with disaggregation but must end with reassembly, 
because sectors might identify distinctive patterns but they still remain inseparable 
parts  of  a  complex  whole  (Buzan  et  al.  1998,  7-8.).  Security  issues  in  each  sector  
have their special characteristics regarding the interunit relations in question, the 
level of securitisation, the political constellations formed around the issue, and 
different argumentation as to why certain “security problems” should be lifted out of 
normal politics. 
 
In the study at hand the sectors are used merely as categories that are useful in 
defining and limiting the research material as well as in classifying and describing the 
diverse findings of the research. Hence, despite the conscious adoption of a wide 
security perspective the purpose is not to take up the “role of securitiser” or “spread 
the negative connotations of threats and enemies to new issue areas” (cf. Eriksson 
(1999, 316) in his criticism on sectors). 
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On the material17 of the second framework 
 
The points concerning the defining and limiting of the research material presented in 
the previous chapter 2.1 are valid here too. This means that the material will mainly 
consists of the official enlargement dialogue produced as a part of the integration 
process between the main actors, that is to say the EU and the applicant/new member 
states. Observed cases where security argumentation appears are then put under 
closer scrutiny. The reading of the material concentrates on the level of formally 
pronounced objectives (as explained in the chapter 2.1). 
 
The adoption of sectors of security as analytical tools has impacted defining and 
delimiting of the material. For instance, the environmental sector as defined by the 
Copenhagen School directs attention particularly on two chapters of the membership 
negotiations that is Chapter 22, concerning the Environment, and Chapter 14, 
concerning Energy. The latter comes into question because in the Copenhagen 
School’s classification the safety of nuclear energy falls into the environmental 
security sector. Other material includes the National security strategies which also 
mention and deal with environmental security, and from the EU side the European 
Commission (i.e.  especially the DG of the Environment)  has produced material  that  
relates directly to enlargement and the environment. Central documents that deal with 
nuclear security include the EURATOM Treaty, the Report on Nuclear Safety in the 
Context of Enlargement (2001), a special peer review that assessed the progress of 
applicants in implementing the report and the Status Report for 2002. Finally regular 
reports on the accession countries also deal with the issue. The other sectors delineate 
material in a similar way. 
 
                                               
17 See note 13. 
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In order to analyse the match or mismatch between the security concepts of the EU 
and applicant countries, one needs first of all to gain a general view on the evolution 
of the premises for European security perceptions. As explained in the previous 
chapter, this can be done with the help of a historical overview as well as various 
security-related EU-documents such as treaties, declarations, conclusions, speeches, 
working papers, action plans, recommendations, opinions, communications, reports, 
etc. Even if the EU machinery normally manages to produce a “final” document on 
each issue it is dealing with – security policy included – the security conception of 
the Union is not an uncomplicated and clear issue but rather a dynamic concept. The 
national views of the member states clash not only with each other but also with the 
views of the Union’s institutions. The question of opening the EU’s “black box” and 
constructing the EU’s security conception is further discussed in the following 
chapters. At this point it is sufficient to note that it is possible and justifiable to talk 
about the EU’s security concept as a single entity, but only when keeping in mind 
that it is a dynamic one consisting of partly clashing development trends. The EU’s 
security concept is actually “poetry in motion” in that it evolves and devalues for it is 
a topic of constant struggle. This struggle prevails for instance between the different 
EU member states and their distinct national interests on the one hand, and between 
the communitarian and inter-governmental visions on the other.18 Consequently, one 
cannot assume that for instance the Commission’s views would be similar to those of 
the different member countries or that they represent an aggregate construction of the 
member states’  views.  But since the EU, as an organisation,  keeps on existing,  it  is  
sensible to assume that the Commission’s decisions inevitably reflect the member 
states’ views or at least cannot openly conflict with them. With the European Council 
decisions the case is more obvious. In short, the security conception of the EU does 
                                               
18 The former refers to the so-called Community method, where the community organs like the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the EC Court of Justice play a key role, and the latter to 
decision-making processes dominated by the Council, the European Council or other 
intergovernmental bodies. 
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exist to the extent that its different aspects can be analysed and consequently 
compared to the applicant countries’ conceptions of security.19  
 
Secondly, the major part of the source material for the tracing of the applicant 
countries’ security conceptions comes from the applicants’ part of the official 
enlargement dialogue. It is based on the material of the accession negations. 
Additional material includes the national security strategies, major speeches, 
accounts, white books and reports related to security issues. The steps taken towards 
the security related co-operation between EU and third countries also offer useful 
material. For instance, as far as military security is concerned, the applicants have 
been participating with the member states at the “Capabilities Commitment 
Conference”, where some of the applicants have announced their own contributions 
to the “Headline Goal” (see chapter 5.3). Some of the applicants have also been 
active in other security forums, i.e. WEU, NATO, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
Programme, and thus security related material in English is available. Generally, the 
negotiation process with the EU provides the most useful data.  
 
Why sectoral analysis rather than geographical? 
 
In general discussion the new members are often seen to form a single block that is 
connected together for instance by their preference for English over French, neo-
liberal capitalism and pro-US opinions.20 For sure most of them are keen on eastern 
policy and have firm views on the North-eastern dimension of EU foreign policy, but 
in the end they are more diverse than the applicants of any previous enlargement 
                                               
19 On “concepts of security in the EU after the Cold War” see Larsen (2000). 
20 Cf. the concepts “new and old Europe” introduced by the US Secretary of Defence Donald 
Rumsfeld in January 2003 after the varying European responses to the military operation in Iraq 
(United States Department of Defense 2003). 
  
 
44 
(Raik & Palosaari 2004). Therefore any classifications grouping the applicant 
countries together should have a more solid analytical founding. 
 
The simplest way of classifying and analysing the new member states is to start with 
geographical facts, facts that inevitable have a connection to security politics. The 
northernmost countries, i.e. the Baltic countries, are often treated as a single block. In 
the south, Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey form the Mediterranean group; and in the 
middle lay the Central and Eastern European states. Such a classification has been 
partly strengthened by the different geographically focused EU policies: the Northern 
Dimension of the EU includes the Baltic States and Poland, and the so-called 
Barcelona process and the Euro-Med co-operation focus on the Mediterranean border 
areas of the Union.  
 
However, such straightforward categorisation should not be accepted to form the 
basis for material gathering, organising and analysis. The evident risk is that the 
applicants are treated using the terms of the EU from the very beginning. For instance 
the fact that security might be a highly regional issue for some applicants – and that 
such regions are not constituted by EU views but more likely by the own geopolitical 
cluster of the applicant – is easily lost if such groupings are taken for granted. 
Moreover, the link between soft security and geography is not that evident, and thus 
security analysis that is based on geography is likely to be biased towards hard 
security.  
 
Naturally, the organisation and reading of material should also be compatible with the 
theoretical frame. In this study the issue-oriented analysis is also compatible with the 
theoretical framework used. No actual country-specific categories were composed, as 
the approach of the study does not build upon case study methods. Instead of 
geographical categorisation this study uses, in the context of the fifth enlargement, 
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the sectors of security also to classify, define and delimit the research object and 
research material. This study goes through security sectors and looks for security 
arguments and matching/mismatching security conceptions. 
 
Locating security argumentation and matches/mismatches of security concepts 
 
In  this  study  a  central  presumption  is  that  some  aspects  of  post-enlargement  EU  
politics can be understood by identifying compatibilities and discords, matches and 
mismatches, in the way the actors construct security. Thus, the tracking of 
mismatches and matches between the security concepts of the EU and of the new 
member states will form the basis from which this study’s conclusions are drawn. 
Possible mismatches in the ways these actors read security – i.e. what issues they 
securitise or what sectors they prioritise – are considered decisive factors when it 
comes to the future directions of European security policy.  
 
In  this  case  when  “trawling  through  existing  security  discourses  to  register  what  is  
going on” (Wæver 1999, 335) the main emphasis will be on the cases that possess a 
mismatching feature, that is where different views concerning security issues relating 
to the enlargement process appear. Finally such findings from each sector will be 
collected together to gain an overall picture of the security conceptions and the 
importance of different sectors. 
 
Summary: Research questions fine-tuned 
 
On the basis of the theoretical, conceptual and methodological elaboration presented 
above it is now possible to summarise the research questions and the logic of 
conclusion making process in more detail.  
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The questions concerning the EU’s security concept are: What has been the role of 
security in the European integration process – especially in the enlargement rounds? 
How has this role changed? How has “security” been used in promoting 
enlargements? How does the development of the membership criteria reflect the EU’s 
security conceptions? What is the EU’s current security conception like and what is it 
based on? How is the EU’s current security concept constructed? 
 
Questions that concern the fifth enlargement round in particular, can be summed up 
as follows: Are the conceptions of the new member states compatible with the EU’s 
security conception?  (In the terminology of the study that is to say: Is there a match 
or mismatch of security conceptions – and if so, in what sectors?). In each sector of 
security, the credibility, success and significance of security arguments that relate to 
the sector in question are analysed by posing the questions: Did any noteworthy 
security arguments emerge in the sector? Did these security arguments have 
significance concerning the whole enlargement process? Were the issues cast in the 
form of security speech; or did any of the major actors consider such issues as 
security questions? 
 
On a more scholarly level, the study should also provide at least introductory answers 
to the following questions: What are the prospects and benefits of constructivist 
approaches to integration? Can a security-oriented approach produce tangible results 
in questions concerning integration? The scholarly questions concern also the 
applicability of the Copenhagen School’s analytical tools: Are the sectors of security 
useful and functioning tools (despite the criticism they have faced)? What are the 
benefits of securitisation theory in analysing integration? 
 
To prepare for the solving of these questions, chapter 3 begins with an analysis of the 
evolution of the EU’s security concept. It offers a constructivist-oriented reading of 
the integration process, highlighting those milestones of the process – the previous 
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four enlargement rounds included – which have contributed mostly to the way the EU 
currently perceives security. The purpose is also to outline the “life span” of security 
as one factor of the European integration. The main goal is to find the foundation on 
which the security conception of the EU is constructed. Next chapter 4 concentrates 
on the 2004 enlargement through the sectoral security analysis. Finally chapter 5 
draws together the results of the research, and offers some theoretical conclusions 
concerning the securitisation theory and related aspects of the security debate. The 
focus is especially on the pros and cons of using such an approach in integration 
studies. 
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3 FROM SCHUMAN DECLARATION TO SOLANA’S SECURITY 
STRATEGY: The role of security in European integration 
 
This  chapter  analyses  the  role  and  meaning  of  security  in  different  stages  of  the  
European integration process and in particular the four first enlargements of the 
EC/EU. It will show that various security arguments have played a significant role in 
each enlargement, and also that the meaning of “security” has varied. A historical 
perspective of the role of security in integration is also needed in order to understand 
how the EU’s current security concept is constructed. Additionally, the analysis will 
also provide tools to better analyse and understand the current debate on European 
security and the differing arguments within it. 
 
3.1 The role of security in the beginning of the integration process 
 
“A united Europe was not achieved and we had war.” 
- Robert Schuman 1950 
 
In the very beginning of the European integration process the relationship between 
security and integration was clear. Security meant military security (i.e. the absence 
of war) , which was to be achieved by economic means. 
 
The words of the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman on the 9th of May 1950 
represent an obvious point of departure for any security policy oriented survey on the 
history of the European integration. In his words the European project to be launched 
would cause “any war between France and Germany” becoming “not merely 
unthinkable, but materially impossible.” (Schuman 1950). One source of this thinking 
was that there were important lessons to be learnt from European history and 
especially the aftermath of the First World War where the attempt to “keep Germany 
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down” failed with disastrous results. This time the plan was to bind Germany within 
strong institutions and a web of positive interdependence. Therefore it is clear that the 
economic cooperation that started the European integration process in the early 1950s 
had really concrete security objectives embedded within it – the controlling of the 
raw materials for the armament industry, for instance. The Coal and Steel 
Community (established by the Paris Treaty in 1951) was gradually accompanied by 
ever deepening forms of common institutions. 
 
The reaction to the Second World War produced the fundamental foundations for the 
evolution of common European security conceptions and respective common 
policies. Subsequent phases in the integration process have witnessed a resurfacing of 
the “Schumanian” thinking from time to time, but often the original ideals have been 
hidden beneath other types of argumentation, as integration has been thought to 
concern mainly economics and social issues. 
 
The threat perception was based on the events in Europe’s past, particularly on the 
continental wars (i.e. war between France and Germany), and a new sort of actor was 
forming, a European community. For this new European entity the ultimate objects to 
be secured were “world peace” and the “peaceful achievements” (Schuman 
Declaration 1950). The logic was that European integration was needed to secure 
these objects since fragmentation would lead to war. 
 
In practice peace, and the integration that was prerequisite for it, were to be achieved 
by moving certain, mainly economic at first, spheres of politics above the national 
level decision-making processes of western European states. First of all, the 
production of coal and steel was to be placed under a common “High Authority” 
whose decisions were to be binding and enforceable on the member countries. Hence 
this event and such conclusions – that in order to secure the peaceful development the 
actions of a supranational entity should take priority over purely national decision-
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making in certain economic issues – presented the frame for further security 
argumentation and development of European “security” policy. 
 
Pressing forward on the road to integration the next stepping-stone was the Treaties 
of Rome, which, when it came into force in 1958, created both the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom). The Rome Treaties primarily handled economic issues (i.e. customs, 
trade, external tariffs, agriculture and such). Hence the security argumentation was 
gradually changing whereby war and peace as the referent object and rationale of the 
integration became less apparent. Economic stability, prosperity and growth got the 
position of those objects whose existence was to be safeguarded by deepening 
integration. 
 
However, behind these treaties some actors involved certainly saw the functionalist-
type logic of integration that would eventually cause integration on one sector leading 
to deeper integration on other issues also. Accordingly, integration was seen to offer 
the solution to the problems of the international  system. By transforming war-prone 
interstate relations integration would decrease the likelihood of war. Different 
variations of the Schumanian logic, including federalist, functionalist and 
transactionalist integration theory, all shared the view that the nation state as a form 
of political organisation was somehow inadequate. They all seemed to argue that 
“peace”, “social advancement” or the “survival of the mankind” were such overriding 
objects that they required moving above foreign policies that were purely based on 
national interest. Integration would eventually shift the responsibility to a federation, 
functional co-operation or security community. According to Deutsch, for instance, 
integration leading to new political climate and sense of community was required to 
secure peace. (Ojanen 1998, 32: Mitrany 1943; Deutsch 1957.) 
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Also in the 1950s, an idea and initiative on European Defence Community was 
presented. The pressure from the Cold War, notably the communist expansionism in 
Europe and Korea, provoked this. Despite the then clear linkage between security and 
integration (and all the introductions of the idea of a European army during and 
between the World Wars), the French proposal of European Defence Community 
with a European army did not succeed. The so-called Pléven plan aimed to create an 
integrated European army under joint command. This plan was the subject of 
negotiation between the member states of the ECSC from 1950 to 1952, and led to 
the signature of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC). An 
outcome of the creation of the EDC was a political project, presented in 1953, for 
creating a federal or confederative structure. The “European Political Community” 
would have created a two-house Parliamentary assembly, a European executive 
Council, a Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice. The political Community was 
to have very wide powers and responsibilities and was, in the long run, to absorb the 
ECSC and the EDC. However, it never came to fruition since the French National 
Assembly rejected it. (Pinder 2001, Urwin 1995.) 
 
Some have noted that from the viewpoint of overall European integration this was 
actually a positive thing, “for the Community institutions, even if strengthened by a 
treaty for a European Political Community that had also been prepared, were 
probably not strong enough to bear such a heavy responsibility” (Pinder 2001, 11). 
The same question remains valid in today’s European debate: Are the institutions of 
the Union of 27 member states capable of handling a common defence policy? And 
furthermore, what would be the level of real communality and EU competence in 
such policy? 
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3.2 The first enlargement (1973): UK, Denmark and Ireland: antagonism and 
power politics 
 
Political context and state of affairs in the integration process 
 
The original declarations that launched the European integration process stemmed 
from a strong commitment to preventing the horrors of another world war by rooting 
out the seeds of major interstate conflict from European soil. However, as the 
memories of the Second World War were to an increasing extent being discarded, 
Western European integration focused on the increasing the welfare of its citizens. 
Although economic stability certainly contributes to hard security21, in the rhetoric of 
politicians, and consequently in the actions that the integrating Europe took, the 
economy gained the unquestioned top position. This was partly due to external 
factors. Since the large scale security questions were being dealt by the two post war 
super powers, the USSR and the US, Europe focused its activities on achieving 
inward prosperity. The US umbrella over Western Europe based on the 1949 Atlantic 
solution allowed European integration the luxury of concentrating on the economic 
goals  and  developing  its  identity  as  a  “civilian  power”  as  well  as  the  possibility  to  
focus on the economic goal of restoring the continents prosperity.  
 
According to Dinan “the history of Community in the 1970s is the history of 
Community in flux, attempting to cope with fundamental changes in the international 
system and fighting for survival in a radically altered political and economic 
environment” (Dinan 1994, 70). The year 1973 was already a post-de Gaulle era, but 
Gaullism still influenced French behaviour. The slogan promoted by the new French 
president Pompidou, “Completion, deepening, enlargement”, obviously underlined 
enlargement, i.e. the membership of United Kingdom, but the order of the buzzwords 
                                               
21 On “cross-sectoral security connections” see Buzan et al. 1998, 167. 
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actually put first the strengthening of the existing Community and finalising the 
financing of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Only then could the 
enlargement issue be finalised.  
 
However, some major security policy issues deriving from the large-scale 
international politics of that era were at play. Germany’s new Ostpolitik and growing 
economic power made the enlargement a more appealing alternative for France, who 
had earlier vetoed against the British membership. Germany’s Ostpolitik,  its  new  
policy towards the east, replaced the previous doctrine of non-recognition of any 
Western state that recognised East Germany diplomatically. That move produced 
criticism that the Ostpolitik was a sell-out of German interests in the East and a threat 
to Germany’s Alliance ties in the West. Nevertheless, Germany emphasised its 
support for European integration, and stressed the importance of British accession as 
a means of reassuring those Community member states that feared Germany’s 
resurgence. Together Britain and France in the West might counterbalance 
Germany’s increasing weight in the East and thus establish geopolitical symmetry in 
the Community. In the UK, Ostpolitik was used in advancing the goal of EC entry by 
arguing that British accession would restrain German nationalist ambition (Dinan 
1994, 72-74). 
 
It was also the view of Washington that Germany’s opening to the East had the 
unintended consequence of spurring West European integration (Dinan 1994, 73). Up 
to that time the enlargement issue was mainly the power politics question of whether 
the  UK would  join  or  not.  It  was  part  of  the  big  game wherein  actors  included  the  
whole western alliance, trans-atlanticism and East-West confrontation. Respectively, 
dominant security conceptions were based on that reading, and the perceived security 
threats posed by the Soviet Union and the expansion of communism. Despite this, 
Germany’s actions and the responses to them show that containing military build-up 
was not the sole solution considered applicable to the East-West relations.  
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Arguments in the accession process: why the enlargement took place 
 
Arguments presented on behalf of the enlargement included the notions that the 
enlargement issue had held up the Community for too long, that it was in the 
common interest of the six member states to extend the Community while trying to 
improve East-West relations and that the Community had to grow beyond its present 
size in order to compete economically and technologically with the United States. 
Thus the enlargement was seen as necessary in order to enhance and secure the EC’s 
economic capacity, as well as to secure the further development of the integration 
process. (Dinan 1994, Preston 1997.) 
 
The British government summarised the results of the accession negotiations and 
presented the arguments in favour of entry. These included: “Our country will be 
more secure. Our ability to maintain peace and promote development in the world 
greater, our economy stronger, and our industries and people more prosperous, if we 
join the European Communities than if we remain outside them.” (British 
Government White Paper “The UK and the European Communities” (July 7, 1971) 
quoted in Dinan 1994, 78.)  
 
It seems therefore that in Britain the economic argumentation was at least to some 
extent complemented with references to the Schumanian logic and the original ideals 
of the integration process (“ability to maintain peace and promote development in the 
world” ibid.).  In the two other countries that  were to join the EC the reasoning was 
more  purely  economic.  In  Denmark  the  binding  referendum  resulted  in  the  
overwhelming endorsement of membership. Once Britain applied for membership 
Denmark had little option but to follow suit. With the bulk of country’s export going 
to the UK and Germany, it would have been an economic suicide for Denmark to stay 
out of the enlarged Community. Ireland’s economic fortunes were also tied to those 
of  the  UK.  The  economic  determinism  for  membership  was  supported  by  the  
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expected benefits for Irish farmers from their participation in the CAP, as well as 
grants and loans. EC membership also afforded Ireland the chance to change the 
place of Anglo-Irish relations to a broader and more equitable, multilateral context. 
Ireland had been relatively isolated from Europe, bound up instead in a suffocatingly 
close relationship with Britain. (Dinan 1994, 80; Preston 1997, 40.) 
 
In Norway a narrow majority voted against accession in the referendum of 1972. The 
government unsuccessfully sought to reassure the electorate about the consequences 
of membership, especially regarding the protected fishing and agriculture industries 
and the fledging oil industry. In the end the Prime minister resigned and Norway 
stayed outside the EC (Dinan 1994, 80). 
 
Membership criteria 
 
The first enlargement did not actually take place on the basis of explicit membership 
criteria. The basic conditions for enlargement were set out in the 1958 Rome Treaty. 
According to article 237 “Any European state may apply to become a member of the 
Community”. But in practice during the Cold War the membership of states outside 
the Western block was unthinkable (Sjursen&Smith 2001, 6). Such informal 
membership criteria reflect the dominant construction of security of that time, i.e. the 
antagonism of East  and West,  superpower rivalry and power politics  were the main 
constitutive factors. 
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3.3 The second and third enlargements: Greece, Spain and Portugal 1981, 1986: 
Security and democracy 
 
Political context and state of affairs in the integration process 
 
Following the signing of the Treaties of Rome, European integration focused on 
moves in the economic sector, i.e. the creation of a common market, although ideas 
for co-operation in the field of foreign policy were already in evidence. For almost 
forty years the expression “common foreign policy” found no place in the Treaties, 
let alone security and defence policies. Only in 1970 did some form of co-operation 
in foreign policy start. However, this was only at intergovernmental level in the 
context of “European Political Co-operation”. The European Political Co-operation 
included the aim of making common positions. In 1986 the Single European Act 
(SEA) formalised this intergovernmental co-operation without changing its nature or 
methods of operation. Security policy was now mentioned alongside foreign policy. 
But the view on security was rather limited or “soft” since the SEA included only 
“political and economical aspects of security” (Single European Act 1986). Hence the 
focus was once again on other issues than traditional security (such as the  single 
market program, decision making, efficiency, market liberalisation, cohesion, 
environment, technological research and development, social policies relating to 
employment, etc) (Ojanen et al. 2000, 38; Dinan 1994, 130; Pinder 2001, 25). This 
meant that integration took place mainly in the economic and political sectors. The 
economic argumentation got rooted deeper and “economic stability”, “prosperity” 
and “growth” gained priority over argumentation that build directly on peace and 
war. At the same time the process of integration had gradually reached the stage 
where the established institutions were stable enough to be considered as relatively 
autonomous political units. They and their legitimacy and recognition have became 
objects whose existences should be secured as part of the European integration 
process’ achievements so far. From this time on safeguarding the European 
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integration process also implied the securing of the existence of the EC/EU’s political 
institutions. 
 
The starting points for the enlargement process in the 1980s were not promising, a 
paralysed decision-making process, a feeble Commission, a CAP apparently out of 
control, new heads of states Mitterand and Thatcher and their demands, and even the 
rather trivial but nevertheless symbolic issue of Greenland leaving the EC, the first 
territory to do so. However, 1979 brought an accession treaty with Greece, the first 
direct elections for the European Parliament, and the launch of the European 
Monetary System. (Nicholson & East 1987, 207; Dinan 1994.) 
 
Momentum for greater integration had gradually been building, mainly due to such 
factors as the trend toward deregulation and liberalisation, the increasing co-operation 
between the Commission and leading industrialists to boost European 
competitiveness, growing business interest in the realisation of a single market, and 
member states’ worries about Europe’s apparent impotence during a sudden drop in 
Cold War temperatures (Dinan 1994, 101). Also there was a certain degree of mutual 
understanding prevailing supporting the new European democracies by granting them 
membership even though they were not fully ready yet in many “pre-accession” 
terms. 
 
Arguments in the accession process: why the enlargement took place 
 
The unfolding events in Southern Europe made the membership conditions a more 
serious matter of concern. As a signal to Greece, Portugal and Spain, who were 
struggling with their democratisation process, the European Council declared in 1978 
that “respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and human rights in 
each Member State are essential elements in the European Communities”. The 
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Commission, however, seemed to put more emphasis on the applicants’ economic 
and administrative capacities. (Sjursen&Smith 2001, 6.) 
 
During the military regime in Athens between 1967 and 1974, the Community 
suspended its 1962 association agreement with Greece. Following the restoration of 
democracy, the Community reactivated the association agreement and soon afterward 
Greece applied for full membership, which the agreement had in any case envisioned. 
Assessing the Greek application on its economic merits, in January 1976 the 
Commission advised against accession. The Council of Ministers however saw the 
Greek case primarily from a political perspective, the German Foreign Minister of 
that time stated that “Greece, only recently returned to the democratic fold, would 
march in future with the Community of European nations”, stated the German 
Foreign Minister. (Dinan 1994, 102.) Here the security arguments based on the 
pursuit of political stability in Europe overran the economic ones. 
 
At the negotiation phases, however, the chief topics were mainly of economic origin, 
i.e. tariff reductions, agricultural products, trade relations with third countries and the 
granting of loans to Greece by the EEC22. When the accession of Greece took place 
on January 1st 1981 the statement by the President of the European Commission 
emphasised  the  event  in  a  way  that  has  a  lot  in  common  with  the  views  to  be  
expressed twenty years later in the context of the fifth enlargement: “Greece joins the 
                                               
22 Actually the issue of loan granting had within it embedded traditional security aspects. Regarding 
the EEC loans Greece put forward the argument that Germany and Italy had been responsible for 
war devastation in Greece and that post-war reparations had been insufficient to enable Greece to 
develop her economy to the point at which she could resume repayment of the pre-war debt. The 
new EEC loans were originally planned to be dependent on the settlement of Greece’s pre-war debt. 
Discussions on this topic were very difficult and agreement seemed impossible. Eventually the 
decision reached was the unconditional granting of loans. 
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Community at a time of movement, for the Community is an organism in evolution. 
We face many challenges but even greater opportunities.” (Nicholson & East 1987, 
183-193.) 
 
Spain and Portugal similarly emerged from dictatorship in the mid-1970s. When 
seeing a large southern enlargement to come, the member states became to take the 
economic implications more seriously. France especially feared competition from 
Mediterranean agriculture and fisheries.23 In general terms, both the Spanish and 
Portuguese applications represented an overwhelming desire by their new 
democratically elected governments to participate fully in the future shaping of 
Europe. However the national debate in each country followed different patterns. 
(Preston 1997, 68.) 
 
With Spain the formal negotiation process lasted more than six years. Spain’s return 
to democracy started when General Franco died in 1975 and the new head of state 
King Juan Carlos committed himself to the “peaceful establishment of democratic 
coexistence based on respect for the law as a manifestation of the sovereignty of the 
people”. Consequently Spain’s first general election for over 40 years took place in 
1977. In 1981 an attempted military coup led to a renewed emphasis on the 
importance of Community membership in strengthening democratic institutions in 
Spain. At the day of the signing of the accession treaty in 1986 the Basque separatist 
organisation ETA made three attacks, however the official Spanish reaction affirmed 
that “no-one through coercion or violence will upset our determination to co-operate 
in building Europe” (Prime Minister Gonzáles, quoted in Nicholson & East 1987, 
229). 
                                               
23 Sometimes such agricultural and fishery questions can lead to surprising military consequences 
too. For example in 1984 French Navy patrol boats fired on two Spanish fishing trawlers about 
160km of the French coast. Nine fishermen were injured (Nicholson & East 1987, 225). 
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In Portugal the end of Salazar’s dictatorship, changed by way of the “Red Carnation 
Revolution” of 1974, produced a more democratic country. Yet the ensuing unstable 
period left the ultimate outcome of the revolutionary process uncertain and foreign 
countries were unwilling to lend substantial support to the country. The opening of 
formal EC negotiations took place in 1978 and eventually led to Portugal’s accession 
in 1986. 
 
In these enlargement rounds the situation was a mixture, and to a certain degree a 
confrontation, of economic versus political argumentation. The traditional “security 
as original aim of integration” discourse was this time complemented with a new 
democracy dimension. Commission reports noted then that all three applicant 
countries were primarily motivated by political factors in that they saw membership 
as a source of support in preserving their democratic institutions (Nicholson & East 
1987, 215). An internal EC argument evident at that time was that enlargement could 
perhaps help the EC out of its institutional malaise (Dinan 1994, 119). 
 
The enlargement shifted the centre of balance significantly towards the South. In the 
Mediterranean basin the EC had also negotiated with Turkey, Malta and Cyprus (the 
association agreements), with the Mashraq and Maghreb countries (Libya excluded) 
as well as with Yugoslavia and Israel (commercial, industrial, technical and financial 
agreements). 
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3.4 The fourth enlargement and beyond: Austria, Finland and Sweden: Towards 
Post-Cold War construction of security 
 
Political context and the state of affairs in the integration process 
 
A change in the EC’s approach to security policy came in the beginning of the 1990s 
at Maastricht where, for the first time, the member states incorporated into the Treaty 
the objective of a “common foreign and security policy”. The European Political Co-
operation became the CFSP and one of the three pillars of the European Union. The 
Western European Union (WEU) was defined as an integral part of the development 
of the Union and a reference to common defence was for the first time included in the 
treaty. Qualified majority voting was introduced in matters of procedure, and 
“common positions” and “joint actions” were created. The often quoted article of the 
treaty notes that “[T]he common foreign and security policy shall include all 
questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a 
common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.” (Ojanen et 
al. 2000, 39; Treaty on the European Union, article J.4.1.) 
 
At  least  the  interpretation  by  the  European  Commission  of  this  change  was  an  
enthusiastic one:  
 
“Since the Treaty’s entry into force on 1 November 1993, the European Union 
as such can make its voice heard on the international stage, express its 
position on armed conflicts, human rights and any other subject linked to the 
fundamental principles and common values which form the basis of the 
European Union and which it is committed to defend” (European Commission 
2003).  
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These comments refer clearly to the alleged need to further strengthen the political 
security structures, and prepare the whole organisation and its members for a new 
type of decision-making procedures in questions related to traditional hard security. 
The issues at play that required and legitimised the mobilisation of such special 
measures were “human rights” and “fundamental principles and common values” as 
well as the role of the EU as an international security policy actor, as the reference to 
armed conflicts implies. 
 
The provisions of the CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into 
force on the 1st of May 1999. Co-operation in the field of armaments was mentioned 
as a way in which the member states, as they consider appropriate, can support the 
progressive framing of a common defence policy. The treaty referred to the defence 
of the territory of the Union in that it adds to the CFSP the objective of safeguarding 
the integrity and independence of the Union. Thus a new referent object for security 
politics was introduced. With such terms as “integrity” and “independence” very 
traditional security argumentation seemed to strike back. The treaty also included the 
tasks of preserving peace and strengthening international security, including on 
external borders. The reference to international security represents a resurfacing of 
the original driving forces of the integration process, i.e.  “preserving peace” and 
“strengthening international security” are both obviously “Schumanian“ referent 
objects. Furthermore, common strategies were added to the tools of CSFP. The treaty 
also established the post of a High Representative for the CFSP to represent and also 
to assist in the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions. A 
policy planning and early warning unit was also established to assist in achieving 
shared views and assessments. Rhetorical guidelines for the acting of these bodies 
were picked from the principles created in the early stages of European integration in 
the 1950s, i.e. to maintain peace, to strengthen international security, and to promote 
democracy and the rule of law. The purpose of all these structures has been to 
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contribute  to  the  political  strength  and  credibility  of  the  EU as  an  organisation  and  
actor to be reckoned with in international politics.  
 
Institutional development was in this sense relatively successful; the Amsterdam 
Treaty indeed gave the CFSP new instruments while strengthening its consistency 
with the European Community’s traditional external activities. The EU now had 
political and administrative structures enabling it to speak “with a single voice” in 
international politics. Moreover, the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the so-called 
“Petersberg tasks” into the new Article 17 of the EU Treaty. They are humanitarian 
and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and combat-force tasks in crisis management, 
including peacemaking. This meant that the EU became an actor in the field of crisis 
management with the competence to deploy military resources as part of its response 
to international crises (Ojanen et al. 2000, 40; Treaty of Amsterdam 1997). Compared 
to the straight references to the EU’s territory and integrity the Petersberg tasks 
offered referent objects for securitisation in the military sector in a slightly softer 
form which suited the new neutral/non-aligned member states. 
 
The Cologne European Council meeting in June 1999 placed crisis management tasks 
at the core of the process of strengthening the European common security and 
defence policy. The European Council decided that, to this end, “the Union must 
have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the 
means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO”. The Union’s relationship 
to NATO was also discussed in detail in a Franco-British summit in November 1998 
that led to the so-called St. Malo Declaration. The declaration makes three sorts of 
multinational military operations involving Europeans feasible: NATO missions, 
“autonomous” EU missions, and EU missions that use NATO assets (Joint 
Declaration on European Defence 1998). This summit also played a central role in 
launching a new phase in European defence issues, especially in the creation of 
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decision-making institutions and in the commitment to increased European defence 
capabilities. 
 
The Cologne European Council also charted an 18-month timetable to put in place 
the necessary decision-making framework and operational capabilities.24 The 
Cologne Summit decided on the institutional framework for the European defence. 
The ESDP issue was developed further in that the EU’s Political and Security 
Committee (COPS, according to the French acronym) would co-ordinate the CFSP 
on daily basis, EU Military Committee would give military advice to COPS, and EU 
Military Staff (consisting mainly of former WEU personnel) would be a planning 
organ. Successive European Councils have given more substance to the process that 
aims to give the Union the capacity for autonomous action in international crisis 
management, where NATO as such is not engaged. Accordingly, the strengthening 
and securing of the capability of the EU to act autonomously in international politics 
has gained an increasingly central role in the way the EU perceives security politics. 
 
The Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999 decided to proceed 
toward the practical implementation of the ambitions of the Amsterdam Treaty and 
the Cologne European Council Declaration. It was decided to establish a European 
military capacity to undertake the full range of Petersberg tasks. The Helsinki 
European Council defined the headline goal in terms of military capabilities. For the 
Union this means being able, by the year 2003, to deploy within sixty days, and 
sustain for at least one year, a rapid reaction force up to 60 000 persons capable of 
carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks. It was also decided that new political 
                                               
24 See Presidency Conclusions, especially points 55-56, and Annex III, which includes the 
“European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and 
Defence” and the “Presidency Report on Strengthening of the common European policy on security 
and defence” (European Council 1999a). 
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and military bodies and structures would be established within the Council to enable 
the Union “to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such 
operations” (European Council 1999b, Annex III). Furthermore, a non-military crisis 
management mechanism would be established to co-ordinate and make the various 
civilian means and resources more effective, in parallel with the military ones, at the 
disposal of the Union and the member states (European Council 1999b, Annex IV25).  
 
The Nice European Council summit decided to establish within the Council new 
permanent political and military structures to provide political control and strategic 
direction in a crisis, namely a Political and Security Committee and a Military 
Committee. In addition, the Council Secretariat now incorporates a military staff 
composed of military experts seconded by the member states under the military 
direction of the Military Committee that it is to assist. Among the documents dealing 
with the “implementation of the defence initiative” was a paper entitled “Military 
Capabilities Declaration”. Although it is explicitly noted in the declaration that it 
“does not involve the establishment of a European army”, the declaration has aroused 
interpretations suggesting that it “in reality will establish the European army” (EU-
Observer 2000). 
 
The documents produced by the Nice summit also include points concerning the 
relationship  between  the  EU  and  NATO,  such  as  the  links  between  the  EU  and  
NATO members not in Union, and standing arrangements for consultation between 
the EU and NATO. These relationships were discussed already in Helsinki where the 
main items were the development of an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, 
where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military 
                                               
25 Annex IV contains the “Presidency Reports to the Helsinki European Council on ‘Strengthening 
the Common European Policy on Security and Defence’ and on ‘Non-Military Crisis Management 
of the European Union”. 
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operations in response to international crises. Also the “consultation, co-operation 
and  transparency”  between  the  EU  and  NATO,  as  well  as  the  need  to  avoid  
unnecessary duplication, were emphasised. 
 
Just like in the late 1940s the Second World War gave impetus to security oriented 
integration, it was the experiences of the Kosovo war and other crises in the Balkans 
in the 1990s that made the time ripe for successful common European moves in the 
military sector. Some have labelled the development of a common EU security and 
defence policy between December 1998 and December 2000 revolutionary, at least 
compared with the slow progress made during the preceding half century (Rutten 
2002). The Union was now provided with a common security policy that covers all 
matters relating to its security, including the gradual formulation of a common 
defence policy – this means that the Common European Security and Defence Policy 
forms part of the CFSP. This common defence policy could lead to a common 
defence if the European Council were to so decide and the decision was adopted and 
ratified by the fifteen member states. The ESDP does not, however, affect the specific 
nature of the security and defence policies of certain member states, and is also 
compatible with the policy conducted in the framework of the NATO. 
 
Membership criteria, plus neutrality, non-alignment and the CFSP 
 
Additional membership criteria were needed as the end of the Cold War drastically 
increased the number of states wanting to join the Community.26 In defining these 
new criteria one major starting point was the need to safeguard the achievements and 
continuity of the deepening process that had started with the 1987 Single European 
                                               
26 In 1990 a “sui generis” enlargement took place, which is the fall and instantaneous integration of 
the länder of the former German Democratic Republic as a result of the German unification 
(Granell 1997, 35).  
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Act and the 1989 Delors report on Economic and Monetary Union. The Commission 
set out clearly that “widening must not be at the expense of deepening. Enlargement 
must not be a dilution of the Community’s achievements” (European Commission 
1992, 11). The basic conditions for membership – such as Europeanness, European 
identity, democratic status and respect for human rights – were accompanied with 
additional criteria that required the applicants to accept the entire Community system, 
i.e. aqcuis communautaire. This included the single European market and the 
Maastricht provisions on Economic and Monetary Union. Applicants also had to 
accept and be able to implement the common and foreign policy (European 
Commission 1992). This criterion was implicitly aimed at the neutral applicants of 
Austria, Finland and Sweden (Sjursen&Smith 2001, 7; Sjursen 1997). Hence for the 
applicants it was now a question of adapting to a more established and clearly 
articulated “European” security conception that was clearly reflected in the 
membership criteria. The issue of neutrality was a particular source of disparity. Due 
to the ending of Cold War tensions and consequent changes of international security 
architecture, however, the security constructions of the neutral countries were 
becoming vulnerable to alteration; this made the assimilation to the Western-
European security conception smoother. 
 
In Norway the debate was largely shaped by the experience of the 1972 referendum 
on EU membership. From the perspective of the EU one central aspect of Norwegian 
security policy, that is to say NATO membership, actually would have made the 
accession easier as there would have been no political constrains on closer integration 
(Preston 1997, 19). The neutrality of the other applicants, however, was something 
new for the EU.27 In Sweden a central starting point was the credibility of Sweden’s 
                                               
27 According to Miles the Swedish neutrality was “voluntary and active”, whereas Finland’s 
neutrality was “semi-mandatory and passive”. In his classification the Austrian neutrality was 
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neutrality policy, which was not to be compromised by the EU membership (Preston 
1997, 20). Critical notions in the discussion concerning the essentials of security 
politics were often based on the argument that the participation in the “peace project” 
of the EU might in some way turn into a process towards NATO membership 
(Lindahl 1999). As a reaction to a Commission statement on Swedish neutrality’s 
compatibility with the CFSP the Swedish Government agreed that it was prepared to 
participate fully in the CFSP although her policy of non-participation in military 
alliances would remain unchanged. Sweden was thus not prepared to join a military 
alliance,  but  would  not  hamper  the  development  of  the  EU by  preventing  other  EU 
members from creating a common defence either (Miles 1997, 99). 
 
In Finland the Government’s White Paper of 1988 stated that EU membership was 
incompatible with neutrality. Until the beginning of 1990s the Treaty of Friendship, 
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance also gave a special twist to the Finnish policy 
towards the EU. Both the political elite and the public seemed to appreciate neutrality 
policy. As a consequence Finland did not openly express that the primary argument 
in  favour  of  joining  the  Union  was  “hard”  security.  In  fact  the  question  of  security  
was not really part of the public debate before the referendum (see Koivisto 1995, 
554). Nevertheless in opinion surveys it became quite clear that for most Finns it was 
an important factor in making up one’s mind. Hence the security issue actually 
played a crucial role in converting the undecided group into Union supporters28 
(Ekholm 1997). Still the Finnish case is told often in economic terms (Huru 1995, 
174), typically noting that Finland is one of the EU’s success stories: “With the help 
                                                                                                                                                            
“mandatory”, “in many ways passive” and "a mathematical function of the East-West power 
conflict”. (Miles 1997, 89-92.) 
28 Those who thought that, as a neighbour of an insecure Russia, Finland would be better off and 
more secure as a member of the Union than outside it accounted for 49% before the referendum, but 
after the referendum the figure rose to 63% (Ekholm 1999, 111).  
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of membership Finland overcome the worst economic crisis of the last decade in a 
remarkable manner. […] [T]hose achievements allowed it to participate in the EMU 
from the start” (Luif 1999, 13). 
 
Austrian and Swiss policies were also determined by the need to sustain neutrality 
policy.  For  Austria  this  was  due  to  the  1955  State  Treaty,  and  for  Switzerland  the  
patronised traditional neutrality was an integral part of the national identity. On the 
practical level, the movement of Austria and Finland away from traditional neutral 
stances seems to be more radical than in the Swedish case. This is partly due to 
geographical reasons as Austria and Finland are closer to the areas most affected by 
the post-1989 changes. (Miles 1997, 115.) But eventually in the late 1980s and early 
1990s a new set of variables found their place in the strategic thinking of all the three 
states. This was the main factor enabling the EU membership applications of these 
countries that had shared quite similar security concerns during the Cold War era. 
Later on the same process has led to the modification of pure neutrality into military 
non-alignment. (Rieker 2004, Sloan 1997.) 
 
Despite this transformation, it has been argued that for the EU the fourth enlargement 
had more impact on the area of the CFSP than on economic issues. “The three new 
entrants have not fundamentally altered the existing balance among the EU member 
states […]. They have not hampered the start of the third phase of EMU and the 
introduction of the euro; but their neutral or non-aligned status has made a common 
foreign and security policy more complicated to implement” (Luif 1999, 11). On the 
other hand, it has been argued that military non-alignment has not significantly 
limited these countries participation in common EU policies (Raunio & Tiilikainen 
2003, 129). In any case, the concerns that the old 12 members had on the negative 
impact of the neutral countries accession resulted in activated advancing of 
integration on foreign and security policy before the enlargement was to take place. 
Consequently, when accessing the EU, the new, neutral, member states had to accept 
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a more consistent CFSP along with the other achievements of the integration process 
thus far.  
 
3.5 Conclusion: Common European security policy - an army of arguments 
 
The analysis presented above shows how a traditional military-oriented security 
conception has been gaining significance in the European integration process since 
the 1990s.29 There has clearly been a shift towards multinational defence planning 
and the “post-national” legitimisation basis of armed forces in Europe. The field of 
defence is no longer seen a “no-go” area for the EU competence. 
 
The development of hard security structures in the EU has been a topic of active 
discussion both in academia and politics. The arguments presented vary considerably, 
but certain consensus seems to exist about the main development trend, for example, 
the pressure towards more concrete European solutions is increasing and contrary to 
earlier attempts some tangible moves have been made. Even if a European army 
might still appear unrealistic the idea that “the progressive framing of a common 
defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence” (Treaty on the 
European Union 1992) undoubtedly has gained some more credibility. Similarly, the 
traditional security and military sector have gained weight in the EU’s security 
conception. 
 
                                               
29 See e.g. Joint Declaration on European Defence 1998 (St.Malo Declaration); Helsinki Headline 
Goals 1999; Petersberg tasks (Article 17 of the Treaty on the European Union), European Council 
Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence (Cologne 
European Council Declarations 1999, Annex III); Security Strategy of the EU (Solana 2003). 
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During the European integration process that started after the Second World War 
questions of peace and war have been among the main driving forces of integration, 
although their significance relative to other factors has varied from time to time. Even 
if  the process started with clearly security-oriented aims,  much of the history of  the 
EU over  the  past  50  years  has  been  about  its  members  getting  together  to  agree  on  
common rules for economic policy making. Currently it seems that security as the 
original raison d´être of integration is about to strike back. 
 
The two main opposing arguments in the debate on the European security and 
defence  policy  can  be  simplified  as  follows:  The  first  argument  builds  on  the  
assumption that the European Union has certain unavoidable and given ”global 
responsibilities” in international politics. Often these responsibilities are seen to 
derive from the growing role of the EU in other areas of international politics, i.e. 
economics mainly.  
 
This argumentation has also been supported by references to European history. 
Firstly, it has been linked to the Second World War and the central role of United 
States in sorting out the military conflict that was of European origin. “The readiness 
of the Americans to do the Europeans’ fighting for them was made necessary […] by 
the fact that the Europeans themselves did not have the resources to do their own 
fighting. In a number of cases, they also lacked the necessary will or unity of 
purpose” (Thody 2000, 11). The current conclusion is that “resources” and the “unity 
of purpose” to do ones “own fighting” should be arranged as soon as possible. This is 
because it is seen that the international credibility of the EU is at stake. The Kosovo 
war in the 1990s undoubtedly reinforced these ideas. From this perspective the 
experiences of the Balkans caused a sense of shame about the EU’s incapacity to 
manage crises effectively. Despite of the manifested European commitments to 
Common Security and Foreign Policy prior to these events, it was the military 
intervention by NATO that served as the most concrete reaction to the war. 
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The development of European security policy into more a militarised form can also 
be presented as preservation of the peaceful era in Europe (or inside the EC/EU, to be 
exact) that has existed since the end of the Second World War and which is seen as a 
product of the integration process. Deepening and widening integration – particularly 
on the sphere of security politics – is seen necessary in order to secure this peaceful 
development, not only inside the EU, but also in the neighbouring regions: 
 
“First of all, we must preserve and develop what we have built over the past 
fifty years. It is something of a miracle that war between our peoples should 
have become unthinkable. To squander this legacy would be a crime against 
ourselves. Secondly, the Union cannot be a haven of peace in a troubled sea. 
Hence the importance of future enlargements. Hence, too, the importance of 
developing a genuine foreign and security policy” (Santer 1995). 
 
Support for the view that promotes further integration in defence and military can 
also be found in the literature on European security that suggests that the common 
defence plans carry a revolutionary significance, for in the long run common defence 
will transform the nature of the EU and its transatlantic and other relations. It has also 
been noted that the field of security and defence poses a great integrative potential: it 
can advance the whole integration process (Ojanen 2002, Howorth 2001). Successful 
development of the European Security and Defence Policy can give an effective 
boost to integration, because the politics of security and crisis management demand 
special rapidity and efficiency of decision-making. (Howorth 2001). 
 
To describe this development process, and often to justify it, a bicycle metaphor has 
often been used. According to it, if the speed is lost on such an important sector of 
integration as common foreign and security policy, the whole EU is compelled to fall 
or go backwards. In addition to the bicycle metaphor and the stressing of the need to 
defend the acquis on this sector too, some other internal motivations for further and 
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deeper integration in the second pillar have been presented. For example there is a 
certain political and ideological pressure since the failure in such an important sector 
undermines steps in other areas. Moreover, it has been noted that integration helps to 
avoid the revival of thinking in terms of balance of power politics in Europe. (Ojanen 
2002.) 
 
Furthermore it has even been stated that the lack of integration in the military sector 
has had “negative effects on the European mind-set in general and on European 
integration in particular”. “It has weakened the sense of responsibility, and caused a 
lack of experience on foreign policy as power politics. Therefore security and defence 
have appeared as an anomaly, a missing element in the construction of Europe.” 
(Andréani et al. 2001). 
 
The second major argument in the debate is built on the notion that the European 
integration process originally started as a response to the horrors of the World Wars 
and thus possesses (or should possess) strong peaceful and antimilitary features. A 
key point in this argumentation is that the 21st century EU plans on power projection 
– i.e. the tasks of combat forces in crisis management outside the EU borders, 
peacemaking, early warning military means, rapid action capacities and the like 
(Helsinki  Headline  Goals  1999)  –  are  incompatible  with  the  “real”  spirit  of  
integration. The peaceful development of Europe can only be achieved and secured 
by peaceful means (as has been done up till now), and not by military means. (See 
Joenniemi 2000, Smith 2000.) 
 
Within the background of this view can be located a longer tradition of thinking that 
connects European integration and peace (including names such as William Penn, 
Jeremy Benham, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Henri Saint-Simon and Victor Hugo). On 
the other hand, military issues and the establishment of a European army were not 
unfamiliar ideas to some of those ”proto-federalist” thinkers. For instance the so 
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called Geneva statement made in the 1940s argued for a federal Europe with a written 
constitution, a supranational government directly responsible to the people of Europe 
and not national governments, and an army under its control, with no other military 
forces being permitted (Urwin 1995, 8). The spirit and philosophy of the European 
Resistance movements can be, and has been, utilised in supporting both of the major 
arguments in the debate on European security and defence. The current European 
debate is in many ways defined by older ideas, discussions and processes. History, 
however, is an inexhaustible source, and everyone can pick a selection of facts 
suitable for his/her purposes. 
 
The winning argument and the EU’s security concept 
 
The first part of the story of European integration is often told in economic terms. 
The enlargement of 1973, for example, is typically seen as an event that closed the 
economic division which developed in the late 1950s: “The first step to reduce the 
gap between the European Community and European Free Trade Association came 
when finally Britain, together with Denmark and Ireland joined the EC in 1973” (Luif 
1999, 10). Often even the causes of the enlargement of 1995 have been attributed to 
the economy by stating, for instance, that the economic crises in Austria, Sweden and 
Finland at the beginning of the 1990s pushed the elites toward considering EU 
membership as the preferred means of helping to cope with negative growth rates 
(Luif 1999). Thus it has been concluded that “security acted as the original starting 
point of European integration, but focus on the economic aspects of integration has 
diverted attention away from this underlying motive” (Pinder 2001, 3). Peter Ludlow 
has divided the European integration development until 1989 into two stages. From 
the early 1950s to the early 1970s there was a “low policy” Community thriving in 
the relatively rigid Cold War climate of unquestioned U.S hegemony, German 
diplomatic diffidence, generally stable exchange rates, and unprecedented prosperity 
in the member states. From that time onward the Community gradually acquired a 
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“high policy” profile in the radically changing environment of fluctuating superpower 
relations, marked by U.S. decline, growing German assertiveness, oscillating 
exchange rates, and the greatly uneven economic performances of the member states. 
(Ludlow 1992, 1-4.) 
 
The latest events support the argument that common foreign and security policy has 
developed from “verbal acrobatics” to new institutions and military capabilities 
commitments with great ease and velocity (Ojanen 2002; Ojanen et al. 2000, 35-36). 
All this has changed the tone in which issues like common standards, planning, the 
operating procedures of the armed forces, and even the common defence are 
discussed. The velocity of events of the last years has surprised many observers.30 
 
All in all it seems that the EU has managed to extend integration to the military sector 
also. The factors used to legitimise these moves have been quite similar to the 
objectives of the Schuman Declaration, but spiced with references to military 
capabilities, the defence of EU territory, and to crisis management outside it. 
Consequently, it is not a question of an internal European issue only, but world 
politics play a role also. The dominant EU security conception seems to build on this. 
Thus it is seen that the credibility and effectiveness of the EU as an international 
actor in world politics is at stake, and the measures required for achieving and 
securing this actorness are mostly located in the military sector, “In order to secure 
the EU’s international role, military capacity should be built”, as the argument goes. 
The Security Strategy of the EU by Javier Solana (2003) echoes these ideas, but this 
reasoning was openly introduced and accepted widely among the heads of 
governments already in the informal EU meeting in Pörtschach in 1998. That meeting 
led to the St.Malo Declaration and the further progress in defence cooperation 
                                               
30 For instance concerning mainstream integration theories, Ojanen notes that currently “theories are 
momentarily at a loss” (Ojanen 2002). 
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achieved at the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils. Referring to the Kosovo 
issue it was agreed that the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action backed 
up by credible military force. For a long time France had already wanted the EU “to 
act like a responsible power on its own security identity” (Lang 199831), but Britain 
had twice vetoed Franco-German proposals for a joint EU defence force in the 
1990s32. It can be argued that especially the recent developments in CFSP and ESDP 
have challenged the traditional assumption that European integration in security and 
defence is impossible or highly unlikely (Ojanen 2006, 57; also Andreatta 2005, 19). 
Likewise the argument that the EU lacks effective military capabilities and cannot 
thus be characterized as a security actor (Bull 1983; Walt 1991; Hill 1993; Kagan 
2003) has become less convincing (see Rieker 2006). The European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) has emerged which contains political and institutional 
framework for decision-making as well as military and civilian capabilities for 
power-projection and crisis management in and outside Europe. According to 
Howorth the EU’s entire “military mindset” has trasformed: the EU is now engaging 
autonomous military and policing missions under a European command chain and the 
European flag (Howorth 2007). In addition to the establishment of EU battle groups 
in 2007, there has been EU military missions in Macedonia (2003), DR Congo (2003, 
2006), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004-), Chad and Central African Republic (2008-) 
and coast of Somalia (2008-) (European Council 2009). 
 
Throughout the history of integration the external environment has produced 
obstacles or counter-tendencies to European security plans. The overall international 
security architecture has had a particular impact on the European security and 
defence development through two historical watersheds. During the Cold War the 
                                               
31 Jack Lang, Head of the French National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee. 
32 Although the firmness of British commitment to autonomous EU can be questioned (see Bonnén 
2003, 46), the Pörtschach meeting signalled a major shift in Britain’s attitude towards defence 
cooperation. 
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antagonism and rivalry of the USA and Soviet Union gave no chances for an active 
and autonomous European role in major security questions, and directed the 
integration process attention towards the economic sector. After the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, a European security and defence policy with military aspirations was free of 
such  repressions.  However,  after  the  events  of  September  11th 2001, and the 
consequent US-led antiterrorist campaigns and military operations, it seems that the 
determined unipolar intentions of the USA do not give any room for other major 
autonomous security policy actors. Even if the EU has to some extent succeeded in 
capacity building and securitisation in the military sector, the current ”post-911” 
international politics undermine the significance of those achievements and pose 
further challenges. What is clear, however, is that the way the EU perceives security 
has strengthening hard security features. 
 
Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, said in his speech in Berlin 1999 that,  
 
“It [European Security and Defence Policy] will give us the ability, where 
appropriate and whenever necessary, to show that the Union is not prepared to 
stand idly by in the face of crises. Nor always to let others shoulder 
responsibility. It will be sign that the European integration dreamed by 
Europe’s founding fathers has come of age” (Solana 1999).  
 
He connected the original starting points of integration to the current globalised 
world, and referred to the responsibility of Europeans to tackle their own problems 
without being dependent on foreign (e.g.US) aid and capabilities. Currently it seems 
that this understanding of the integration history and of security’s role in further 
integration has the dominant position. However, on the basis of historical evidence on 
the varying “engines of integration” and on the changing role of security conceptions 
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and  arguments,  one  can  pose  the  question  if  this  is  a  permanent  state  of  affairs  or  
whether hard security is just another issue in the long line of drivers of integration. 
 
The enlargements of the EC and EU appear to be moments in the integration process 
when diverse and often clashing security concepts and security arguments surface. 
The next chapter looks at the security constructions in the context of the fifth 
enlargement. 
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4 THE FIFTH ENLARGEMENT ROUND 
 
This chapter analyses the role of security in the fifth enlargement round with the help 
of the second framework that was developed in chapter 2. The development process 
and the most important background factors of the EU’s security concept were 
reconstructed in the previous chapter. This chapter continues from that by analysing 
the compatibility (i.e. match/mismatch) of the new member states’ views on security 
with the EU’s conception of security. As explained in the theory chapter the main 
analytical tools that are used for identifying the differences are the constructivist view 
on security and the sectors of security. The constructivist view guides attention to 
security arguments – as in the previous chapter – and the sectors of security guide the 
classification and reading of material, as well as helping to avoid the inherent 
problems in basing analysis on the geographical grouping of countries (see chapter 
2.2).  
 
All in all, such an approach is enabled by adopting a constructivist view on 
integration, and it offers a new way for making conclusions on the future directions 
of the EU’s security policies as well as to understand the current situation better. 
 
The main guideline when trawling through the security sectors is the question, what 
do the issues surfacing in each sector tell us about the security concepts of the 
applicants and the EU – i.e. their priority setting, activeness, premises, and the like? 
Therefore the purpose is not to go through at length every aspect of applicants’ 
security policies on each security sector, but rather to track down and highlight some 
essential security issues that point to mismatching aspects of the security concepts. 
Accordingly, the main topics of scrutiny are cases where security arguments appear 
on  each  sector.  A  key  aim  is  also  to  find  out  within  what  sectors  the  main  
securitisation and desecuritisation attempts and the related security issues are located.  
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Sector-by-sector analysis also specifies how and to which degree the national security 
strategies of the applicant countries reflect the widening of security. A tentative look 
gives reason to assume that political, societal, economic, and environmental security 
threats have found their way into the strategies, as the Security Strategy of Poland 
indicates: 
“The character of threats and challenges to the security of European states, 
Poland included, has clearly been changing. The diminishing threat of a global 
or continental war is accompanied by an increasing number of local crises, 
which at times evolve, into local or regional conflicts. Their sources are 
manifold: ethnic and religious strife, border disputes, human-rights 
violations, natural and man-made disasters, a shortage of life's essentials, 
economic and societal collapse, the weakening or disintegration of state 
institutions, etc. By disrupting both the real and subjective sense of security, 
they constitute a serious source of destabilisation.  (Security Strategy of 
Poland, 2000.; emphasis added.) 
 
Before going into the sector analysis, an overview is given on the relevant technical 
and institutional aspects of the accession negotiations and the accession process. 
 
4.1 Institutional aspects of the accession process 
 
The accession process that resulted in the fifth enlargement round in 2004 and 2007 
originally contained thirteen countries that had applied to become new members of 
the European Union: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, and 
Turkey. In October 2002, the Commission recommended ending negotiations with 
ten of these countries. This meant that Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey were left out 
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from the enlargement which took place on the 1st of May 2004, the date that was set 
by the EU member states’ foreign ministers meeting in November 2002. The fifth 
round of enlargement was completed on 1 January 2007 as Bulgaria and Romania 
joined the EU. From the EU perspective the main reason for prolonging the accession 
process with these two countries was their relatively weak economies. With Turkey 
there were also other reasons. According to the Commission, the beginning of the 
entry talks with Turkey depends on improvements in the economy, finances, and 
human rights. Problematic issues include the restrictions on freedom of expression, 
the torture of prisoners, and the lack of sufficient civilian control over the armed 
forces. However, the Commission also found considerable progress towards meeting 
political membership criteria, including the lifting of the death penalty, except in case 
of war, and the permitting of education in languages other than Turkish. (Regular 
Report on Turkey 2002, Guardian 9.10.2002.) 
 
The Copenhagen criteria set in 1993 offered a tested platform for the fifth 
enlargement. However, with some of the countries the accession process had started a 
lot earlier, and thus certain agreements giving background and structure for the 
accession process were quite old, some even predating the previous two 
enlargements.  
 
The Copenhagen criteria include the following economic and political conditions for 
membership: “a stable democracy, respect of human rights, the rule of law, the 
protection of minorities, a functioning market economy, and the adoption of the 
common rules, standards, and policies that make up the body of EU law” (European 
Council 1993). According to the criteria, the applicants are expected to accept the 
acquis,  which  is  the  detailed  laws  and  rules  adopted  on  the  basis  of  the  EU’s  
founding treaties, mainly the treaties of Rome, Maastricht, and Amsterdam. Formally 
the framework for the fifth enlargement process consisted of the European 
Conference, the accession process, and the accession negotiations. The negotiation 
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process determines the conditions under which each candidate country will join the 
EU. It is supported by a pre-accession strategy, a so-called “screening” of EC 
legislation, and a review of procedure. The negotiations focus specifically on the 
terms under which candidates adopt, implement, and enforce the acquis. In certain 
cases, the granting of transitional arrangements may be possible, but these must be 
limited in scope and duration. The topics of negotiations with the Central and Eastern 
European countries as well as Cyprus and Malta were divided into 31 chapters. The 
Commission started submitting, in November 1998, regular reports to the Council on 
further progress achieved by each country. (Directorate General for Enlargement 
2003.) 
 
Through the pre-accession strategies the applicant countries adapted themselves to 
the EU norms to a certain degree before the actual accession took place. Furthermore, 
they participated in certain forms of co-operation on security affairs that took place 
between the EU and the applicants. The pre-accession strategy was decided by the 
Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 and consisted of a combination of 
priority setting coupled with financial assistance, and the preparation of the 
negotiations through screening. It aimed to help the candidate countries to prepare for 
their future membership by aligning them with the Union’s acquis before accession. 
Tools in this process were the Accession Partnerships, the Europe Agreements, and 
participation of the countries of central and Eastern Europe in Community 
programmes and agencies. 
 
Europe Agreements provided the legal basis for bilateral relations between these 
countries and the EU. The European Community had already established such 
Association Agreements with Turkey (1963), Malta (1970), and Cyprus (1972). The 
Agreements cover trade-related issues, political dialogue, legal approximation, and 
other areas of co-operation, including industry, environment, transport, and customs. 
The Association Agreements with Cyprus and Malta covered similar fields (except 
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for  the  political  dialogue),  while  the  Agreement  with  Turkey  was  also  aiming  to  
achieve a customs union. In addition to the liberalisation of trade, the Europe 
Agreements also contain provisions regarding the free movement of services, 
payments and capital in respect of trade and investments, and the free movement of 
workers. The key instruments of the Europe Agreements are Association Councils, 
Association Committees, and Joint Parliamentary Committees. The Accession 
Partnerships set out the key short and medium term priorities to be met in order to 
prepare for membership. They also indicated the financial assistance available from 
the EU in support of these priorities and the conditionality attached to that assistance. 
The Phare programme, created in 1989, provides financial support for the reforming 
and rebuilding of the central European countries’ economies. In addition to Phare, 
two other support programmes were introduced in 2000, they are the pre-accession 
structural assistance (ISPA) and the pre-accession aid to agriculture (SAPARD). 
Phare is identified in the Europe Agreements as the financial instrument specifically 
aimed at helping to achieve the objectives of the Europe Agreements. 
 
Each country prepared a national programme for the adoption of the acquis that 
indicated the resources and the predicted timetable for the implementation of the 
accession priorities. In addition to the Accession Partnership priorities, most 
applicant countries had defined their own priorities for accession. The EU underlined 
the importance of participation of the applicants in Community programmes as part 
of the enhanced pre-accession strategy, and as a useful preparation for accession by 
familiarising the associated countries and their citizens with the Union’s policies and 
working methods. Negotiations were concluded with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia in December 2002. The negotiations determined the conditions under which 
each applicant country joined the EU. Thus the negotiation results presented, for 
instance, the terms under which the applicants will adopt, implement and enforce the 
acquis. Furthermore, the transitional arrangements in each chapter were agreed. In 
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the negotiation process the EU acquis is divided into 31 chapters33. Each applicant 
country develops a position on each of the 31 chapters. The Commission proposes 
common negotiating positions for the EU for each chapter relating to matters of 
Community competence. However, formally the Treaty of Accession is an 
international treaty between the accessing states and the incumbent member states of 
the EU. Therefore, despite the active role of the Commission, on the Union side it is 
the member states who are the official parties to the accession negotiations (European 
Commission 2004b).  
                                               
33 Chapter 1: Free Movement of Goods, Chapter 2: Free Movement for Persons, Chapter 3: 
Freedom to Provide Services, Chapter 4: Free Movement of Capital, Chapter 5: Company Law, 
Chapter 6: Competition Policy, Chapter 7: Agriculture, Chapter 8: Fisheries, Chapter 9: Transport 
Policy, Chapter 10: Taxation, Chapter 11: EMU, Chapter 12: Statistics, Chapter 13: Employment 
and Social Policy, Chapter 14: Energy, Chapter 15: Industrial Policy, Chapter 16: SMEs (Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises), Chapter 17: Science and Research, Chapter 18: Education and Training, 
Chapter 19: Telecommunications and Info, Chapter 20: Culture and Audiovisual Policy, Chapter 
21: Regional Policy and Co-ordination, Chapter 22: Environment, Chapter 23: Consumers and 
Health Protection, Chapter 24: Justice and Home Affairs, Chapter 25: Customs Union, Chapter 26: 
External Relations, Chapter 27: CFSP, Chapter 28: Financial Control, Chapter 29: Finance and 
Budgetary Provisions, Chapter 30: Institutions, Chapter 31: Other. (European Commission 2004b.) 
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Table II: Main dates of the accession process. 
 
Country Europe 
Agreement  
signed 
Europe  
Agreement  
came into  
Force 
Official 
application for  
EU 
Membership 
Bulgaria March 
1993 
February 
1995 
December 1995 
Czech 
Republic 
October 
1993 
February 
1995 
January 1996 
Estonia June 
1995 
February 
1998 
November 1995 
Hungary December 
1991 
February 
1994 
March 1994 
Latvia June 
1995 
February 
1998 
October 1995 
Lithuania June 
1995 
February 
1998 
December 1995 
Poland December 
1991 
February 
1994 
April 1994 
Romania February 
1993 
February 
1995 
June 1995 
Slovakia October 
1993 
February 
1995 
June 1995 
Slovenia June 
1996 
February 
1999 
June 1996 
Country Association 
Agreement  
signed 
Association  
Agreement  
came into force 
Official 
application for 
EU 
Membership 
Turkey September  
1963 
December  
1964 
April  
1987 
Malta December  
1970 
April  
1971 
July  
1990 
Cyprus December  
1972 
June  
1973 
July  
1990 
 
  
 
86 
4.2 The environmental sector 
 
This chapter looks at the environmental sector of security (as defined by the 
Copenhagen School in Buzan et al. 1998) and analyses the credibility, success, and 
significance of security arguments that relate to the environment in the fifth 
enlargement round. Questions that give support the analysis are: Did any noteworthy 
security arguments emerge in the environmental sector? Did these security arguments 
have significance concerning the whole enlargement process? Were environmental 
issues  cast  in  the  form  of  security  speech,  or  did  any  of  the  major  actors  consider  
environmental issues as security questions? Were there any mismatches in the 
security conceptions in this respect? 
 
Categories of environmental security 
 
“Constant attention must be channelled into the risks of industrial or military-
technology accidents and natural disasters, epidemics, and ecological dangers, 
such as changes in the climate, drinking water shortages, and other global 
threats.” (Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, 2001.) 
 
”Natural disasters as well as catastrophes caused by human activity can 
constitute a serious threat to state security. Particular concern surrounds the 
question of safe nuclear power in Europe.”  (Security Strategy of Poland, 2000.) 
 
Generally threats to environmental security can be divided into two main categories. 
As the environmental paragraphs of the Czech and Polish Security Strategies 
indicate, there are two threat types, they are threats not caused by human activity and 
threats from human activity. Despite the fact that the official security conceptions of 
the then-applicant countries covered environmental threats with parlance reminiscent 
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to that  of  the EU, the attainment of  EU standards has been,  and still  is,  challenging 
for them. For example, concerning air, water and waste management the 
implementation of environmental acquis remains difficult and costly, mainly because 
the existing installations in the new member countries have not been designed or built 
taking into account environmental concerns. 
 
In the accession process environmental security was thus expected to play a 
somewhat  problematic  role.  Often  special  priority  for  the  environment  in  the  
accession process was searched for by referring to drinking water, air, and waste 
management as crucial elements for guaranteeing the well-being and safety of 
Europeans. Biodiversity and “European natural heritage” were presented as potential 
referent objects too, whereby species and habitat types that have nearly vanished 
from Europe must be prevented from disappearing. The EU is seen as a community 
of shared values, and natural heritage as one of these values (See Directorate General 
for  Environment  2002).  However,  in  the  context  of  enlargement  the  EU  clearly  set  
varying priority rankings to different types of environmental issues. 
 
On environmental issues the general aim of the EU is to introduce and harmonise the 
environmental norms of the new member states that will have to adopt the stricter 
environmental rules and standards of the EU environmental legislation. Concerning 
the bulk of the environmental acquis it has been recognised that full compliance with 
it is achievable only in long term due to the gap in the level of environmental 
protection of applicants compared with the situation in the EU (European 
Commission 1997). The majority of these environmental issues belong to a group 
with the lowest priority status, meaning they are handled with the “normal” 
procedures without any actual reference to special priority or other security logic.  
 
On the issues concerning quality of air and water, and related waste management, 
certain references to special measures and prioritisation are observable. Thus they get 
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a  higher  priority  status  than  the  issues  of  the  first  group.  The  EU  claimed  that  a  
”special strategy for the environmental approximation” and a ”reinforced Community 
pre-accession assistance strategy” for tackling water and air pollution are needed 
(European Commission 1998, 1). These were presented as “pieces of environmental 
legislation for which no transition periods have been, or will be, accepted because of 
their particular importance.” (Directorate General for Environment 2002, 2). The 
suggested reason why these issues should be taken care of “as soon as possible” is 
that they carry “very important gains for environment and public health” (European 
Commission 1998, 8). The related legislation was classified according to priority by 
labelling them either Stage 1 or Stage 2 legislation. Principles for guiding the 
“identification of key priority areas” were created by the EU in 1995 (European 
Commission 1995).  
 
Even though the EU found that these prioritised issues and special strategies ”call for 
special measures and consideration both in the candidate countries and in the 
Community” (European Commission 1998, 1), this activity does not, however, meet 
the criteria of securitisation set by the Copenhagen School. Even if special measures 
are introduced, it is not argued that these issues ”should break the normal rules of the 
game and take absolute priority”. Neither are they unambiguously presented as 
existential threats, since the references to the safety of Europeans and biodiversity 
remain quite cursory. Furthermore, the demanded means consist of co-operation, 
mobilisation of support, and assistance for the national programmes. Thus even if a 
higher urgency and prioritisation is set on these issues, the enlargement dialogue will 
follow the normal characteristics, i.e. “meeting quality requirements and standards” 
and  “encouraging the candidate countries to set in place related directives with the 
help of National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis” (European 
Commission 1998, 4-8). Only in some special cases like the cross-border pollution of 
water, heavily polluting industries, and energy production does the dialogue gets 
tones reminiscent of security speech. Yet the more apparent security argumentation is 
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reserved for other issues – issues on which the lack of action is seen to have the 
potential to threaten the subsistence of the existing levels of European civilisation.34 
 
Nuclear safety 
 
There seems to be one particular environmental issue that triggered the use of 
security argumentation in the enlargement dialogue. The EU considers the issue of 
nuclear safety important enough to use security argumentation. The security speech is 
based on the presumed threat of widespread cross-border effects and the urgency of 
tackling the problem. Concerning nuclear safety the EU’s mode of speech in 
enlargement dialogue is clearly different when compared to other environmental 
issues, ”Nuclear safety in the applicant countries is a major political issue and 
challenge in the enlargement process, which goes well beyond the environmental 
approximation process” (European Commission 1998, 9). When countering 
arguments of the applicants appear on the issue, they are mostly economically based 
and relate to the national energy politics of the countries. Typically for the 
environmental security sector, there are also other actors that succeed in playing a 
significant role in the securitisation and de-securitisation attempts of environmental 
issues (cf. Buzan et al. 1998, 77). In addition to these actors, there are certain 
fundamental internal EU factors that determine the securitisation process and the 
success of it. The most important of these is the unclear status of nuclear policies in 
the acquis. 
 
There are ten nuclear power plants in Central and Eastern Europe that are defined as 
“causes of special concern” by the EU, a definition that is largely based on technical 
                                               
34 According to Buzan et al. (1998, 75-76) in addition to the “existing level of civilization” the 
typical referent objects in the environmental sector include the local and planetary biosphere, 
human enterprise, and endangered species. 
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assessments. The nuclear power plants in question are of the infamous RBMK type 
(often called Chernobyl-type), which does not have an adequate cooling down system 
necessary especially in the case of an accident. The safe operating life-time of these 
power plants is also limited. In addition to the seven Central and Eastern Europe 
countries that have nuclear power plants (i.e. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Lithuania,  Romania,  Slovak  Republic  and  Slovenia)  the  EU  has  paid  attention  to  
research reactors, and spent fuel and radioactive waste management facilities in other 
countries also. As a result, the military and civilian nuclear waste facilities that do not 
conform to Western standards have been labelled as a “source of concern” for the 
EU. Therefore the applicants/new member states that do not have nuclear plants are 
also included in the EU’s nuclear safety activities. Estonia, for instance, has two 
waste storage facilities, one of these situated at Paldinski, the site of the 
decommissioned ex-Soviet training reactors. Latvia has two research reactors, both 
shut down, and an old waste disposal containing military waste. Poland has one 
operating research reactor and two that are shut down. Cyprus and Malta have 
relevant activities only in the form of management and disposal of “institutional 
radioactive waste”, mainly sealed sources from industrial and medical applications. 
(Report on Nuclear Safety in the Context of Enlargement 2001.) 
 
The main aim of the EU is to integrate Western European nuclear safety culture into 
the applicant countries. The task is complicated because the EU does not have 
common safety standards and binding regulations on nuclear safety issues. 
Consequently, an acquis on nuclear safety is lacking. The setting of specific nuclear 
safety standards is the responsibility of the individual member states and their 
regulatory bodies. The application of high nuclear safety standards in the applicant 
countries was requested by the Laeken European Council in December 2001. 
However inside the Union common nuclear safety standards have been lacking, 
despite of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) and the 1995 White Paper on Energy Policy. This paradoxical situation 
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has lately led to activities by the Commission that are designed to put into action a 
truly Community approach to nuclear safety both in the current member states and 
the candidate countries. (Taylor 1999; European Commission press release 
6.11.2002.) The EURATOM treaty is one of the founding treaties of the European 
Union. It was originally drafted in the 1950s and therefore many of the current major 
concerns of the safety of nuclear power plants and radioactive waste were not 
addressed.35 As a result, these aspects of nuclear industry regulation have become the 
responsibility of individual member states. Further standardisation has been provided 
by international organisations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and international conventions. 
 
In environmental issues the EU follows an accession strategy according to which 
there are “urgent problems that have to be addressed in short term” (e.g. setting up 
national authorities and making nuclear power plants safer). Longer-term objectives 
include replacing less-safe reactors with alternative energy sources, improving energy 
efficiency, and assisting in the modernisation of the safest reactors. Agenda 2000 and 
the Accession Partnerships spelt out which reactors should be upgraded, in Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria, and which reactors should be closed 
because they could not be upgraded (Ignalina 1-2, Kozloduy 1-4, Bohunice V1). 
Other main instruments of the EU activities during the pre-accession period included 
the Report on Nuclear Safety in the Context of Enlargement (2001), a special peer 
review that assessed the progress of applicants in implementing the Report, and a 
Status Report (2002). These activities gave recommendations concerning national 
                                               
35 The EURATOM Treaty mainly covers issues like radiological protection of the work force and 
the public, supply of uranium for the developing nuclear power sector, safeguarding of this fissile 
material to prevent it from being used for unauthorised military purposes, and general aspects such 
as research and dissemination of information (Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community 1957.) 
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safety improvement programmes (i.e. spent fuel, radioactive waste, and safety of 
research reactors) and assessed their implementation.  
 
The EU activities on nuclear security issues of the applicant countries include general 
and country-specific recommendations. These recommendations are classified into 
two groups, those with the “highest priority”, and measures to be implemented in a 
more flexible time frame. They concern, for instance, the safety improvement 
programmes of nuclear power plants including emergency operating procedures and 
the like. Under EU evaluation has been the legislation, the regulatory and 
organisational framework, financial safety resources, and national emergency 
planning. The recommendations include also very practical and technical issues, such 
as high-energy pipes, condenser systems, safety documentation, as well as fire and 
seismic hazards. In the country-specific observations and recommendations the two 
objects gaining most attention are the operating nuclear power reactors in Kozloduy, 
Bulgaria and Ingalina, Lithuania. 
 
All in all, by invoking  “western standards” the EU has managed to quite successfully 
introduce a principle of early closure for certain types of power reactors that are in 
operation in the applicant countries. Furthermore, to compensate the lack of actual 
laws, a “non-binding acquis”36 (sic.) on nuclear safety has been created. This “non-
binding acquis” consists of two European Council Resolutions (from 1975 and 1992), 
the instruments developed by the western European nuclear industry (referring to co-
operation in development costs and operating licences), and technical assistance to 
Central and Eastern European countries for the improvement of nuclear safety levels. 
(European Commission 2000.) This way the EU has partially managed to place the 
                                               
36 The delicate state of affairs is well described by the wordings of Non-paper 29/09/2000: 
“Throughout this paper, the expression “non-binding EU-acquis” should not be understood as 
having any legal meaning” (European Commission 2000). 
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security tag on the nuclear safety issue. Nuclear safety policies constitute a break in 
the “normal” integration procedures between the EU and the accessing countries – 
particularly due to the stricter nuclear safety requirements that apply for the new 
members only. 
 
According  to  the  Copenhagen  School,  in  the  environmental  sector  there  are  two  
factors that determine the securitisation processes. Firstly, there is a specific form of 
dependence upon scientific authority for questions of evidence and proof of 
environmental  threats.  In  the  context  of  the  fifth  enlargement  there  seems  to  be  a  
certain agreement as to these aspects of the nuclear threat. The International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) has a special programme that concerns the safety of certain 
types of reactors (the RBMK-type included) in countries of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. The assessments of the condition of the ex-Soviet nuclear 
plants and waste facilities has led to international consensus on the major safety 
issues for these reactors, and their safety significance (IAEA 1999). But in the end, 
critical for the success of the securitisation is not whether specific threats to the 
environment are real or speculative but whether their presumed urgency is a political 
issue  (Buzan  et  al.  1998,  73).  In  this  respect,  the  lack  of  real,  binding,  acquis on 
nuclear safety seriously hampers the EU’s attempts.  
 
Despite all the above-presented instruments and activities the EU is lacking some 
capacities of an effective lead actor that would be successful in securitising nuclear 
safety.  The case of “non-binding acquis” actually only highlights the EU’s inability 
to make successful security moves in this area. This means that in this case the 
internal features of the securitising actor, that is to say of the EU, clearly restrain the 
security argumentation. Consequently, this significant deficiency in the EU’s 
instruments evidently hampers the credibility of its security moves. It also questions 
“the strong commitment to effective international action” (Buzan et al. 1998, 77) that 
typically is a central feature of the lead actor in the securitisation processes within the 
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environmental sector. Thus it has given room for continuous political discussion 
between the EU and applicants, as well as made the intervention of other actors easier 
and more likely. The Copenhagen School calls these actors of the securitisation 
process “veto actors” and “functional actors” (Buzan et al. 1998).  
 
Economy versus environment: Countering the environmental security argumentation 
 
“Protection from the danger of radiation is a priority of national security in 
Lithuania, because there is a potential source of nuclear pollution – Ingalina 
Nuclear Plant. In accordance with the laws and other legal acts of Republic of 
Lithuania, control and nuclear waste and monitoring of the environment of 
nuclear energy sites are being implemented.”  
(National Security Strategy of Lithuania, 2002.) 
 
On the level of official declarations the applicant security conceptions in 
environmental sector seem up-to-date in the sense that they match with the EU 
language. Thus the applicant countries did not challenge the basic points of departure 
of the EU’s nuclear safety policies. However, in most of the cases where the EU 
demands the closure of nuclear power reactors, designating them as security threats 
that don’t meet the “western standards” on the grounds of their alleged technological 
backwardness,  attempts of counter-securitisation or desecuritisation by the applicant 
countries have taken place. This has been evident especially in the case of Lithuania, 
Bulgaria and Romania. Thus such issues remained on the enlargement agenda after 
2004, and gained extra impetus due to the nuclear power plants in Bulgaria and 
Romania (especially the Soviet-era Kozloduy plant in Bulgaria), as well as other 
numerous environmental problems in the Balkans. Western responsibility and the 
linkages of environmental and military security issues come into spotlight above all 
in the post-conflict activities of the Kosovo war. The clean-up, strengthening of the 
capacity of authorities for environmental management and protection, and other aid 
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forms in recovery and reconstruction period are currently ongoing. They will remain 
a long-term task for the international community and the EU, especially as the 
countries of the Balkans are potential EU candidate countries in the future37. (See 
UNEP 1999; UNEP 2002.) 
 
The European Commission has emphasised the significance of the Ingalina question 
by naming it as “the most essential issue” in the environment and energy sector. 
“Lithuania took the necessary decision regarding the closure of Unit 2 of the Ingalina 
Nuclear Power Plant. Developments regarding this plant remain a core element of the 
evolution of Lithuania’s energy policy” (Regular Report on Lithuania 2002, 86). The 
aforementioned decision was that Lithuania formally confirmed that Unit 1 of the 
plant will be closed before 2005 and formally committed to close Unit 2 by 2009. 
Before these commitments were fulfilled, Lithuania appealed to the national 
economic significance of the Ingalina plant. According to an adviser to the 
Lithuanian Government, at some point the Lithuanian Government was reluctant to 
abide with the agreement, and there had been political debate on the legality of the 
agreement and whether it was approved with proper parliamentary procedures (Kittel 
1999). As a result Lithuania has received additional assurance of continued financial 
assistance:  
“The EU, for its part, recognised that the decommissioning of the Ingalina 
Nuclear Power Plant will have to continue beyond the current financial 
perspectives and that this effort represents for Lithuania an exceptional 
financial burden not commensurate with the size and economic strength of the 
country. The EU expressed its readiness, on the basis of Community solidarity, 
                                               
37 In June 2000 Feira European Council stated that Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania are “potential 
candidates” for EU membership. Croatia submitted an application for EU membership on the 21st 
of February 2003. 
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to continue to provide adequate additional Community assistance to the 
decommissioning effort also after Lithuania’s accession.”  
(Regular Report on Lithuania 2002, 88.) 
 
The consecutive securitisation and counter-securitisation attempts by Lithuania and 
the EU eventually resulted in victory for the supranational rule. States, however, are 
quite keen on connecting the novel, untraditional, “soft” environmental security 
issues to the traditional security policy mechanisms, “The system of state defence 
should take such [environmental] threats into account. That requires increasing the 
structures and mechanisms, as well as suitable legal regulations.” (Security Strategy 
of  Poland  on  the  natural  environment.)  The  aims  and  approach  of  the  EU  are  not  
necessarily more “post-modern” than that, but the EU integration logic places the 
security actions above the national level, even if not that effectively as the lacking 
acquis on nuclear safety indicates38. 
 
In addition to the EU, member states, and candidates, some international interest 
groups have actively tried to influence the security moves by contesting the attempts 
to prioritise the threat. Concerning the nuclear safety issue, the current plans and 
activities of the EU have raised reactions from economic actors, such as the 
FORATOM (trade association of the European nuclear industry), which argued that 
the nuclear industry is already highly regulated and that “any other new instruments 
pertaining to safety or decommissioning funds would have to examined carefully as 
                                               
38 After the enlargement of 2004 too, the Commission has been – unsuccessfully – calling for 
tougher EU nuclear safety standards and for a community level nuclear safety mechanism. For 
instance in May 2005 the EU Energy Commissioner said that ”the EU should be allowed overall 
framework control for the safety of nuclear installations” and that “It is not possible to continue to 
function efficiently in relation to the varying national legislation in force. In an area as sensitive as 
nuclear energy, it is essential to show the greatest form of transparency”. (EUobserver 11.5.2005.) 
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they are in our view already managed properly.” (FORATOM 2002) In the 
Copenhagen School’s reading such actors are labelled economic functional actors, 
and they are often placed in the spotlight, in a negative sense, of environmental 
security debates, due to the fact that they are motivated by profit making. The rather 
active and visible involvement of such actors as the FORATOM shows that the EU is 
not capable of fully successful institutionalised securitisation in the environmental 
sector. This is partially due to a general characteristic of the environmental sector, “In 
the environmental sector, the security status of issues has only recently been asserted 
and, lacking any depth of social sedimentation, is much more vulnerable to such 
countermoves” (Buzan et al 1998, 77). 
 
Summary on environmental sector 
 
It seems that in general terms the conceptions on the environmental sector are 
matching. The national security strategies imply at least the superficial adoption of 
the wide security conception, as far as environmental security is concerned. In this 
respect environmental security has found its way on the political agenda beside the 
more traditional security concerns. Its position among the other issues on the security 
agenda, however, is not unquestionable or deep-rooted. 
 
In the Central  and Eastern European countries the industrial  policies of  the socialist  
era have not given easy starting points from which to achieve western environmental 
standards. Meeting the environmental norms and other requirements posed by the EU 
calls for huge financial investments. Consequently, economic questions can be found 
in the background when mismatches and countering argumentation and securitisation 
attempts appear in the environmental sector. The countering arguments stem from the 
national economy, and build on the claim that the impacts of environmental security 
(and nuclear safety especially) are negative for the national economy. The 
possibilities for such countering argumentation are enhanced by two factors, the first 
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being an internal feature of the EU, i.e. lack of common binding rules. The second 
factor is the general vulnerability to countermoves of the environmental sector. Both 
factors have also made the intervention of other actors into the securitisation 
processes easier. 
 
4.3 The economic sector 
 
This chapter looks at the economic sector of security (as defined by the Copenhagen 
School in Buzan et al. 1998) and analyses the credibility, success, and significance of 
security arguments in that sector of the fifth enlargement round. The main task is to 
see if any noteworthy security arguments emerged in the economic sector – were 
there are any economic issues that were moved beyond normal politics by arguing 
that they form an existential threat to a certain referent object? And if so, who was the 
securitising actor and who the audience of the security move, and what was set as the 
security referent object? Furthermore, how did the securitisation take place? What 
were the security arguments? On what they were grounded? And what explains the 
success or failure of securitisation? In addition the following issues are kept under 
scrutiny, the significance of these security arguments on the whole enlargement 
process, and the match/mismatch of the accessing countries’ and the EU’s security 
concepts.  
 
As a starting point for the analysis, the potential securitising actors and their 
motivations in the context of the enlargement can be categorised as follows: Firstly, 
building on the Copenhagen School’s framework, from the perspective of the 
applicant countries there might be issues that are considered that imperative for the 
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national economy39 that they are constructed as security referents that are threatened 
by the integration process. In the context of the accession process this would mean 
arguing that the issue in question should gain the status of an exceptional case and 
remain outside the bounds of, in this case, economic integration. Secondly, the 
historical perspective on the role of security in integration presented in Chapter 3 
gives ground to suggest that the EU could construct issues like economic growth, 
economic stability, and the single market system as referent objects whose existence 
is threatened if the accessing countries do not submit to the common economic rules. 
The potentiality of these latter issues as a basis for securitisation is enhanced by the 
inescapable link between the overall legitimacy of the EU and economic growth and 
welfare in the Union40. 
 
This chapter will show that successful securitisation in the economic sector is quite 
difficult to achieve. It will also show that the capacity of the applicants to securitise 
economic issues in the context of integration is limited. This limitation results from 
several factors, as will be explained in this chapter. Furthermore, it is argued in this 
chapter that the observation and analysis of securitisation is more laborious and 
problematic in the economic sector than in any of the other sectors. Two reasons for 
this can be found: The first stems from the special characteristics of the economic 
security sector. The Copenhagen School refers to this by arguing, “little of a strictly 
economic security agenda exists within liberalism” (Buzan et al. 1998, 116). This is 
because one characteristic of economic security under liberalism is that it is about the 
creation of stable conditions in which actors can compete mercilessly. In a capitalist 
system the actors in the market are supposed to feel insecure in their struggle for 
                                               
39 See Buzan et al. 1998, 100 on the variety and overlap of security actors and referent objects in the 
economic sector, as well as on the limited possibilities of securitisation in terms of a national 
economy under economic liberalism. 
40 The Copenhagen School notes, “the EU can be existentially threatened by whatever might unglue 
the rules and agreements that constitute its single market.” (Buzan et al. 1998, 106.) 
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profits and survival. Insecurity is a basic feature of life in a market economy, and 
because of the nature of economic relations under liberalism the logic of survival is 
difficult to argue within the economic sector itself (Buzan et al. 1998; 98, 115). 
Therefore it might be difficult to distinguish between proper economic security and 
merely politicised economy. 
 
The second factor that blurs the logic of securitisation in the economic sector comes 
from the characteristics of the European integration process. As the historical 
perspective on the role of security in the integration process indicated in the Chapter 
3, focusing on the economy has had a central role in the history of the integration 
process, and the economy has played an essential role in the EU’s security concept. 
The original starting points and logic of integration emphasise the link between 
military security and economic structures. The aim was to make war materially 
impossible by means of economic control (see chapter 3.1). Certain components of 
the economic sphere were thus moved beyond normal politics and into the authority 
and competence of a multinational actor. This was based on the argumentation that 
European peace – or even world peace – depended on these components. The 
Copenhagen School acknowledges this by noting, “part of the founding logic of 
formal European integration was to link the basic industries (i.e. iron, steel, coal, and 
nuclear) of Europe together in a way that would reduce states’ capability for 
independent military mobilization” (Buzan et al. 1998, 103).  
 
Initially the economy-related security argumentation was clearly identifiable, and the 
peaceful development in post-war Europe was used as the main security referent, but 
as the integration process advanced such security arguments become more 
subliminal. Instead, in promoting the essentiality of further economic integration 
preferably reference is made directly to issues like economic growth and 
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competitiveness.41 At the same time, applying special measures and moving decision-
making above the national level in economic issues become widely considered and 
accepted as the “normal” way of making politics.  
 
In the context of the fifth enlargement this is manifested for instance in the way the 
Single Market and other EU’s economic rules are presented as critical features that 
the new members must comply with:  
“The challenge lies in managing a pan-European Single Market of 25 or more 
member countries and in coping with the increased inequality across the 
Union. To function properly, the Single Market requires a set of common rules 
and policies in a number of areas. And one requirement for accession to the 
European Union is that new Member States countries must adopt and be able 
to implement the full body of Community legislation. Of course, this has placed 
an immense administrative burden on the newcomers and the real challenge 
will come when the rules have to be applied in full, immediately upon 
membership. At any rate, however big the challenge to implement the 
regulations in full may be, the new Member States' smooth integration into the 
                                               
41 The White Book by the Commission titled “Growth, Competitiveness, Employment” gives a 
good example of this: ”…we must [create jobs] if we want to safeguard the future – the future of 
our children, who must be able to find hope and motivation in the prospect of participating in 
economic and social activity and of being involved in the society in which they live, and the future 
of our social protection systems, which are threatened in the short term by inadequate growth and 
in the long run by the deterioration in the ration of the people in jobs to those not in employment. 
[…] This major challenge confronts us all. That is why we are arguing, first and foremost, the need 
to press on with building a unified Europe […] Nothing would be more dangerous than for Europe 
to maintain structures and customs which foster resignation, refusal of commitment and passivity.” 
(European Commission 1993.) (Emphasis added.) 
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Single Market will be decisive.” (President of the European Commission 
Romano Prodi 2003) 
 
Therefore  it  can  be  argued  that  compared  to  other  sectors  of  security,  the  EU’s  
securitisation moves have gained most acceptance and success in the economic 
sector. As the success of this securitisation materialises, however, there is no longer 
need for visible security moves. The initial securitisation move has been accepted and 
the institutions established accordingly to implement the required special measures 
which move economic decision-making beyond the national level. Thus one can 
argue that since the economy has been successfully and institutionally securitised, 
there is no need for constant stressing of the existential threat. Paradoxically, the 
securitised state of issues has become normal politics – business as usual. This 
unavoidably makes it more difficult for the applicant countries to look for exceptions 
to the economic conditions that the EU is placing on them.  
 
Economic decline – an existential threat to the EU?  
 
The special status that economic issues have achieved in integration is based on the 
following logic: economic issues could pose an existential threat to the EU when it is 
a question of violations to the single market rules that threaten the economic order 
and stability in the EU. But more typically, the main security referent is economic 
growth and welfare and the achieved market systems in the EU (i.e. the Single 
market) rather than the EU as a whole (cf. note 42). However, these referents are 
inseparable. The economic sector is of particular significance to the EU because the 
overall legitimisation for the advancing integration process comes largely from the 
economic argumentation, even though the military and crisis management oriented 
aspects of security might be regaining a bigger role in European security construction 
(see chapter 3.4). If economic growth turned negative and caused economic 
instability, the whole EU integration process would be questioned. Hence threat 
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scenarios with especially large-scale implications can be located in this sector. The 
EU has, however, managed to build a convincing security argument based on the 
necessity of economic integration. It has become a rarely challenged perception in 
European politics that integration has contributed to the economic stability of the EU. 
After each enlargement round there has been economic success stories to show off 
(Ireland, Spain and Finland, for instance). To some extent this development has 
reached a stage where economic integration is no longer seen in Europe as an 
exception from “normal political procedures”. Therefore the dominant perception is 
strongly influenced by readings that see economic integration as the normal, 
desecuritised, state of international politics. 
 
It is largely accepted, not only among the EU members, that the inherent logic of the 
economy is global and thus beyond the reach of a single state. Therefore 
supranational decision-making and power is more typical and accepted in the 
economic sector than in the other sectors of security. In the world politics 
regionalisation is a strong trend in this sector as the multitude of regional 
organisations  with  economic  orientation  indicates,  for  example,  the  EU,  NAFTA,  
ASEAN, AFTA, APEC, MERCOSUR, ECOWAS, SAARC, SADC, and CIS42. In 
the economic security sector the security conceptions of the applicants and the EU 
match in the sense that European regionalisation has been accepted as a response to 
globalisation,  to help states to cope with the success or failure of liberal international 
economic order.  
 
                                               
42 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Southern Cone 
Common Market (MERCOSUR), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), Commonewealth of Independent States (CIS). 
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Limited possibilities of the applicants to securitise economic issues 
 
A number of factors that delimit the possibilities of the applicants to securitise 
economic issues in the context of enlargement can be found. To start with, as 
indicated below, issues like economic growth and competitiveness have been 
permanently securitised in the EU, in the sense that they are moved beyond national 
politics in an institutionalised manner. Further delimiting factors stem from the logic 
of economic globalisation and the responses to it.  
 
The Copenhagen School argues that the current strong globalising trend in the 
economy weakens the state and might result in the marginalisation of the state (Buzan 
et al. 1998, 115). This obviously decreases the possibilities of states to act as credible 
securitisation actors in the economic sector. What also made it more difficult for the 
EU applicants to securitise national economy in the context of integration was the 
fact that economic security was what they were looking for from EU membership, 
and in order to achieve this main goal they agreed to open their national economies 
for integration. Besides, during the post-Soviet era all the Central and Eastern 
European applicant countries have accepted and welcomed capitalism and a market 
economy. According to the Copenhagen membership criteria, set by the EU, this is 
also a prerequisite since EU membership requires “the existence of a functioning 
market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the Union” (European Council 1993).  
 
In this light the applicants have accepted the aforementioned EU’s “securitisation 
move” in the economic sector, and share the same economic security concept: to 
avoid the risks that loom in the economic sector of globalised economy they have 
chosen the path of economic integration. This is clearly linked to the way “economic 
stability”, “economic growth” and “competitiveness” serve generally as key 
  
 
105 
buzzwords in legitimising the deepening of the whole European integration process. 
This type of strive for economic security is generally noted as the main pro-argument 
of the EU membership by the applicants: 
 
“The Slovak Republic will connect stability, efficiency and security of the 
economy with gradual integration into the European Union, namely by 
adopting its legislation and the rules of economic regulation.“ 
(Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic, 2001.) 
 
The typical threat perceptions of the economic security sector are described quite 
uniformly both in the theoretical literature and official policy papers. The 
Copenhagen School argues that due to globalisation of production and economic 
dependencies, threat perceptions of states concern the ability to maintain an 
independent capacity for mobilisation and security of supply (Buzan et al 1998, 
chapter 5). Correspondingly, the official policy statements read economic threats 
similarly: 
 
“In an age of globalisation, marked by a high degree of mutual economic ties, 
the economy is exerting a growing influence on issues of state security. That 
applies both to a state's economic potential and its macroeconomic and financial 
stability, as well as the amount of resources it earmarks for defence and the 
capacity of its defence industry.” 
(Security Strategy of Poland, 2000; on economic threats.) 
 
The main differences in the general approach on economic security derive from the 
significance that the economic sector is given in the aggregate security concept since 
for the applicants this seemed to be the main EU security sector, whereas the EU has 
been increasingly aiming to emphasise its significance in the other security sectors 
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also. Despite these aspirations, the applicants tend to think of European integration 
and the EU in soft security terms. Because of its link to military issues this mismatch 
will be explained in more detail in the chapter that deals with the military security 
sector.43 But in general terms, in the economic security sector the concepts of the 
applicants and the EU can be regarded as coherent and matching. Given the 
delimitations to successful securitisation in the economic sector in the context of 
European integration, examples of cases that would refer to mismatching concepts 
are rare. Only a very few cases where attempts to securitisation seem to be taking 
place can be located. Among the issues that the applicants consider vitally important 
for their national economy, agriculture figures prominently. In this single area of 
economic politics, issues were cast in a form that comes very close to security speech 
and the logic of securitisation. 
 
The attempt of Poland to securitise agriculture in the accession process 
 
Agriculture is a key sector of the Central and Eastern European countries’ economies 
– in terms of the amount of farmland, the percentage of agricultural production in 
GDP, and the amount of working agricultural population – and it plays an important 
role in the domestic politics of most of them. The relative importance of agriculture is 
heightened in these countries, and the health of the general economy is inescapably 
intertwined with that of the agricultural sector. (IPC 1997.) Therefore agriculture also 
seems to hold the potential to evoke security argumentation. Consequently, it was in 
some cases constructed as a matter of life and death during the accession process. It 
should be noted, however, that irrespective of the accession process, the economic 
and political transformation of the Central and Eastern European countries had 
                                               
43 The Copenhagen School emphasises the “security spillovers” from the economic sector to other 
sectors (Buzan et al. 1998, 117). 
  
 
107 
resulted in wide and deep structural changes in the agricultural sector of these 
countries.44 
 
Agriculture is also high on the agenda of the EU. In financial terms the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU accounted for 45 % of the total EU budget 
before the fifth enlargement. It was calculated that the accession of ten new member 
states increased the number of farmers by 120% and the area under cultivation by 
42% (Swinnen 2002). Agriculture was also the largest of the negotiation chapters.45 
 
Therefore it was widely expected by the both negotiation sides that the agricultural 
chapter  of  the  negotiations  (chapter  7)  would  be  one  of  the  most  difficult  and  
sensitive. For instance, concerning the negotiations with Poland the EU 
Commissioner for Agriculture noted, “According to our experience with previous 
enlargements, the chapter on agriculture could remain open until the very last night of 
the negotiations.” (The Polish Voice 2000b, 17). 
 
The membership negotiation process showed that concerning agricultural policies 
some applicants were reluctant to meet the EU requirements – even to the point 
where membership was put at stake, from the perspective of the both negotiation 
sides, i.e. the EU and the applicant. To a certain extent this can be regarded as part of 
normal negotiation tactics, but momentarily the disagreement and persistence was so 
strong that one could argue that attempts to securitise the issue were taking place. 
                                               
44 The structural reforms in agriculture include inter alia privatisation of primary agriculture; land 
reform and the creation of a new farming structure based on private ownership of land and 
productive assets; and creation of a new macro-economic framework for agriculture with price and 
market liberalisation (IPC 1997). 
45 The issues included in the negotiation chapter for agriculture are classified under the following 
titles: Horizontal Issues, Common Market Organisations, Arable Crops, Specialised Crops, Animal 
Products, Veterinary Legislation, and Phytosanitary Legislation (European Commission 2004b). 
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The following analysis concentrates on Poland since agriculture seemed to trigger the 
use of security speech in the membership negotiation process and the related 
enlargement dialogue between Poland and the EU. Due to its large size, it can be 
assumed that Poland’s capacities for securitisation in the economic sector are greater 
than those of the other applicants. When Poland joined the EU in 2004 it became one 
of the six largest member states. Poland also clearly aims for a degree of leverage 
proportional to its size in many policy sectors in the EU (Raik & Palosaari 2004).  
 
The last stages of the membership negotiations witnessed Poland making strong 
claims concerning its agricultural production. On the issue of agricultural subsidies 
Poland argued for higher payouts and quotas and extended tariff protection. The 
Polish Deputy Prime Minister noted that if these claims were refused by the EU, the 
Polish government would “selectively protect the market and postpone 
implementation  of  some  of  the  CAP’s  instruments”  (EU-observer  2.7.2002).  As  a  
response Günter Verheugen, the European Union Commissioner for enlargement, 
said that Polish entry into the EU could be delayed for years, “perhaps until 2013”, if 
Warsaw did not accept the proposals for agricultural subsidies (BBC News 7.2.2002). 
 
When looking at the background of this dispute, it becomes apparent that from the 
Polish perspective it was seen that the whole future of Polish agriculture was at stake. 
Integration that takes place in the terms dictated by the EU was constructed as a 
threat to the existing forms of agriculture in Poland. Poland’s main negotiator and 
Deputy Minister of Agriculture argued, “The future of Polish agriculture will depend 
on the conditions that we negotiate” (The Polish Voice 2000a, 16). At the same time, 
the significance of agriculture in the whole integration process was stressed, “the 
situation of Polish agriculture will depend on the conditions that Poland manages to 
negotiate with the EU”. […] Everybody, both on the EU and Polish sides, 
understands that this is the most important issue in the integration process.” (Jonas 
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2000, 2). What also highlights this point is the fact that the main negotiator on the 
Polish side was the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Jerzy Plewa.  
 
This special weight given to agriculture is a key factor in understanding the Polish 
security argumentation. Agriculture was presented as an issue that not only has an 
extremely important role in the Polish national economy but is also a decisive factor 
in the whole integration process. In more detail the question concerned the “rights of 
Polish farmers” and the related “direct payments”46 to Poland. The main assumption 
behind  the  Polish  position  was  that  when  Poland  becomes  a  member  of  EU,  Polish  
farmers will be subject to the same agricultural policies as EU farmers, including 
direct payments. The Polish negotiators labelled the particular issue of direct 
payments “the most important problem” in the membership negotiations: 
 
“It is imperative that Poland resolve the issue of direct payments before 
discussing limiting production. This is currently the most difficult problem in 
negotiations” (Jerzy Plewa, The Polish Voice 2000a, 16). 
 
Based on this, Poland also tried to set special conditions for the negotiations: 
 
“Poland declared its readiness to accept all membership responsibilities on 
the condition that our farmers are granted all their rights. The EU’s response 
is not clear about direct payments, so the issue requires further analysis, and 
will be discussed in later stages of talks.” (Plewa ibid. Emphasis added.) 
 
 
                                               
46 Direct payments as an instrument of the CAP were introduced in 1992 when the CAP was 
reformed. The system of guaranteed prices was then converted into a system of direct support to 
farmers. (Fouilleux 2003, 255.) 
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Additional support for the call for special measures that deviate from the normal 
arrangements was searched for by constructing the issue as historically exceptional:  
 
“The present enlargement cannot be compared to anything that has taken 
place in the EU’s past. It demands unusual transition arrangements.” (Jacek 
Saryusz-Wolski, Chief Advisor on integration issues to the Prime Minister of 
Poland. Saryusz-Wolski 2000, 51).  
 
It was argued that the rules applied in the previous enlargements could not be used in 
this case. Poland cautioned against the EU applying “the sort of very strict rules that 
were a feature of previous enlargements” (Saryusz-Wolski 2000, 50). In more 
practical terms the extraordinary status of the issue was to be attained by establishing 
exceptions to the Single Market system:  
 
“When it comes to agriculture, Warsaw has asked the EU to allow it to keep 
for a certain time two ‘quality regimes’ […] One would be for the Single 
Market and the other for the internal Polish market” (Saryusz-Wolski, 2000, 
59). 
 
The way the enlargement dialogue, and the speech acts within it, proceeded followed 
largely official negotiation procedures whereby the Association Council reviewed the 
state of Poland’s preparation for accession in light of the Regular Reports issued by 
the European Commission. The Commission issued and updated Regular Reports and 
Poland revised the Polish National Program for Adoption of the Acquis accordingly. 
Poland prepared its position on agriculture, submitted it to Brussels and received the 
EU’s reply. In the last stages of the negotiations other, often unofficial, political foras 
were utilised too, as the aforementioned quotes of the Polish Deputy Prime Minister 
and the EU Commissioner for enlargement indicate. 
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The securitising actors in this process were the official representatives of Poland in 
the negotiations. The referent object was agricultural production, and the alleged 
existential threat was characterised by the significance of agriculture to various 
aspects of the national economy (such as the labour market system and the 
privatisation process). The alleged risk was that agriculture would lose its conditions 
of existence because of EU accession. The security move was boosted with 
references to the allegedly historically exceptional nature of the fifth enlargement. As 
could  be  expected  on  the  basis  of  the  factors  that  delimit  the  possibilities  of  
securitisation in the economic sector, the securitisation remained rather unsuccessful. 
In this particular case, the EU also committed counter-securitisation by making 
references to the essentiality of EU’s economic rules and economic growth that 
results from the applying of these rules, “the EU stressed the need to complete 
structural reforms in order to maintain sustainable economic growth” (EU-Poland 
Association Council 2000.) (Emphasis added.)  In countering the Polish security 
argumentation “economic growth” was set as the security referent object. The 
security argumentation built on the logic explained above: the continuation of 
economic growth cannot be risked due to the strong link it has with the legitimisation 
of EU integration. 
 
Therefore, in the end, the potential achievements of the Polish securitisation lie in the 
impact it might have had as a tactical move in the membership negotiations. When 
the membership negotiations were concluded, transitional methods were adopted, for 
instance, in trade, in agricultural products, and in measures in the sugar sector. 
Additionally Poland gained a transitional period in order to upgrade to fully meet the 
EU requirements on certain food establishments in 721 premises (European 
Commission 2004b). From the perspective of securitisation analysis these 
accomplishments are insignificant. The transitional methods were also applied to a 
number of other new members, and Polish agriculture was granted no exceptional 
status, but normal integration procedures were applied. However, the Polish 
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securitisation attempt points to the attraction of security argumentation as a way to 
obtain attention for the issue in question. 
 
Summary on the economic sector 
 
Due to the characteristics of the market economy the value of securitisation as a 
political tool is smaller in the economic sector than in the other sectors. In the 
European context particularly this can be explained by characteristics that evolve 
from the history of European integration, such as the centrality of economy, and the 
rather permanent and institutionalised securitisation of economic stability and 
growth. Supranational decision-making is increasingly perceived as the “normal” 
way of handling economic issues in Europe.  
 
Even if the analytical ability of the Copenhagen framework might be smaller in the 
economic sector, a significant contribution of the Copenhagen framework is that it 
helps to show how the national economy can still be used in constructing security and 
threats. The case of agriculture demonstrates that the European integration process 
can be constructed as a threat to referent objects that are considered nationally vital. 
But the countering forces to such security moves are considerable: both globalisation 
and regionalisation are among those forces. The logic of the European integration 
process in particular provides additional factors that limit the success of states’ 
securitisation attempts in the economic sector. Furthermore, from the perspective of 
the applicants the EU accession was strongly motivated by economic reasons, and 
this provided another limiting factor. 
 
In general, the concepts in this sector appear to match. An explanatory factor for this 
comes from the finding that the new member states’ decisions to apply for 
membership can be seen to relate largely to economic security. The course of 
integration history has witnessed a certain interplay of economic and harder, 
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traditional, security. As was pointed out in Chapter 3, economy and more military-
oriented security have both served, for their part, as the motor of integration. This is 
because, in addition to the internal political trends of the EU, of the general situations 
in international politics. After the Second World War questions related to war and 
peace were naturally high on the political agenda, whereas the Cold War restricted 
the EC’s room of manoeuvre especially in areas of traditional security politics. The 
end of the Cold War opened up new possibilities for other than economic actorness. 
 
4.4 The societal sector and political sector 
 
This chapter looks at the societal and political sectors of security (as defined by the 
Copenhagen School in Buzan et al. 1998) and analyses the credibility, success, and 
significance of security arguments that relate to these sectors in the fifth enlargement 
round. As in the previous chapters, the purpose is to see if issues related to these 
sectors were cast in the form of security argumentation. In the societal sector such 
arguments are typically based on identity, whereas in the political sector they concern 
sovereignty. Thus the question is to what extent identity and sovereignty have been 
the objects of securitisation – either from the perspective of the applicants or the EU. 
Furthermore, the possible securitisation attempts serve as indicators of the 
match/mismatch of the security concepts between the new members and the EU. 
 
The main difference between the societal and political sector is that the former 
typically considers the nation as the security unit, and the latter considers the state as 
such. Due to the connections that both the issues of state sovereignty and national 
identity of the applicant countries have with the current phases of European 
integration (see below), these sectors will be analysed together. The main benefit of 
this procedure lies in the possibility for the analysis of the relation of state and nation, 
and the related security arguments, in the context of the EU enlargement. From the 
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theoretical perspective societal and political security are also closely linked, as the 
following paragraphs indicate. In these two sectors of security the Copenhagen 
School’s tools manage to locate two elements that have a link to distinctive 
dynamisms in the European integration process generally: state sovereignty vs. 
integration (pooling of sovereignties); and national identity vs. European identity.  
 
It should be kept in mind that these broad questions are handled here from a 
deliberately delimited perspective that concentrates on the EU accession process and 
security argumentation. Moreover, the approach is delimited by the way the 
theoretical framework – adopted from the Copenhagen School – defines the political 
and societal sectors, their agendas, and the logic of threats and vulnerabilities in these 
sectors.  
 
The point of departure of the societal sector is to represent the nation as a security 
unit.47 The Copenhagen School argues that the nation has been neglected in this 
respect; the focus of security studies in this respect too has been on the state (see 
Chapter 2.1.2 on the security debate and new security approaches). For the 
Copenhagen School the organising concept in the societal sector is identity48, 
“[s]ocietal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a 
development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community” (Buzan et al. 
1998, 119). Actually the threats contribute to the construction or reproduction of the 
                                               
47 In this sector of “collective identity security” the referent objects are self-constructed “imagined 
communities”. Therefore in addition to the nation, they can be any larger groups – tribes, clans, 
minorities, civilisations, religions, race etc – that carry the loyalties and devotion of subjects in a 
form and to a degree that can create a socially powerful argument that this “we” is threatened 
(Buzan et al. 1998, 120). 
48 Societal security is not the same as social security. Buzan et al. note that “Social security is about 
individuals and is largely economic. Societal security is about collectives and their identity.” 
(Buzan et al.1998, 120). 
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self-definition of the community in question by offering the “other” on which own 
identity can be built. According to the basic assumptions of identity theory, the 
concept of identity is based on unity or similarity, which has its spatial (i.e. identity 
as distinction) and temporal (i.e. identity as continuity) aspects. (Mikkeli 1998.) 
Consequently, the most common threats in the societal sector include migration 
(whereby identity is being changed by a shift in the composition of population), 
horizontal competition (cultural and linguistic influence from neighbouring culture), 
and vertical competition (integrating projects or secessionist-regionalist projects). 
Consequently, in the context of the EU enlargement the national identity of the 
applicant countries is the main potential security referent. From that perspective the 
question to be asked is whether EU membership is constructed as a threat to the 
survival of the nation in question. Furthermore, what becomes a topic of analysis is 
the significance of identity in the security concept of applicant countries. 
 
It is argued in this chapter that although there is some concern about the negative 
impact of integration on national identities, the EU accession is not simply perceived 
as a threat to national identity, but more often as potential construction material for 
the building of  the  national  identity.  This  is  due  to  two  factors:  Firstly,  EU  
membership can be seen to strengthen the claimed inherent “European” or “Western” 
features of the national identity. Secondly, the EU accession is considered as part of 
the rebuilding of national identity that started after the Soviet system collapsed. In 
this “European post-bipolar process of renegotiation of identity” (Johansson 2002, 3), 
the EU enlargement plays a multifaceted role.  
 
In addition to national identity there is another element that arises in the context of 
the accession process: the question of “European identity”, and the political 
construction of it. Therefore in the analysis of the societal sector it is largely a 
question of the interplay of European and national identities. Buzan et al. note that 
“remobilization of state in identity issues would constitute a major threat to European 
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integration, whereas a more separate securitization could be more compatible with 
further integration” (Buzan et al. 1998, 123).  
 
In contrast to the societal sector, the political sector considers the applicant countries 
as states and identity as the organising concept is replaced by sovereignty. Political 
security is about “organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the 
ideologies that give governments and states their legitimacy” (Buzan et al. 1998, 
119).  
 
In the political sector the main question is the recognition of the political unit, 
typically the recognition of the state as a state.49 Threat perceptions include non-
military threats to the sovereignty of the political units. Threats concern the 
legitimacy or recognition of either political units or the essential patterns (in 
structures, processes or institutions) among them. Under threat is the stability of 
political order. Therefore serious threats are those aimed towards the ideas that hold 
political unit together (typically nationalism and political ideology). The main 
referent object is the state. Other referent objects can be state-like or “state-parallel” 
political organisations, the Copenhagen School sees the EU as an example of such an 
object.50 On another level, security arguments can also be made in relation to 
institutions, structures, or processes in the international system which are generally 
valued as a precondition for continued political stability (e.g. the EU, the United 
Nations, NATO, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, and international law). The 
                                               
49 A special feature of the sector is that in a way all security is political: to securitise is a political 
act. It is a residual category, a subgroup of political threats that do not use massive military, 
identificational, economic, or environmental means. That is to say that the threats are predominantly 
political in form. (Buzan et al. 1998, 141.) 
50 Other examples are self-organised stateless societal groups such as tribes, minorities, and clans: 
transnational movements that are able to mobilise supreme allegiance from adherent international 
society such as some world religions (Buzan et al. 1998, 145). 
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central securitising actors include governments, states, international governmental 
organisations, and non-governmental organisations. (Buzan et al. 1998.) Thus two 
types of referent objects can stem from the European integration process: firstly the 
EU as an institution (containing numerous sub-structures) can be constructed as the 
security referent, secondly the political ideology that drives the integration process 
forward can be constructed as the object that should be securitised (cf. chapter 3.1). 
 
Security threats in the political sector can concern either the internal legitimacy of the 
political unit (i.e. the ideologies and other constitutive ideas and issues defining the 
unit) or external legitimacy (i.e. recognition of the unit). The modern territorial 
sovereign state has a clear, standardised form of recognition that constitutes an entire 
international system of equal and “like” units. Even minor violations of sovereignty 
are threats because sovereignty is a principle that claims the ultimate right of self-
government. (Buzan et al. 1998.) The question of sovereignty has therefore been a 
sensitive and much discussed issue in the European integration process (see e.g. 
Wind 2001). To a certain extent the logic of EU integration and the “pooling” of 
sovereignties seem to be challenging the rigid sovereignty conception. Therefore in 
the context of the EU accession process the main question is whether the sovereignty 
of state is securitised by the applicants, or looking from the other perspective, 
whether there are attempts by the EU to securitise the sovereignty or legitimacy of 
the EU and its political sub-units. Both the security arguments that are based on 
“collective sovereignty” – the EU’s sovereignty – and those that base on (member) 
state sovereignty, have appeared in the enlargement dialogue. 
 
By  discussing  these  issues  this  chapter  will  show  that  although  the  EU  can  be  
presented as a threat both to state sovereignty and national identity, attempts to 
securitise these objects have not gained significant success in the enlargement 
dialogue. 
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Political sector: State sovereignty versus integration? 
 
A categorical requirement made by the EU is that the accessing countries recognize 
and accept the legitimacy of the Union institutions. At the same time it is a question 
of securing the achievements of the integration process so far (this is what the French 
expression acquis communautaire refers to). For the new member states accession 
thus meant  the recognition of  the EU as a legitimate political  unit  together with the 
recognition of its political achievements. Furthermore, it can be argued that the EU’s 
position and credibility as a political actor in global politics grew when the number of 
member states increased. What can undermine this, however, is the expected increase 
of difficulties in decision-making in the EU of 27 members. (Grabbe 2004.) 
 
There is a basic issue that limits the applicants’ possibilities for securitising state 
sovereignty in the context of the accession process: As the Copenhagen school notes, 
states enter the process of European integration voluntarily even though this process 
has the potential to cut away their sovereignty (Buzan et al. 1998, 153). It has been 
noted that for the Central and Eastern European applicants the decision to join the 
pooling of state sovereignties was not easy, ”Applicants fear erosion of the national 
sovereignty that they fought so hard to regain in their struggles against Soviet 
domination.” (Zielonka 2000, 1.) Additionally, the European integration process is 
often labelled a living proof of an emerging “post-sovereign security order” (see e.g. 
Herd & Löfgren 2001; Krause & Williams 1997)51.  However,  the applicants’  views 
on sovereignty and security have been more traditional, this is partly due to the role 
of the Soviet Union in their near-history.  For instance, in the mid-1990s the Baltic 
                                               
51 Given the possibilities of forthcoming enlargements in 2007 and beyond, the borders of “Europe” 
remain in a state of flux. Due to the various pre-accession activities the relations between potential 
entrants and members cannot perhaps be adequately described by applying the traditional concepts 
of state relations and sovereignty (Richmond 2000, 45; Palosaari 2001).  
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analysts noted that for the Baltic countries, the logic of security aspirations was in 
this respect very traditional. This was well summarised in the political slogan 
“Security for us is our sovereignty” (Haab 1995, 39; Stranga 1997, 12). 
 
The so-called Kelstrup’s integration dilemma has been used to describe the question 
of sovereignty and integration. The choice is between two options: to be entrapped 
within integration or abandoned from the integration (Kelstrup 1993). Despite the 
certain degree of traditionalism of views in the light of the accession process the 
applicant states’ final answer to this dilemma, to join the EU, reflects the view that 
security and a new type of sovereignty is gained by participating in the pooling of 
sovereignties. 
 
However, the issue of state sovereignty is still a source of intense debate regarding 
the very essentials of the European integration process52, and even the state-building 
and nation-building rhetoric are not extinct features on the European forum. The issue 
of sovereignty is constantly present in the EU decision-making and structural 
development. Concerning the common foreign, security, and defence policy plans 
this can be seen in the complexity and sensitiveness of the related negotiations with 
all the setbacks and advances (see chapter 3.2). Since the “post-sovereign” and post-
modern, non-territorial EU security concept gets from time to time quite traditional 
injections from the member states53, the applicant countries views on sovereignty are 
not that mismatching with the views that are dominant in the EU. Applying for EU-
membership proves that the EU has been recognised as a political unit with a 
legitimate constitutive idea of integration, while other – more sceptical – aspects of 
                                               
52 In particular the “EU Constitution” prepared by the European Convention has aroused debate on 
concepts such as peoples, states, national identities and values (see Bonde 2003). 
53 For instance, France and the Netherlands – both founding members of the EC – rejected the treaty 
outlining a European Constitution in 2005. 
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applicants’ approaches to EU’s legitimacy reflect the general European discussion 
concerning integration, legitimacy and democracy (see Banchoff & Smith 1999). The 
Hungarian security strategy case tellingly suggests that it is typical to concurrently 
support both state sovereignty and the enhancement of community methods:  
 
“The Republic of Hungary considers as a national security interest: 1. the 
preservation of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order, 
[…] 4. the widening and deepening process of the European Union’s 
integration, the equality of rights and solidarity between the Member States, 
the enhancement of community methods.”  
(National Security Strategy of Hungary, 2004.) 
 
On the other hand, for the new member states the accession also served as recognition 
of their status as equal and fully European states. Furthermore, in the fifth 
enlargement round the positive decisions concerning European integration by the 
governments of the applicant countries did not seriously undermine the legitimacy or 
recognition of the national political units.54 This is actually contrary to the first and 
fourth enlargements. In 1972 referendum the Norwegian government did not get 
support for its decision to join the EC, and subsequently had to resign (Dinan 1994, 
80). This was repeated in the EU referendum of 1994. 
 
 
 
                                               
54 A minor exception to this is the case of Malta. With active anti-EU politics the Maltese 
opposition party managed to change Malta’s EU accession policy for a short period. The pro-EU 
government was changed and Malta’s EU application was withdrawn in 1996. For a period of two 
years the application was frozen and Malta no longer enjoyed a “pre-accession” relationship with 
the EU. The application was re-activated in 1998. 
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Societal sector 
 
Vertical competition: European and national identities 
It can be argued that both the EU and the applicants struggle with the same dilemma: 
the  question  of  identity.  For  the  EU  it  is  the  question  of  constructing  a  European  
identity, whereas for the accessing countries it is a question of reconstructing and 
preserving national identities. Although it can be argued that different identities can 
exist and prosper simultaneously55, the relation of European and national identities 
offers potential for security argumentation and competing security moves, or even the 
potential ”use of extraordinary measures that would block European integration”, as 
the Copenhagen School suggests (Buzan et al. 1999, 132). 
 
Despite the concerns of preserving of national identities in the new member states, it 
seems that European integration is not regarded exclusively as a threat. This is 
because integration into Western Europe has been seen as way to strengthen the 
“western” elements of the accession countries’ national identities. These elements are 
considered something that have always been there, but only in a latent and suppressed 
form. Thus integration can support the rehabilitation of national identities after the 
Soviet era, and for that reason ”European values” have been welcomed as the 
foundation on which the national identities of applicant countries can be rebuilt. 
Therefore the interpretation is not that the Central and Eastern European countries are 
just joining the European family, but that Europe is now getting back its heartland 
that it was so violently deprived of after the Second World War. 56 The Europeanness 
of national identities is thus seen as inherent rather than external. 
                                               
55 On multiple identities and multilayered nature of identities see Marcussen et al. 2001, Waever et 
al. 1993, and Banchoff 1999. 
56 Tellingly, the Czech Foreign Ministry publicises a monthly magazine titled “The Heart of 
Europe”. 
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In terms of identity politics, reorientation towards the West did not turn out to be as 
simple as had been anticipated: the break-up of the Eastern bloc meant the 
disappearance of the Eastern “other”, the benefical factor maintaining the unity of the 
Western camp. A return to the West and to the “European family” was rendered 
difficult  by  the  fact  that  there  was  no  longer  such  a  family  in  the  old  sense  of  the  
term. At the same time, European integration was turning in new directions. The EU 
was seeking new directions and incentives for integration (for instance, in the field of 
foreign and security policy) and thus became a moving target for the applicant 
countries. This complicated the process of accession and attitudes adopted towards it. 
(Raik&Palosaari 2004.) 
 
The president of the Czech Republic, Václav Havel, acknowledged this by noting that 
“West” should gradually become a morally neutral word again. Instead of providing 
the opposite for  “spiritual and physical oppression, callousness, ignorance, empty 
monumentalism, and a general state of backwardness” (which Havel sees as the 
qualities of the Soviet rule) it will mean “no more and no less than a clearly delimited 
region  of  the  contemporary  world,  one  of  the  spheres  of  civilization  that  is  
characterized by a shared history, culture, scale of values, type of responsibility, as 
well as by its very own specific concerns”. (Havel 2001, 7.) 
 
The minister of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Jadranko Prlic, shared the same type of perception about the transition process. He 
states that what started as “an effort to escape as soon as possible, be it only 
psychologically at first, from one part of Europe into the other better one” became 
more or less a successful transition process diminishing the meaning of such phrases 
as “other world” or “third world” (Prlic 2000, 24).  
 
However, concern for national identities also exists. This can be observed by 
analysing the official security policy documentation on one hand, and the public 
  
 
123 
opinion polls on the other. For instance the strategic goals of Polish security policy 
include “the creation of the best possible conditions for (…) the development of the 
national identity”. Furthermore, the basic principles of Poland’s security policy state 
that: 
 
“It [Poland] pursues the vision of a free and democratic Europe, where 
security, prosperity and conditions conducive to cultural development and the 
preservation of national identity constitute the common, indivisible good of a 
continent undergoing integration” (Security Strategy of Poland 2000, 
emphasis added). 
 
According to public opinion polls Hungarians have the strongest national identity of 
the ten newcomers. However, the difference between these results and  the results of 
polls of the old members is quite marginal. Moreover, Slovakia, Cyprus, Poland, and 
the Czech Republic get a more “European” ranking than the current member-states. 
(Eurobarometer 2002). This proves that the old members are facing the same question 
as well. Although it can be argued that Europe has strong regionalising dynamics in 
the societal sector (Buzan et al. 1998, 132), the vertical competition of identities 
remains and concerns both new and old members. An explanation for this can be 
found when one looks at the problematic nature of European identity. 
 
In terms of identity politics the building process of a European identity is lacking a 
convincing “other”, that is to say a mirror on which the real feature of the European 
self can be reflected and compared. Some see European identity as being constructed 
against the Eastern “other”, that Europe was something totally else than the barbaric 
East (i.e. Ottoman Empire and Soviet Empire). Others argue that the East as the 
“other” does not make Europe in anyway distinctive from the large Western group 
including the United States. Some state that the recent history of Europe is the 
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founding ground for the European identity. Immediately after the Second World War, 
a war that had been born in the heart of Europe, the image of Europe at war was 
something Europeans could point to and state “this is something we do not want to 
be”. Thus history is the “other” on which the real European identity is to be built. By 
excluding the belligerent past, a new European identity should arise (Lesaar 2001, 
185). 
 
Despite all the attempts to build a European identity, unanswered questions remain. It 
is not clear on what basis a European identity should or could be built. Furthermore, 
it can be questioned if an overarching European identity is emerging at all, or if it is 
merely a purely political and elite-led project.57 Therefore, European identity does not 
(yet) form a credible referent object for any security moves. Security speech that 
would be based on securing a European identity does not function. For instance, the 
EU Security Strategy (2003) does not mention “identity” or “European identity” at 
all. Consequently, if any security argumentation appears, it is likely to stem from 
national identities rather than European identity. Due to the limiting factors presented 
above credible security argumentation has not appeared in such a form that would 
construct the EU as a serious threat to national identity. Nevertheless security 
argumentation that is based on national identity – and is mismatched with the EU’s 
concept – has been taking place on another level. In those cases it is the question of 
so-called horizontal competition between neighbouring groups that holds the 
potential for identity-based security argumentation and securitisation. During the 
enlargement process the EU has been paying special attention to cases where seeds of 
conflict between different cultural or linguistic groups in the applicant countries have 
appeared. 
                                               
57 For instance the idea of giving an official status for state-like EU symbols, such as a flag, motto, 
anthem and annual holiday, proposed by the European Convention in 2003 soon run into trouble, 
and were later on removed from the Lisbon treaty text. 
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Horizontal competition and the EU’s reactions to it 
The case of the Hungarian Status Law highlights the sensitiveness of identities and 
nationalism. The Status Law offers financial and cultural advantages to ethnic 
Hungarians living in other countries in Central Europe. Under the Status Law ethnic 
Hungarians living in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, 
and Slovenia are entitled to work in Hungary for a limited period, receive health 
treatment and educational aid.58 This has been considered controversial by Hungary’s 
neighbours, and particularly by Slovakia. Romania and Slovakia argued that the law 
discriminates against other ethnic groups and interferes with their sovereignty as it 
allows Hungary to give aid to about three million people on the basis of them being 
ethnic Hungarians. The Slovakian Prime Minister said the law was being approved 
against Slovakia’s will and without consultations with Hungary's neighbours (BBC 
24.6.2003). 
  
The Hungarian argument was that the main goal of the Status Law is to help the 
Hungarian minorities to preserve their cultural and national identity. The purpose of 
the Status Law is, 
 
“to ensure the well being of Hungarians living in neighbouring states in their 
home-state, to promote their ties to Hungary, to support their Hungarian 
identity and their links to the Hungarian cultural heritage as expression of 
their belonging to the Hungarian nation” (Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians 
living in neighbouring states, Hungarian National Assembly 2003). 
 
The issue was also raised in the context of the EU accession process. The European 
Commission noted that the law is not in line with EU standards (EU-observer 
                                               
58 Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory under the 1920 Trianon Treaty after World War I, and 
about three million ethnic Hungarians now live outside their historic homeland. 
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18.12.2002). The key issue was whether the Status Law contradicts the provisions of 
the EU association agreement, which prohibits granting “inadmissible advantages” to 
any group of EU citizens after accession. The EU’s Regular Reports on Hungary’s 
admission referred to the issue in Chapter 27, which concerns the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. The Conclusions of the Regular Report of 2002 stated that: 
 
As regards the status law, ” the Commission will continue to monitor the 
situation and will request Hungary to bring the law - at the latest upon 
accession - in line with the anti-discrimination provisions enshrined in the EC 
Treaty”  (Regular Report on Hungary’s Admission to EU, European 
Commission 2002b). 
 
The EU also called on the Hungarian government to continue intensive consultations 
with Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) regarding the law. As a result of the criticism Hungary made an attempt 
to conform to the EU guidelines. The law was amended and several key aspects were 
removed, including a reference to a “unified Hungarian nation” spanning borders. 
However, the National Security Strategy of Hungary from 2004 still states that 
Hungary considers as a security interest “the broadest possible implementation of the 
rights of the Hungarians living in neighbouring countries” (National Security 
Strategy of the Republic of Hungary 2004). As the Commission’s Regular Report on 
Hungary of 2002 noted, the dispute over the Status Law, together with the question of 
Czechoslovak Presidential Decrees of 1945 (the so-called Benes Decrees) limited 
momentarily the dialogue between the four Visegrád countries Hungary, Poland, 
Czech, and Slovakia. 
 
The Czech Benes Decrees raised a similar type of debate and also created claims of 
attempts to revitalise nationalism. The issue concerns the rights of citizenship and 
property  of  Germans  that  were  transferred  as  a  result  of  the  Second  World  War.  
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Therefore it brings back to daylight historical unsolved security questions from the 
era that gave birth to European integration. Terms used in the debate on the Benees 
Decrees, such as “transfer of population” and “confiscations of so-called enemy 
property and citizenship” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic 2003), 
carry echoes from the cruel reality of 1940s and 1950s Europe. This forgotten legacy 
serves now as an unwelcome reminder of the original starting points of the 
integration. The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that, “after all, present-
day European integration is a reflection of the experiences of the Second World War, 
linked with the resistance to Nazism” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech 
Republic 2003). The EU Commission found such rhetoric unwanted, and thus the 
Commissioner on Enlargement, Günther Verheugen, tried his best to solve the issue 
rapidly and without too much fuss. The joint press statement of Czech Prime Minister 
and the Commissioner stated that ”..those (decrees) on citizenship and those on 
property, by their very nature and content, no longer produce legal effects. We thus 
maintain our position that these Czechoslovak Presidential Decrees are not part of the 
Accession Negotiations and should have no bearing on them” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Czech Republic 2002). 
 
The framework of the Copenhagen School enables also the analysis of identity threats 
of units other than nation. The analysis was here limited to the national and European 
identities, since it is clearly the primary level in the context of the EU enlargement. 
Nevertheless, a brief example can be presented that indicates how other units, such as 
minorities, can have significance in the framework of the accession negations. For 
instance in the Slovakia’s membership negotiations the conditions set by the EU 
concerning rights of minorities became a disputed issue. A question that Slovakia was 
regularly faced with during the EU accession process was the situation of the Roma 
minority in the country. On this issue, however, the Slovakian government has been 
able  to  gain  the  support  of  the  actors  in  question:  the  Roma  Parliament  Council  of  
Non-Governmental Organisations stated that it will support Slovakia’s aspirations to 
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join NATO and the EU (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic 2002a). 
In this sense the state has been able to make a successful domestic securitising move 
whereby NATO and EU memberships are not to be risked by other political issues. 
This question of the rights and treatment of minorities has also touched upon the 
current EU member states as some Roma have travelled from Slovakia to the Union 
in search of asylum. EU responses have been made problematic by the fact that 
concerning the issue of minorities the EU has been accused of having double 
standards: while the EU has strict accession criteria on minority rights and puts 
pressure on the applicants some existing EU countries have failed to ratify and 
implement the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, which according to Minority Rights Group International forms 
the only legally binding treaty specifically to protect minorities. (Minority Rights 
Group 2003.) 
 
Summary of the political and societal sector 
 
In short, in the European context, both identities and sovereignty are currently fairly 
open to change. Due to their overlapping and ambiguous nature issues of sovereignty 
and identity are too complicated to serve as the basis for credible and successful 
securitisation and security-policy making in the accession process. Although the EU 
can be represented as a threat to state sovereignty and national identity, attempts to 
securitise these threats have not gained success because they would threaten or 
undermine the European integration process. On the other hand, despite all political 
attempts, the EU has not managed to build convincing security argumentation based 
on European identity. In moving sovereignty above the state-level the EU has been 
more successful, but many of the concerns that the new member states might have of 
this process are also shared by the old members. Therefore the political debates on 
European identity and on the relation of state sovereignty and integration will 
continue. 
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4.5 The military sector 
 
The Copenhagen School’s definition of military security sector guides the attention of 
this analysis to military alignment, geography, history (i.e. historical enmity and 
repeated war), and politics (i.e. harmonies and disharmonies in political ideologies) 
(Buzan et al. 1998, 58). From the constructivist perspective of this study the main 
questions are: Were military issues securitised in the enlargement dialogue? What are 
the security concepts in the military sector like? Are the issues that the EU and the 
applicants construct as military threats matching? And what about the desired 
solutions to these threats, are they similar? What characterises and complicates the 
analysis in the military sector of security is that military threats are by definition 
existential. Therefore a mere reference to military is likely to give the issue in 
question a “security label”.59  
 
As was explained in chapter 3 there is clearly a trend towards the growing 
significance of military sector in the overall security concept of the EU. In recent 
years, the direction of developments within the 15-member EU has been towards 
enhancing the military dimension and subsequently the effectiveness of the EU’s 
foreign and security policy. The security arguments not only reflect the Schumanian 
roots of the integration process but also contain novel post-Cold War (and post-911) 
features as to the reasons why the EU should be active in such traditionally state-
dominated areas of politics. As was pointed out in chapter 3.5, in the EU’s collective 
security concept the securitisation moves in the military security sector are 
legitimised, for instance, with references to stability, to the new turbulent 
neighbouring regions, to the EU’s responsibilities as a regional and global actor, or to 
                                               
59 However, according to the Copenhagen School, all military activities are not security issues. If 
Danish troops, for instance, participate in peacekeeping operations in Africa, “this has nothing to do 
with existential threats to Denmark” (Buzan et al. 1998, 49). 
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the need to reflect upon US activity in the increasingly unipolar world of politics. The 
enlargement brought the new member states’ constructions of military security into 
the picture: Do the new members think that the EU should become a security referent 
in the military security sector? The views the new members have on transatlantic 
issues, military alignment, European security, and defence development and regional 
security are in this sense particularly significant. The most evident potential 
mismatch is the relation of NATO and EU in the military sector. Geographical 
considerations also have a potential for mismatching security concepts.  
 
According to the Copenhagen School the threat perceptions in the military sector are 
either internal or external in their basis. Threats are frequently intentional and 
directed, existential par exellence: brute force instead of normal political relations. In 
cases of internal threat military security is primarily about the ability of the ruling 
elite to maintain civil peace, territorial integrity, and the machinery of government in 
the face of challenges from militant separatists, revolutionary, terrorist or criminal 
organisations. In cases of securitisation focused on external threats it is a question of 
interplay between the actual and the perceptions of armed offensive and defensive 
capabilities of states. Threats range from complete obliterate of state and society to 
coercion and intimidation in particular issues of policy. Even though generally the 
security agenda has widened and new actors have gained more central position, in the 
military sector the state is still the most important referent object. Other candidates 
include tribes, nations, and religions, and on the subsystem and system level such 
entities as NATO, the UN, civilisation, nuclear nonproliferation, or the balance of 
power. As a securitising actor, however, the state is not always coherent: in addition 
to the ruling elites of the states, subunits within the state may have the ability to shape 
the military and foreign policy of the state (e.g. governments with their own survival 
interests, armed services with their inter-service rivalry, arms industry etc). (Buzan et 
al. 1998.) The currently ongoing processes of the EU in building capacities and 
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intensifying co-operation (see chapter 3.4) can be seen as a series of moves aimed at 
making the EU a securitising actor in the military security sector.  
 
A “hard EU” versus “soft EU” 
 
This chapter argues that the applicants’ view on military security differed from the 
dominant EU concept in the sense that the EU was considered primarily with the 
solution for economic and social security problems, which implies that applicant’s 
ignored the EU’s attempts to build a role as a credible actor in the military sector. 
 
The national security strategies of the Central and Eastern European countries rest on 
the observation of “a strategic drift from the post-Soviet recovery tasks to […] 
functioning as a mature modern Western-type democracy with a free-market 
economy, observing fully human and minority rights, fulfilling reliably its 
international commitments and integrating purposefully into the strategic 
communities of nations with shared values, NATO and EU.” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Lithuania 2002.) When applying for the membership in the both 
organisations mentioned, the applicants’ views on the division of labour between the 
organisations were quite clear and also not in line with the EU’s current aspirations in 
the military sector. In the following it will be shown how the applicant countries 
tended to see the EU membership exclusively in terms of soft security. Economic and 
social well-being and other related soft questions are in the list of issues on which EU 
is expected to contribute most. Any needs related to military security were expected 
to be solved by NATO membership. This clear-cut reading of soft and hard security 
also affected the priority order of many applicants concerning the urgency of gaining 
EU and NATO membership. Accession to the latter was seen crucial and to be 
achieved as soon as possible. Even if EU membership would have happened sooner, 
in the context of hard security it was considered mainly a solution for the “transition 
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period” before entering the NATO.60 Even the fact that the EU is increasingly 
committed to building security structures that are aimed at answering to the needs of 
hard security did not change either the way the applicants read security or the order of 
priorities for fulfilling their security needs. Before going into these issues in more 
detail, the relevant aspects of the EU-NATO relations are briefly presented below. 
 
As chapter 3 indicated the way military security is perceived by the EU has been 
changing. The latest changes have also had practical implications: power projection 
for the sake of peacekeeping, peacemaking or antiterrorist operations abroad has led 
to the stressing of the need for high technology and rapid action forces. Some 
analysts claim that in fact there is a European military revolution going on (see e.g. 
Andréani et al. 2001). The background of this argumentation is that during the Cold 
War the European military establishments had mostly been focused on the need to 
fight continental wars close to home. This tendency was reinforced by the notion of 
collective defence, via NATO, that encouraged role specialisation. The role for the 
Europeans was mainly to “provide troops, tanks, air-defence, anti-submarine and 
other  defensive  assets  for  a  static  ‘homeland  defence’”  (Andréani  et  al.  2001,  52.).  
America’s role was to take care of the intelligence satellites, command systems, and 
offensive counter-operations. Thus the Europeans after the Cold War suddenly found 
themselves with “large, mostly conscript armies that were ill-suited to deployment 
outside the NATO area, and which needed complete restructuring” (ibid., 52). 
Lessons-learned already from the Gulf War were interpreted by many European 
leaders as a need to turn their large, static and defensive force structures into leaner 
armies that are better able to “project power” beyond their borders. The Kosovo war 
further strengthened this interpretation. Between 1989 and 1999, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, Spain, and Italy decided to turn their armies into smaller, all-
                                               
60 Cf. Archer 2001 on the hard and soft security and the ease of achievement of the EU and NATO 
options. 
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professional forces. (Andréani et al. 2001, 52-54.) These changes also reflect the 
transformations in the nature of war as well as in the legitimatisation of armed forces 
(Kaldor 1999).  
 
The EU activity on the military security sector has been clearly increasing along the 
same lines since the late 1990s. An argument that has been used to boost this 
development builds on the issue of military capabilities and a claimed “capability 
gap” between the U.S. and Europe, “It remains essential to the credibility and 
effectiveness of the European security and defence policy that the European Union’s 
military capabilities for crisis management be reinforced so that the EU is in a 
position to intervene with or without recourse to NATO assets” (Military Capabilities 
Commitment Declaration 2000). The guiding idea has been autonomous EU action. 
On the practical level this has meant EU member states committing to a process of 
reinforcing military capabilities for crisis management as defined in the Treaty on 
European Union (see chapter 3.4). As was concluded in chapter 3.5, on the more 
general level an autonomous capability is related to the overall credibility of the EU 
as a major actor in world politics. In order to gain or secure that position, being 
merely an “economic giant” is often considered insufficient (see e.g. Financial Times 
December 15 2002, Andréani et al. 2000, Bonnén 2003). Altogether, the current 
military restructuring clearly aims to serve both such symbolic and more practical 
purposes.  
 
Among the first practical responses to the “capability gap” have been the European 
Galileo satellite system, the Helsinki Headline goals and the Military Capabilities 
Commitment Declaration (November 2000). The Helsinki European Council set the 
military capability goals, and a Capabilities Commitment Conference drew together 
the corresponding specific national commitments. The Declaration builds on the 
conflict-prevention and crisis-management missions defined in the Treaty of 
European Union, that is to say the Petersberg tasks:  
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“The Union has in this respect highlighted its determination to develop an 
autonomous capacity to decide and, where NATO as such is not involved, 
launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international 
crises. For that purpose, Member States have decided to develop more 
effective military capabilities.” (Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration 
November 2000). 
 
It was stated that the main aim was to improve the availability, deployability, 
sustainability and inter-operability of the forces. The identified needs were outlined 
in a capability catalogue. The specified areas included “weapons and munitions, 
support services (including medical services)” and the “prevention of operational 
risks and protection of forces”61 (Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration 
2000). 
 
In  developing  its  position  as  a  military  actor  the  challenge  for  the  EU  has  been  to  
successfully combine two factors: on one hand to preserve the EU’s autonomy in 
decision making, whilst on the other to obtain “transparency, co-operation and 
dialogue between the EU and NATO” (Military Capabilities Commitment 
Declaration 2000),  ultimately in the form of access to NATO capacities and assets. 
Success  in  this  area  was  achieved  when  the  EU  and  NATO  signed  a  new  type  of  
partnership agreement, the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP (16.12.2002). To some 
extent this provided a solution to the dynamic and undefined relation between NATO 
and the EU’s security and defence policy. A general interpretation was that one major 
                                               
61 In the area of strategic capabilities mentioned issues include command, control and 
communications, intelligence, as well as air and naval transport. Additionally, references to 
“ground-to-ground missiles, precision weapons, logistic support, simulation tools”, “Future Large 
Aircraft (Airbus A 400M), sea transport vessels, Troop Transport Helicopters (NH 90)” , and ”radar 
satellite equipment” are made. (Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration 2000.) 
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obstacle in the path from Maastrich’s article J4 to Berlin Plus, an agreement 
concerning the EU’s ability to borrow NATO assets and capabilities for European-led 
crisis-management operations, and eventually to an effective ESDP, was thus 
overcome (Financial Times 15.12.2002, EU-Observer 17.12.2002). The EU’s 
Security Strategy notes that, 
 
“The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance 
the operational capacity of the EU and provide the framework for strategic 
partnership between the two organisations in crisis management (Solana 2003, 
12).  
 
On the practical level this advancement has made possible a step that undoubtedly 
enhances the credibility of European common security and defence policy, a step 
whereby the EU deployed, for the first time, its own soldiers in a peace-keeping 
mission in Macedonia. Together with plans to establish the 60 000-strong rapid action 
force by mid-2003, these operations were presented as the vanguard of the EU’s 
activities in the military security sector. When referring to the peace-keeping 
missions of the EU, the Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen Council 
European Council used for the first time the formulation “military operation”:  
 
“The European Council confirmed the Union's readiness to take over the 
military operation in fYROM as soon as possible in consultation with NATO, 
and invited the relevant bodies of the EU to finalise work on the overall 
approach to the operation, including development of military options and 
relevant plans.” (European Council 2002.) 
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This all points to the strengthening role of military security in the EU’s perception of 
security. In its relations with NATO, the EU’s aspiration has been towards enhanced 
ability for autonomous action. The EU’s Security Strategy (Solana 2003) also 
supports this tendency. In reforming their military the applicant countries, however, 
have emphasised integration into NATO rather than into the EU. This has the certain 
potential to undermine the EU’s achievements in clarifying the role between NATO 
and ESDP as well as in building the EU’s ability as a military actor. 
 
Military reform and NATO integration have been among the central topics of the 
military sector in the new member states. In the integration process with Western 
organisations, most applicant countries chose the so-called “twin-track” model62. 
While their goal was membership of both the EU and NATO, they nevertheless 
placed the further NATO integration as the decisive factor that would shape the 
European security environment. The collective defence system of NATO, the 
Partnership for Peace programme, and the activities of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council gained a central position in the security strategies of these countries. 
Consequently, the Euro-Atlantic link is emphasised in the national security strategies:  
 
“With its historical, cultural, political, geographical, economical and other 
linkages, it [the Slovak Republic] is an inseparable part of the Euro-Atlantic 
civilization and cultural environment.” (Security Strategy of the Slovak 
Republic, Introduction, 2001.) 
                                               
62 Malta has withdrawn its application from NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme (PfP), and is 
currently a neutral country. The case of Cyprus is in many respect a complicated one, largely due to 
the way the tensions between Greece (member of the EU and NATO) and Turkey (NATO member 
looking for EU membership) arise from the geographical division of the island. However, it seems 
that Cyprus is in the process of putting in place arrangements that would lead to the demilitarisation 
of the island. 
 
  
 
137 
“Euro-Atlantic links, based on the Atlantic Alliance and guaranteeing Europe’s 
security, were strengthened by NATO’s enlargement, thereby expanding our 
continent’s areas of democracy and stability.” (Security Strategy of Poland, 
Introduction, 2000.) 
 
According to official defence guidelines the aim of the Lithuanian defence policy is 
“to ensure, by military means, security of the State and contribute to the 
strengthening of international security and stability” (The Guidelines for 
Development of the Lithuanian National Defence System for the year 2002-2005, 2). 
The main strategic goals are the development of the National Defence System and 
NATO integration. In similar fashion, the other EU/NATO applicants emphasised 
NATO integration, or the “final preparations for entry into NATO”, as the Lithuanian 
National Security Strategy put it. The willingness to become a NATO member has a 
strong impact not only on how the defence system is currently being developed 
(interoperability with NATO) but also on the overall applicant view on European 
security and defence. For instance, the Lithuanian official guidelines state that 
“Lithuania believes that the defence of Europe does not require the development of 
separate Armed Forces as an alternative to NATO” (The Guidelines for Development 
of the Lithuanian National Defence System for the year 2002-2005, 2). In the 
development trends and plans of the land, air and naval force; military logistic and 
training systems; armament and equipment procurement priorities; and the public 
relations of the armed forces, this NATO-centred approach is even more clearly 
pronounced: the “interoperability, consistency and compliance” with NATO is 
stressed in all these sectors (The Guidelines for Development of the Lithuanian 
National Defence System for the year 2002-2005; cf. Defence Strategy of the Slovak 
Republic 2001).  
 
The EU encouraged applicants and non-EU European NATO members to contribute 
to “improving Europe’s capabilities” (Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration 
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2000), but in many cases the applicants have seen NATO as the primary organisation 
in this respect:  
 
“CESDP is still only on the paper – it is voluntary – and rules and connections 
with NATO have still to be worked out. It is essential not to double the functions. 
[…] For military crises management I personally think that NATO is the 
organisation”  
(Klaar 2001, Member of Estonian Parliament and Member of the Committee for 
Foreign Affairs). 
 
In the national security strategies soft security and broad security are terms that 
characterise the perceptions of the EU’s role in security politics:  
Poland's accession to the Union fortifies the foundations of Poland's broadly 
conceived national security (Security Strategy of Poland 2003). 
 
Another typical feature is the emphasis on economic security:  
Positive effects for our security will accrue from our participation in the EU 
Single Market and common trade policy, and from our use of the Union 
support measures for less developed regions. This will definitely furnish 
propitious conditions for Poland's economic growth and civilisational 
advancement, thus contributing to Poland's reinforced security (Security 
Strategy of Poland 2003). 
 
Furthermore,  what  also  points  to  the  applicants’  prioritisation  of  NATO  is  the  way  
the issue of military reform was firmly linked to NATO integration. For instance 
according to the defence reform in Slovakia, the Slovak Armed Forces should be 
fully professionalised by the year 2006. Amendments to several laws were initiated in 
order to introduce a whole set of financial and social benefits (e.g. increased wages, 
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motivation bonus, and housing contribution) for those who want to work as army 
professionals. These defence reforms are taking place as part of the country’s 
preparations for joining NATO. In addition to the defence reform, Slovakia discusses 
political reforms with NATO, for example with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic 2002). Also in Lithuania the 
defence reform is taking place almost entirely in NATO-oriented terms. Whilst the 
agreement signed by the Lithuanian parliamentary parties on the defence policy of 
2001-2004 mentions both the interoperability with NATO forces and support for the 
EU Common Security and Foreign Policy, when it comes to practical development 
steps  the  emphasis  has  been  on  NATO  issues,  such  as  the  establishment  and  
development of a fully NATO interoperable reaction brigade, the so-called Host 
Nation Support infrastructure enabling the receiving of foreign units on Lithuanian 
soil, and law-foreseeing procedures to send military units to Article 5 and other 
operations. The reform and development has not been one-sided: the US-led war 
against terrorism and the Eastern enlargement of NATO have also led to the 
transformation of NATO (NATO Statement on capabilities 12.6.2003). 
 
The impact of NATO integration has not been limited to the military sector only. For 
instance, a NATO monitoring group has been monitoring the problem of floods in the 
territories of Hungary and Slovakia. Working groups have monitored the situation of 
river basins in Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania by concentrating on 
meteorology, the management of water supplies, geography, and infrastructure.63 In 
addition to the environmental sector, the NATO integration process has had links to 
the political security sector as well. Although NATO members stressed during the 
accession period that Slovakia is “first among the NATO candidates” and that 
Slovakia has acted like a “’de facto member’ of NATO in supporting the war on 
                                               
63 On the other hand this also refers to the aspirations of NATO to reform its nature to include other 
issues than purely military ones (cf. NATO Statement on capabilities 12.6.2003). 
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terrorism” (President of Turkey A.N. Sezer during his visit in Slovakia, of Foreign 
Affairs of the Slovak Republic 2002), for a long time the question concerning the 
legitimacy and recognition of the political leadership of Slovakia was causing 
uncertainty for the issue of NATO membership. It was stated quite clearly, for 
instance by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, that “if Vladimír Meciar becomes 
Prime Minister, Slovakia would not get an invitation to join NATO” (Vice-President 
of NATO Parliamentary Assembly M.Meckel, March 6 2002, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Slovak Republic 2002). Along the same lines NATO secretary General 
Lord G. Robertson stated that the parliamentary election of September 2002 would be 
the most important in Slovakian history. According to him, the Slovak voters had a 
unique chance to determine their future. “The world will be closely following Slovak 
citizens and their decision”, he stated (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak 
Republic 2002). These statements highlight the possible linkages between the 
military and political sectors of security, such as, a defence organisation can use its 
legitimacy and political membership criteria to advance its goals.64 
 
The different perceptions as to the roles of NATO and the EU in the military security 
sector did not lead to serious disputes or securitisation attempts in the enlargement 
dialogue. Preferring NATO over ESDP did not mean that the applicants would have 
                                               
64 The  empathy  that  came  from  other  NATO  candidates  did  little  to  comfort  Slovakia:  Romania  
noted that it would be “unwise to punish the whole country because of one person” (Romanian 
Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana, March 5, 2002). NATO members did not however consider the 
negative statements concerning Meciar as an intervention in Slovakia’s internal affairs: “Slovak 
citizens have a free choice to vote for whoever they want to, but Western institutions have the right 
to inform them about whom they want to have as NATO members”. As a reaction to the political 
pressure coming from NATO the President of Slovakia, Rudolf Schuster, assured the full political 
commitment of Slovakia to the membership plan and its requirements by noting that while choosing 
the next Prime Minister, he will “bear in mind the country’s NATO membership aspirations” 
(Slovakia to NATO, March 7, 2002). In the end  the results of the election did not cause any such 
problems for Slovakia’s NATO membership. 
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openly opposed the ESDP and other relevant EU policies in the negotiation process. 
The negotiation chapter 27 that deals with military issues led to no transitional 
arrangements, exemptions or opt-outs. Consequently, the EU membership 
negotiations were completed without any such opposing securitisation moves 
between the EU and the applicants as there were in the environmental or economic 
sector (cf. chapters 4.1 and 4.2).  
 
The lack of any serious counter-argumentation in the accession process is partly 
explained by the fact that the position of an applicant country is different from that of 
a member state: the applicant’s priorities are the continued progress of membership 
negotiations and the adoption of EU legislation, so it may be wiser for the applicant 
not to take a stand on controversies or moot points which affect the incumbent 
member states. Moreover, in the CFSP cooperation is mainly intergovernmental, and 
there is no actual common legislation (i.e. no directives or regulations). As far as 
applicant countries are concerned, the main expectation is that they should support 
common positions and joint actions, and adapt national policies in such a way as to 
conform to the CFSP (therefore the accession of new members did not cause a 
significant strain on the budgets of either the EU or the countries joining it). The 
matter was thus dealt with quickly and smoothly during the membership negotiations. 
It was only after accession, when the CFSP rhetoric became a reality for the new 
member states, that unqualified attitudes gave way to the formation of genuine 
opinions (Raik & Palosaari 2004).  
 
Outside the negotiations framework the approach of the applicants was often more 
critical. At the European Convention65, for instance, the countries’ stances were 
detectably influenced by their NATO membership (i.e. for the Czech Republic, 
                                               
65 The European Convention prepared the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. It 
completed its work during July 2003. The applicant countries were also represented. 
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Hungary, and Poland) or by them being in the final stages of the NATO accession 
process (i.e. for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia): the fact that a 
common  security  and  defence  policy  should  not  endanger  NATO  was  a  matter  of  
concern to all of them (Cameron & Primatarova 2003). The applicant countries did, 
however, give their support to closer cooperation in the area of security and defence, 
at  the  same  time  pointing  out  that  this  did  not  replace  or  threaten  the  transatlantic  
alliance. 
 
The fact that military alignment had a position of priority for most of the EU 
applicants is actually a typical feature of the military security sector generally. The 
Copenhagen School notes that due to the historical condition of the international 
system in the military sector the securitisation process is highly institutionalised, and 
the political structures created by military concerns are more likely to reflect the 
structure of power relations than other sectors (Buzan et al. 1998, chapter 3). At this 
point of time the structure of power relations in the international system is such that 
NATO membership or membership aspirations with “full and credible guarantee of 
security and the possibility to participate in collective defence” (Polish White Paper, 
Ministry of the National Defence 2001), were the main guidelines for military 
security policy for almost all of the EU applicants. Even though the majority of 
current EU members share this view due to their NATO membership, the EU’s plans 
and advancements in the areas of common security and defence policy make the 
picture somewhat contradictory.66 This mismatch has been highlighted also by the 
US-led “War on Terror”, which has witnessed the introduction of ad hoc “coalitions 
of willing” instead of NATO-based action. Most of the EU applicants chose to 
participate in these coalitions. The coalition supporting US action against Iraq 
                                               
66 For an assessment of the impacts of the enlargement on the EU’s common foreign, security and 
defence policy see Raik & Palosaari 2004, which argues that the new member states will adapt to 
the CFSP and ESDP. 
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included the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and 
Slovakia. Furthermore, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey were also members of the 
coalition (White House Press Release 27.3.2003). Of those countries that joined the 
EU in 2004 only Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta were not in the coalition. The fact that 
only 6 of the current EU members (Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and 
United Kingdom) were among the coalition members suggests that there are apparent 
mismatches in the way military alignment and US military policies are perceived by 
the new and old EU-members.  
 
Therefore, a proposed solution to overcome these complexities has been to introduce 
the idea of flexibility to the military sector as well (Junge 2003). This would mean 
assembling a core group that would proceed faster in the integration of military 
sector. Applicants’ reactions to this can be summed up with the opinion that such acts 
would imply a division of the future EU into core and periphery, condemning the 
post-communist states to an inferior peripheral status. The idea of a core Europe is 
thus seen as a strategy to keep the less developed Eastern European countries outside 
the frame of advanced integration. The applicants, however, are not looking for 
partial membership: “It is Poland’s intention to join an effective EU with all the 
consequences involved.” (Polish position in IGC 2000; Zielonka 2000). 
 
Other mismatches in the military sector 
 
In addition to the differences explained above, there seem to be mismatching 
motivations concerning hard security: in the dominant EU security concept the means 
of hard security are regarded as tools for gaining general credibility in international 
politics, whereas for most of the applicants military security relates to more practical 
concerns stemming from traditional geographical and historical factors. Practically 
for all the new EU members the geographical factor is quite dualistic whereby 
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integration progress from east to west yet from the Eastern border starts an area of 
uncertainty and insecurity. The historical factors in most cases strengthen this 
tendency, as Russia still represents for its western neighbours the successor of Soviet 
power. Belarus and Ukraine, however, remain more unclear cases. In other 
geographical directions it is the Balkans and Mediterranean region that will form the 
new “near abroad” of the EU. The applicants have promoted these as the new 
dimensions of the EU with some success (see e.g. Mazur 2002). The Security 
Strategy of Poland refers to neighbouring countries, Ukraine and Belarus, as a 
“region with excessive concentrations of military potential” and notes that “political 
instability or economic collapse and related internal crises impede adherence” 
(Security Strategy of Poland 2000) to international commitments with regards to arms 
control and confidence-building measures. The strategy also notes “the increased risk 
of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)” (ibid.) in the area that 
borders Poland. With that observation the strategy understands the importance of the 
development and implementation of NATO’s WMD Initiative. The EU only gets 
attention in the next paragraph of the strategy, concerning economic threats. Neither 
does the Polish Security Strategy of 2003 mention the EU when dealing with the 
controlling of weapons of mass destruction. This is worth mentioning since the EU’s 
Security Strategy (Solana 2003) dedicates one section to WMD.  
 
Because of the new members’ recent history and geographical position they are 
placing considerable emphasis on traditional regional defence, which, at least for the 
time being, the EU is in no position to guarantee. Although the EU is striving to 
develop its activities militarily as well as in other areas of security, the strengthening 
of Europe’s ability to act in line with the current trend (i.e. involvement in crisis 
management outside the EU) will not lead to fundamental changes in this respect. 
The burden of recent history can also be seen in the fact that some of the new 
member states’ security problems originate from unresolved issues resulting from 
Second  World  War  –  issues  that  remained  buried  during  the  Cold  War.  During  the  
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Cold War period, within the Eastern bloc there were officially no mutual claims 
regarding, for instance, border issues or minorities, so it is only now that these are 
being raised. The EU’s emphasis on a more postmodern military approach and related 
tools (such as high technology, rapid action, and autonomous crisis management) are 
not tailored for dealing with such issues. (Raik & Palosaari 2004.) 
 
On the other hand, the significance of hard security in their security concepts makes 
the new members more open and willing to discuss hard security questions, without 
the restrains that many of the current non-aligned/neutral member states have. This 
has been proved, for instance, by the fact that in 2003 all the applicant countries 
(Cyprus and Malta excluded) sent participants to the military operations taking place 
in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although the involvement of the new 
members is relatively small their presence has symbolical significance. Additionally, 
the new member states are more adaptable than many of the old ones with regards to 
being able to take radical steps towards the unification of military capacities and role 
specialisation, the complementation of other countries’ armed forces, and joint 
acquisitions. In addition to the national military reforms now underway, this 
adaptability is also of course a product of limitations set by the economy since 
specialisation and cooperation utilizes limited resources more effectively (Fröhlich 
2004). 
 
These mismatches have either not, however, resulted in any significant opposing 
security argumentation or securitisation moves in the enlargement dialogue. The first 
explanatory factor is that modernisation of the security approach and national security 
strategies had also started in the applicant countries, and followed largely the same 
tendencies as in the Western European countries. Thus at least superficially, in the 
latest national security strategies the new member states seem to have adopted a new, 
modern terminology according to which security policy consists not only of hard, 
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military security but of other dimensions as well67 (for instance, the difference in the 
use of terminology between the Polish Security Strategies from 2000 and 2003 is in 
this sense significant). Secondly, the new members may view the EU’s common 
security and defence policy as a kind of stopgap or safety net that can be used as 
back-up: compared to a re-nationalisation of defence – which might take place if US 
interest in NATO and Central and Eastern Europe declines – the EU cooperation is a 
better alternative (Fröclich 2004). Thirdly, it can be pointed out that in the new 
member states the public is ready to accept EU defence, and these countries have a 
more positive attitude towards dealing with defence matters jointly than the old 
members (Eurobarometer 2003). 
 
Summary of the military sector 
 
The main potential sources of mismatching conceptions in the military sector of 
security include military alignment, and regional and historical factors. The emphasis 
that the applicants put on the NATO integration process implied somewhat 
contradictory perceptions as to the division of labour between the EU and NATO and 
the development of the EU’s military capacity. This did not, however, lead to 
opposing security argumentation in the enlargement dialogue: Military alignment or 
complying with the advancing of EU’s foreign, security and defence politics were not 
securitised during the accession process by applicants or the EU – but the applicants 
have been rather flexible towards common European policies in the military sector. 
Partly this has been due to the nature of the CFSP: it has been unproblematic to 
submit to a policy that has (so far) had no common legislative instruments or caused 
huge financial burden. Furthermore, the modernisation of the national security 
strategies has also decreased the possibilities for mismatches. 
                                               
67 The Concluding chapter of this study will return to the general widening of security strategies and 
concepts, when the all the sectors of security are drawn together. 
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Resulting from the regional and historical factors there are certain characteristics in 
the new members approach to military security which are in discord with the more 
“post-modern” dominant EU approach. Yet these issues were neither cast in the form 
of security speech that would demand exceptional deviations from the “normal” 
integration procedures on the basis that they would cause an existential threat to the 
actors. (Typically for this sector of security, at the same time military issues in 
question nevertheless had an embedded aspect of existential threat.) 
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5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
The main research questions of the study concerned the role of security in the 
integration process and in the enlargement rounds particularly. For the fifth 
enlargement the analysis was deepened by using the sectors of security introduced by 
the Copenhagen School in Buzan et al. 1998. The sectors also provided a way to 
avoid the problems related to geographical classifications or country-by-country 
analysis. From a theoretical perspective the purpose was to contribute to the 
development of constructivist approaches in integration studies by testing the 
applicability of tools of middle-ground constructivist security studies in studying 
integration.  Moreover,  with  the  help  of  this  study  it  could  be  assessed  whether  a  
constructivist approach on integration, along the lines of the Copenhagen School, can 
produce functioning research questions, coherent methodological solutions, and 
plausible answers to the questions presented. In this respect the linking of the results 
of the research to the policy level is important, since the repeated criticism towards 
constructivism in IR relates to the alleged lack of connection to the “real world” (see 
e.g. Moravcsik 2001).68  
 
On the basis of the analysis of the five enlargements of the EC/EU presented in the 
previous chapters, it can be concluded that the enlargements are particularly valuable 
in showing that security has always been present in the European integration process. 
Furthermore, by analysing the different enlargement rounds from a constructivist 
perspective it was possible to verify that the role and quality of security has varied – 
as well as to describe how this variation has taken place. 
 
                                               
68 For another recent attempt to use the Copenhagen School’s framework in studying the fifth 
enlargement see Higashino 2004. Additionally, Schimmelfennig (2003) analyses the fifth 
enlargement from a perspective of “sociological institutionalism”. 
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By looking at the roles, forms, and meanings of security in the context of the 
European integration from Schuman to Solana it can be concluded that the latest 
stages of integration have witnessed a return to the “original” Schumanian logic and 
security concept of the 1950s, in the sense that traditional security arguments with 
links to military security have re-emerged. Although there are significant differences 
between Schuman’s and Solana’s views, the similarities are noteworthy. Currently no 
direct reference is made to the need to prevent further wars between the big European 
states (and consequently world wars), but otherwise the build-up of the EU’s military 
capability is based on comparable argumentation: the EU is seen to have 
responsibility for regional, and even global, security and stability. During the 
duration of the European integration process there has been variation in the 
significance of traditional hard security in the European security construction. The 
traditionally oriented security arguments have lately been used to promote both the 
deepening and widening of integration, but for a long period before that, security 
argumentation that was based on hard security was not valid within the European 
community: military security sector simply did not provide for credible enough 
referent objects, and military security was not a functioning driving force for the 
integration either. 
 
The analysis of the enlargement rounds showed that security arguments have often 
surfaced in the context of enlargements. The conclusion is that this is chiefly because 
security arguments have often been used in giving the widening of integration 
priority over the deepening of integration. The role that security has played in the 
enlargements reflects both the security concepts and the general situations of 
international politics at that time. The second and third enlargement rounds 
particularly showed how economic reasons (i.e. those stated by the Commission) that 
argue against the accession of the candidates were overruled by security arguments 
(by the member states/European Council) that were based on the peaceful 
democratisation and stabilisation of the former military regimes and dictatorships. 
  
 
150 
The analysis of the different enlargement rounds also revealed in what kind of cases 
and under which type of conditions it has been possible to override the then-
membership criteria by referring to security. The development of explicit 
membership criteria has since clearly established limitations to such deliberate 
overriding. The first enlargement took place without any explicit membership 
criteria. While some guidelines were given in the Rome Treaty (1958), the impact 
that the Cold War had on the West-European security perceptions dictated the rest of 
the accession criteria since in practice only the Western European could apply to 
become a member. The second and third enlargements showed that despite the central 
role that economic issues had in the security concept of the EC in the early and mid-
1980s, the economic membership conditions (set by the Commission) were 
discarded. An explanatory factor for this is that the economic criteria did not yet form 
a coherent and well-established set of membership criteria. In the following 
enlargement rounds the situation was in this respect different given that the 
Copenhagen criteria, consisting of political and economic criteria, clearly stated the 
rules of accession. The fourth enlargement round was the first to utilize the 
Copenhagen criteria, but contrary to the fifth enlargement the criteria did not became 
a source of any serious political problems or debate – mainly due to the economic 
preparedness of the accession candidates. 
 
The national security strategies and widening of security 
 
The national security strategies of the applicants have undertaken a major process of 
rearrangement since the end of the Cold War. At least in rhetorical terms the 
difference between the national security strategies and how the EU’s dominant 
security concept is manifested, in the EU’s security strategy (Solana 2003), has been 
decreasing. Consequently, despite the different perceptions concerning the EU’s role 
in hard security conceptually both actors used the basic terminology in congruent 
ways that reflected the general widening of the security concept. Thus, on the surface, 
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the form of the overall security concept of the applicants appeared quite similar to the 
prevailing EU concept: the modern wide security features are explicitly noticeable, as 
the following two examples from the security strategies referred to earlier indicate: 
 
“The Republic of Lithuania perceives its security as preserving its sovereign 
and territorial integrity, internal security and order, democratic foundations, 
economic security of all legal entities and population and protection of its 
natural environment.” (National Security Strategy of Lithuania, 2002.) 
 
“Poland approaches security in a comprehensive manner, taking into account 
the significance and influence of diverse political, military, economic, social, 
environmental, energy-related and other factors.” (Security Strategy of 
Poland, 2000.) 
 
Often the cases where threat perceptions appear to diverge are in the end mainly a 
result of different (national) priority setting. Even if the applicants have tried to 
securitise certain issues, for instance by claiming special rights in the negotiations, 
eventually the majority of such issues has been handled through normal integration 
politics – the subsequent results principally being rather modest transitional periods 
or other such concessions. In such cases the striving of the EU to move certain issues 
to the sphere of integration procedures has not led to either severe political 
controversies or hindrances to the enlargement process.   
 
Mismatches and securitisation attempts in the fifth enlargement round 
 
Nevertheless, this is not to say that there were no controversies at all. By looking at 
the securitisation attempts, cases where issues were cast in the form of security logic 
and security speech, it was possible to locate the cases where mismatches were most 
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significant. In each sector of security there are certain issues that indicate 
mismatching security concepts and which thus will have significant implications for 
the post-enlargement EU security politics.  
 
In the environmental sector the references to common European heritage and shared 
values did not provide a sufficient basis for credible security speech by the EU. This 
was the case even with the most highly prioritised environmental threats. Scientific 
authority and conclusions on nuclear threats are not strongly questioned, yet the 
achieving of political urgency is not fully successful, partly due to the institutional 
and regulatory deficiencies of the EU on this issue. A finding that had particular 
significance to these questions was that while the EU emphasises environmental 
security, its ability and mandate in many environmental issues is in fact rather 
limited. Consequently, arguments related to environment have not played a central 
role in the European integration process, and only rarely has the environment been 
successfully conceptualised as a security question. In the fifth enlargement, however, 
environmental issues, especially those related to nuclear energy, served as a basis for 
arguments that underlined the necessity of the Eastern enlargement. Also the shouts 
for an urgent improvement in nuclear safety had features reminiscent of security 
speech. But the lack of a proper acquis on nuclear safety gave much room for the 
applicants, as well as some other actors, to make countering securitisation attempts. 
These moves were mostly based on the allegedly negative impact of environmental 
security on the national economy (given the legacy of the industrial policies of the 
socialist era, meeting the western environmental standards is not a small task in 
financial terms for the Central and Eastern European countries). These findings also 
supported the theoretical assumption that the environmental security sector is 
generally quite vulnerable to countering security moves. 
 
In the economic sector there were no major contesting securitisation moves 
concerning the basic economic integration principles set by the EU, even though the 
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agricultural questions continue to invoke national counter-securitisation moves. 
Economic growth and stability and economic integration as a source of these values 
have been successfully securitised by the EU. Despite the problems and excessive 
actions that a rapid change to capitalism in the Eastern Europe has caused, the open 
market economy and economic integration, as well as the related norms and 
legislation that the EU promotes and obliges, are generally accepted. Additionally, 
the new member states’ decisions to apply for EU membership were strongly 
motivated by reasons that relate to economic security. Thus in the economic security 
sector the basic premises of the security view are matching. The historical perspective 
on the evolution of the EU’s security concept highlighted the role of the economy and 
showed how economic stability, economic growth, and more recently 
competitiveness, have gained a permanent and institutionalised securitised status. 
Somewhat paradoxically, this has lead to a situation where supranational decision-
making is increasingly perceived as the “normal” way of handling economic issues in 
Europe. Nevertheless, the analysis of the economic security sector indicated that the 
national economy can still be used in constructing security and threats. The case of 
agriculture demonstrated how the European integration process was constructed as a 
threat to a referent object considered nationally vital. Agriculture triggered the use of 
security speech in the membership negotiation process in particular between Poland 
and the EU. Agriculture was presented as an issue which has an extremely important 
role in the Polish national economy, and which is threatened by the integration 
process determined by the EU. Poland also tried to construct the issue as historically 
exceptional, so that the rules applied in the previous enlargements could not be used 
in this case. All in all, the securitisation attempt remained relatively unsuccessful. 
The EU’s countering securitisation move was based on references to the essentiality 
of the EU’s economic rules and economic growth. In the background an assumed link 
between economic growth and EU’s legitimacy could also be observed. 
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In the societal sector European integration has not managed to produce credible 
referent objects. “European identity” does not function as a basis for securitisation. 
The preservation of national identities remains thus an explicit part of the security 
concepts of the new members. This might also reinforce similar, already existing, 
tendencies in the current member states. Yet, although the EU can be presented as a 
threat national identity, attempts to securitise national identity did not gain significant 
success in the enlargement dialogue. This was because the EU accession was not 
plainly perceived as a threat to national identity, but more often as a potential 
construction material for the building of  the  national  identity  in  the  new  member  
countries. In this ongoing rebuilding process the European/Western features are 
considered inherent in the national identities. The Hungarian Status Law and the 
Czech Benes Decrees are examples that show that security argumentation that builds 
on national identity is taking place, but on a different level: horizontal competition 
between neighbouring countries led to cases where the EU reiterated heavily that the 
applicant countries legislation should conform to the EU’s rules, such as those set in 
the antidiscrimination provisions and the EU accession agreement. 
 
In  the  political  sector  the  support  and  legitimacy  of  EU  institutions  and  the  
constitutive idea of European Union were considered initially in the processes that 
resulted in applications for EU membership. By applying for membership the 
applicants recognised the EU as a legitimate political unit, and subsequently 
recognised its political achievements. For the new member states the accession also 
served as recognition of their status as equal and fully European states. No significant 
securitisation attempts were observed that built on the argument that the integration 
process and the “pooling” of sovereignties would seriously threaten state sovereignty. 
Two main reasons for the lack of securitisation in the political sector were identified. 
Firstly, it seems to be possible to simultaneously promote integration and state 
sovereignty. Secondly, although the integration process is clearly challenging the 
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rigid sovereignty concept, the relation of sovereignty and integration remains 
undefined and the related political debate continues.  
 
It can be concluded that in the European context both identities and sovereignty are, 
due to their overlapping and ambiguous nature, too complicated objects to serve as 
the basis for credible and successful securitisation and security-policy making. 
Although the EU can be presented as a threat to both state sovereignty and national 
identity, attempts to securitise these have not gained success in the sense that they 
would threaten or undermine the European integration process.  
 
In the military sector it became clear that the applicants’ view on military security 
differed from the dominant EU concept in the sense that the EU was considered the 
primary solution for problems of economic and social security. This is in contrast to 
the strengthening role that the EU currently places on military security in its 
perception of security. Military security is seen as a way to build credibility in 
international politics, as well as an answer to the challenges posed by the instability 
of the new neighbouring regions. Consequently, in its relationship with NATO, the 
EU’s aspiration has been towards enhancing its capability for autonomous action. 
The applicant countries, however, tended to see the EU membership exclusively in 
terms of soft security, and in reforming their military they emphasised integration to 
NATO rather than to the EU. The different perceptions as to the roles of NATO and 
EU in the military security sector did not lead to serious disputes or securitisation 
attempts in the enlargement dialogue. Moreover, the observed mismatches resulting 
from the regional and historical features of the applicants did not result in any 
significant securitisation moves either. Among the main reasons found for this lack of 
securitisation in the military sector were the easily adoptable intergovernmental 
nature of the CFSP, the modernisation of the national security strategies and policies, 
the perception of ESDP as a safety net in case the US interest on NATO fails, the 
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positive attitude towards military specialisation and unification of military capacities, 
and the relatively favourable public opinion towards common European defence. 
 
Factors that limit securitisation in the context of enlargement 
 
The sector-by-sector analysis also indicated that the factors that limit the possibilities 
of securitisation by the applicants are numerous. In many cases the fundamental 
nature of the limiting factors makes them difficult to overcome, resulting in 
conditions that are thoroughly unsuitable for successful securitisation. By combining 
these findings with the findings from the sectors where securitisation was easier to 
achieve, the following can be concluded about the factors that set the conditions for 
securitisation in the context of enlargement. 
 
In the economic security sector the hindrances to securitisation stem largely from the 
logic of the European integration process. As the historical perspective indicated, 
economic security has had an essential role in the EC/EU’s security concept, and 
issues like economic growth and stability are considered vital for the existence and 
legitimacy of the whole integration process. Credibility and success for such 
argumentation that opposes these referent objects, is almost impossible to gain. 
Furthermore, it can be concluded that when the membership criteria are well defined 
and clear about the obligations of the membership, then the applicants’ possibilities to 
oppose those criteria and claim exceptions to the demands set by them are limited 
from the start, and subsequently securitisation attempts are highly likely to remain 
unsuccessful. This was the case in the economic sector, thanks to the economic 
criteria set clearly in the Copenhagen Criteria. 
 
The  environmental  sector  provided  a  different  case.  From  this  sector  it  can  be  
concluded that the lack of internal political understanding in the EU as well as the 
lack of binding common legislation on a given topic, in this case nuclear safety, 
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results in conditions that are favourable for securitisation by the applicants. Clearly 
for the EU this means that the possibilities for successful securitisation are very 
limited, and the credibility of related claims restricted. The analysis of the political 
and societal sectors suggest, however, that the undefined status of or lack of political 
consensus on an EU issue, the question of European identity, for instance, does not 
alone create a sufficient basis for successful countering securitisation. 
 
Theoretical conclusions and how to develop the constructivist integration approach 
further 
 
This study placed the enlargement process in the frame of constructivist security and 
securitisation theory. It can be concluded that the constructivist approach to studying 
integration that builds on the Copenhagen School’s framework is a successful move 
towards constructivist integration studies. With the help of the theoretical framework 
it was possible to grasp the changing role of security in the European integration 
process as well as show how the dominant security concept of the EC/EU has 
changed during the integration process. Furthermore, by trawling through the security 
sectors and looking for security argumentation it was possible to analyse the 
securitisation attempts and to assess the compatibility (i.e. matches/mismatches) of 
the new member states’ security concepts with that of the EU. 
 
The criticism directed towards the sectors of security in the theoretical debate was 
already handled in chapter 2. From the lessons-learnt in making this study a couple of 
critical remarks can be added. Firstly, it can be noted that focusing on securitisation 
instead of narrowly defined security politics (e.g. military issues, use of force, violent 
conflict and the like) means that “security” can be found in any imaginable sphere of 
politics. The logic of the securitisation theory implies that security politics can be 
made practically everywhere and every actor has the potential to be a security actor –  
by being a “securitiser”. For the analysts this means that the limitation of the research 
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object can be a complex task to overcome, of which success is critically important for 
the whole study. Moreover, the limitation also needs to be supported by other than 
theoretical issues. 
 
Much of the criticism directed towards the Copenhagen School’s theoretical 
framework relates to the political and societal sector (McSweeney 1996; see chapter 
2.1.2). The conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of this study is, however, that 
the Copenhagen School’ framework offered valuable analytical tools for specifying 
the dynamics related to identity and sovereignty. Vertical and horizontal competition, 
as well as the possibility to grasp the way identities can be constructed as security 
objects proved useful in analysing the problematic issues of the accession process. 
Concerning the economic sector, the finding was that even if the analytical ability of 
the Copenhagen framework might be smaller in the economic sector, due to the fact 
that insecurity is a basic characteristic of the market economy, a significant 
contribution of the Copenhagen framework is that it helps to show how the national 
economy can still be used in constructing security and threats.  
 
The rest of this concluding chapter ponders briefly the potential ways to develop 
constructivist integration studies further. When studying the enlargement process 
with the Copenhagen School’s framework one central dilemma arises. The problem is 
that in the current European politics, the defining of “the normal political rules of the 
game” is anything but an unambiguous and simple task. The “normal procedures”, as 
opposed to extraordinary means legitimised by a claim of an existential threat, are a 
constitutive point of departure for the securitisation theory (cf. Buzan et al. 1998, 24). 
The securitisation approach starts from the fundamental assumption that there 
implicitly is a given and established state of normal procedures that is accepted by all 
actors. The analysis of securitisation, counter-securitisation, and desecuritisation 
moves rests on the observation of normal procedures being broken and the arguments 
used to legitimate it. Thus, inevitably, assumptions of the normal political rules of the 
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game are the theoretical backbone of the securitisation analysis. Furthermore, the 
definition of the security concept is based on that. In the context of European politics, 
however, the “normal procedures” currently seem to be in a state of flux. For instance 
traditional inter-state modes of international politics, integration with federalist-
oriented aims, and integration with strong intergovernmental features can be all 
observed simultaneously.  
 
On  the  other  hand,  this  dynamism  can  also  be  read  as  an  advantage  of  the  
constructivist approach since it unfolds the complexity of the state of European 
affairs by pointing out how Europe is on the move, looking for its content, identity, 
and political operating model. Integration is a central factor shaping European 
politics, but labelling it as the sole feature that sets the rules of the “normal” 
European politics would certainly be putting too much emphasis on it. Actually, in 
the literature on European integration various deficiencies in the integration process 
have been presented. Some of those have emphasised the lack of democracy at the 
multinational level, pointing out the structural and ideological problems in creating a 
working form of representative democracy on the European scale. Other explanations 
build on the legitimacy deficit of the European multinational politics (see Banchoff & 
Smith 1999).69 Introducing these questions and perspectives can be interpreted as a 
benefit of the constructivist approach, but at lack of attention given to this point by 
the Copenhagen School is a sign of deficiency rather than of a purposeful move. The 
most salient practical implication of this for the analyst is that the selection of the 
level and perspective of the analysis carries a particular weight. 
 
                                               
69 Banchoff & Smith see, however, that such legitimacy is emerging as an increasing number of 
actors are recognising the EU as a productive arena for pursuing their objectives (Banchoff & Smith 
1999, 2). 
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The current European development trends, that have to some extent blurred the 
meanings of national interest and sovereignty, make the defining the “established 
rules of the game” challenging. The lack of a common understanding between the 
actors of what the normal procedures are leads to a situation where all EU actions 
might often be interpreted as securitisation, that is to say the EU is moving issues out 
of  the  ordinary  public  sphere  and  beyond  normal  politics.  From  the  perspective  of  
(nation) states, the integration process itself might resemble a breaking of the normal 
rules  of  politics,  i.e.  taking  the  issues  outside  the  bounds  of  what  they  see  as  the  
normal political procedure. In this sense all EU actions could be called securitisation. 
The normal, i.e. traditional, procedures of international politics are broken. The 
referent object to be secured would then be the integration itself. The peaceful aim of 
anti-fragmentation and avoiding of wars would thus be achieved by taking issues 
away from state level control. Indeed, this describes quite fittingly the distinctive 
logic of integration, and resembles many traditional integration theories, such as 
federalist and functionalist integration theories. 
 
It is also possible to approach the integration process from a perspective that sees 
integration as a move closely reminiscent of desecuritisation. Consequently, one 
could argue that the conventional practices of international politics resemble more 
“extraordinary measures” (especially if the international system is defined as a state 
of anarchy, like in the realist tradition – what else other than special measures can 
actors take in such an environment?). The integration process could thus be seen as a 
move towards the “real” public sphere and normal decision-making. This view would 
fit in also with such approaches like global democracy theory, human security, and 
transnationalism (Moller 2000). These views, critical to traditional IR and to 
traditional international politics, all seem to argue that the notion of the international 
system as an anarchy where no rules apply and  only sovereign states and their power 
matter, is incorrect and/or to be cast aside. The move is towards a more “normal”, 
  
 
161 
desecuritised state of international politics, where securitised emergency measures no 
longer dominate, but “normal” political procedures apply. 
 
In this  sense from the perspective of  the EU the normal political  sphere in which it  
would want to have the issues handled is the multinational level (international 
subsystem), instead of having those issues securitised by the states (unit level). Thus, 
if one takes the viewpoint of the system level entity EU, integration changes into a 
process that shares the logic of desecuritisation. In some of the latest contributions to 
the theoretical debate on integration studies there have been notions suggesting that 
the specificity of the European integration process lies in the capacity to transform 
high policy fields (i.e. those forming the core of national sovereignty, such as security 
and defence) into normal, low politics (see Ojanen 2002, 8). To put it in blunt 
Copenhagen terms, this is desecuritisation. The EU is making desecuritising 
arguments, i.e. by co-operating we will remove security disputes between ourselves 
from the agenda (cf. Joenniemi & Browning, 2003).70 
 
In their framework the Copenhagen School seems to regard the desecuritised state of 
affairs as the preferred option. In developing a constructivist integration framework, 
however, such in-built assumption should be excluded. It is thus up to the actors of 
the integration process to decide whether they see integration (or “de-integration”) as 
i)  the  preferred  option  or  not,  and  ii)  as  the  normal  state  of  affairs  or  not.  
Consequently, whereas in the constructivist security perspective security means 
moving issues beyond normal politics, in the constructivist integration perspective 
integration means moving issues beyond normal politics or back to normal politics. 
At  the  same  time  this  process  often  tends  to  transform  the  actors’  conception  of  
“normal politics”. 
 
                                               
70 For the links between desecuritisation and the EU’s neighbourhood policies see Palosaari 2001. 
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One option for the use of securitisation theory in integration studies would be to 
reconstruct the whole integration process as an interaction where the ultimate goal is 
to bring securitised national issues into to the sphere of multinational decision-
making procedures. The ability of the EU (or any other form of regional integration) 
to manoeuvre such actions within different sectors and in respect to different objects 
is a practical indicator of the state of the integration process. As soon as the 
integration procedures are accepted as the normal rules applying to certain issues, 
integration will have, from this perspective, reached its peak. In order to analyse the 
quality of integration, attention can be focused on how the interplay of involved 
actors and the logic of argumentation varies in different sectors.  
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